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Abstract 
The thesis offers a critical comparative reading of testimonial literature emergent 
from the Holocaust and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Through 
identifying aspects of thematic and stylistic commonality between these literatures, 
this thesis aims towards establishing a series of narrative traits that characterise the 
testimonial genre. This comparative stance informs the structure of the thesis, in that 
each chapter deals with examples of testimonies emergent from the Holocaust and the 
atomic bombings. 
Chapter one engages with the history of autobiography criticism and genre theory, 
and through close readings of both testimonial and autobiographical works by Primo 
Levi and Elie Wiesel, posits areas of potential difference between the two forms of 
life-writing. The traditional understanding of the autobiographical contract, as 
defined by Philippe Lejeune, is challenged through a comparative analysis of the way 
in which the self is constructed in Holocaust and A-bomb testimonies. 
Chapter two focuses on the narrative challenges posed by the encounter with trauma. 
Informed by structuralist theories of language and critical readings of testimonial 
writing, this chapter examines the way in which the experience of trauma intensifies 
the arbitrary nature of the relationship between language and experience, to the extent 
that language appears to fail. Drawing on Blanchot's theory of the communicative 
possibilities of silence, the thematic and stylistic representation of silence, in its many 
forms, is considered in the context of Holocaust and A-bomb testimonies. 
Chapter three explores the representation of the female experience in testimonial 
texts. Beginning with Cixous' and Irigaray's theories of dcriturefiminine and 
fimininitj as an interpretative lens with which to approach women's narratives, this 
chapter considers the way in which women's testimonies are influenced by both a 
poetics of gender and a poetics of trauma. 
Contents 
Introduction 
Chapter 1: Autobiography, Testimony and the Construction of the Self 
1.1 Introduction: Defining Autobiography, Defining Testimony 14 
1.2 Fragmented Selves: A Comparison of the Testimonial and 22 
Autobiographical Writings of Primo Levi and Elie Wiesel 
1.3 Anonymous Selves: Representing the Hibakusha Experience 51 
Chapter 2: Absence and Presence: The Role of Silence in Testimonial Writing 
2.1 Introduction: Silence and the Limits of Representation 80 
2.2 Absence as Presence in the Holocaust Narrative 84 
2.3 Presence as Absence: Writing the Japanese Experience 114 
Chapter 3: Women's Testimony 
3.1 Introduction: "Masculine Genealogy" and Women's Life Writing 154 
3.2 "Different Horrors, Same Hell: " Women's Experiences in History 162 
3.3 Writing the Female Experience of the Holocaust 171 
3.4 Writing the Female Experience of the A-bomb 202 
Conclusion 221 
Bibliography 229 
Introduction 
There are two events that have marked our century for all times: the 
Shoah and the atomic bomb. These two moments in human history, 
embodied by Auschwitz and Hiroshima, will be the icons of our century. 
(Blumenthal) 
Auschwitz and Hiroshima are often presented as twin nadirs in the history of 
human suffering. They represent unprecedented, if not actually unique, chapters in 
history and thus occupy a privileged position in the revelation of man's inhumanity to 
man. Elie Wiesel establishes a causal relationship between the two events, arguing 
that, "Hiroshima was a consequence of Auschwitz. The world that allowed the murder 
of the Jewish people would eventually not care about the annihilation of a city far 
away" (Future of Remembering 3129). Wiesel, of course, is a well-known advocate of 
the view that the Holocaust is unique, and he is careful to assert that his link between 
Auschwitz and Hiroshima is not a comparison made on historical grounds, but rather 
an acknowledgement that nuclear assault was the inevitable outcome of the amorality 
that made the Holocaust possible. The relationship between Auschwitz and Hiroshima 
as presented by Wiesel and Blumenthal ostensibly offers an initial justification for the 
comparative focus adopted in this thesis. 
However, fashioning the relationship between Auschwitz and Hiroshima in 
such a way that presents them as linked icons of amorality is not unproblematic. John 
Whittier Treat, the first English language literary critic to offer a sustained analysis of 
atomic bomb literature, argues that too often the relationship between these two 
discrete events is invoked casually and without acknowledgement of the historical and 
cultural specificities that divide them. He argues: 
It has been common in writing on the Holocaust to add, perhaps for 
dramatic effect, 'Hiroshima' to the litany of sites illustrating modem 
man's savage treatment of himself. the first atomic bombing, which like 
the death camps should be understood as a model for contemporary 
knowledge, is instead treated as an optional example of some other idea 
typically more colloquial and thus less unsettling (e. g. 'man's inhumanity 
to man'). (Writing Ground Zero 9) 
Treat's concern here is that Hiroshima comes to occupy a supporting role in 
discussions of the Holocaust and suffering; it ftmctions only to emphasise issues made 
apparent by the Holocaust. Somewhat contradicting his assertion that the Auschwitz 
and Hiroshima jointly share a position as "icons of our century, " Blumenthal argues 
that it is the Holocaust alone that represents a "paradigm of suffering. " Other events 
may be discussed in the context of the Holocaust - Blumenthal suggests the Armenian 
genocide, slavery and the killing fields of Cambodia amongst others as examples - but 
they are most emphatically "not the Shoah" (Blumenthal). Mfflst not arguing for the 
'uniqueness' of Hiroshima, Treat objects to the use of Hiroshima as a comparative 
example rather than it being acknowledged as a paradigmatic event in the same way 
as the Holocaust. 
A further objection Treat has to Wiesel's and Blumenthal's understanding of 
the relationship between the Holocaust and the atomic bombings is their use of the 
words 'Auschwitz' and 'Hiroshima. ' He suggests that these terms have transcended 
their historical realities as an extermination camp and a bombed city, and are regarded 
as "no longer merely places but ideas, tropes of a new fact within the human 
condition: a condition compromised by our ability, in a matter of respective hours and 
seconds, to eliminate whole ghettos and cities of people" (Writing Ground Zero 9). 
The connection between the two events is thus established purely on a philosophical, 
contemplative level, which potentially jeopardises our appreciation of the Holocaust 
and the atomic bombings as real events in history. Just as the term 'Auschwitz' masks 
the multitude of different experiences of Holocaust victims, so the term 'Hiroshima' 
tends to obscure the fact that two cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were targeted for 
nuclear attack. Although the bombing of both cities marked the entrance into an age 
of nuclear warfare, the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki cannot be considered to be 
the same. The uranium bomb known as "Little Boy" was dropped on Hiroshima at 
8.15arn on August 6. Hiroshima was completely devastated, by both the initial impact 
of the bomb and also by the intense fire that subsequently raged through the city. 
Ironically, an all-clear siren had been sounded in the city fifteen minutes before the 
attack, and so the majority of people in Hiroshima were occupied with their daily 
activities in the home and at work when the bomb was dropped. Whilst casualty 
figures have never been satisfactorily confirmed, it is estimated that 59% of the 
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population were killed in the attack. In Nagasaki, the situation was somewhat 
different. Nagasaki was, in fact, not the intended target for the second bomb, a 
plutonium bomb known as "Fat Man". The original target was Kokura, a city about 90 
miles away from Nagasaki, but low visibility over Kokura on August 9 1945 led to the 
bombing-run pilot being given a command to fly on to Nagasaki. In contrast to the 
total annihilation of Hiroshima, Nagasaki was only partially destroyed, and a minority 
of the population lost their lives. Even so, estimated casualty figures place the loss of 
life between 21,762 (Nagasaki Prefecture Report, 1945) and 73,884 (A-bomb 
Records Preservation Committee, 1949). 1 Precisely because the terms "Hiroshima" 
and "Auschwitz" function as synecdoches and so threaten to elide historical 
specificities, I have used the terms "Holocausf 'and "atomic bombings" throughout 
this thesis. If testimonial writing is to be recognised as the narrative representation of 
experience, then the precise historical provenance of a text assumes significance. The 
use of synechdochic terminology, then, potentially threatens not only historical 
understandings of each event, but also the literary analysis of emergent eye-witness 
accounts. 
Treat's identification of both the Holocaust and the atomic bombings as 
paradigmatic events in the history of human kind inevitably invokes the spectre of 
uniqueness, which haunts discussions of the Holocaust in particular. The claim that 
the Holocaust is historically unique has formed a cornerstone of Holocaust 
remembrance and scholarship. Whilst having always been a fundamental aspect of 
Holocaust awareness, the issue of uniqueness was foregrounded in the 1986 
Historikerstreit, or historians' debate, which regarded the singularity or otherwise of 
the Holocaust as central to efforts to historicise the German past. Right-wing 
intentionalist historians disparaged the claim for uniqueness, by arguing that although 
the event was certainly unique in German history, it was not to be regarded as a 
peculiarly singular regime, for it had echoes and reflections in other totalitarian states, 
particularly in Stalinist Russia. Conversely, left-wing functionalists feared that to 
adopt this historical perspective, and enter into comparison, would result in 
1 Casualty statistics for both Hiroshima and Nagasaki vary tremendously, depending on both the time 
at which the data was collected, and the authority which conducted the surveys. A full comparative 
account of the different suggested death tolls can be found in: Committee for the Compilation of 
Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical and Social Effects of The Atomic Bombing (see bibliography for 
publication details. ) 
3 
diminishing the true horrors of the Nazi regime. Eberhard Jdckel's often-quoted 
response strongly asserts the justification of the claim for uniqueness. He wrote: 
The Nazi extermination of the Jews was unique because never before had 
a state, under the responsible authority of its leader; decided and 
announced that a specific group of human beings, including the old, the 
women, the children and the infants, would be killed to the very last one, 
and implemented this decision with all the means at its disposal. (76) 
However, in retrospect, despite the heated nature of the debate, the value of the 
Historikerstreit does not lie in the unearthing of any new historical insights or radical 
theory. The real significance of the debate was the attention that it brought to the 
project of historicising and remembering the past. The claim that the Holocaust is 
unique is problematic; indeed, it is a logically misleading statement. Every historical 
event is unique in its time and place with its own specific features, which excludes it 
from direct comparison with any other historical moment. In fact, as Norman 
Finkelstein has argued, it could be suggested that the uniqueness of the Holocaust is 
that it holds its historical singularity to be a distinguishing feature. (Finkelstein) 
Indeed, this claim for uniqueness is notably absent in the context of atomic 
bomb remembrance. Whilst there are occasional testimonial voices which call for the 
recognition of the atomic bombings as unique (most notably from Ota Y6ko), the 
comparison with the Holocaust in particular has been embraced by the memorial 
discourse of the atomic bombings. Ian Buruma suggests that the comparison between 
the Holocaust and the atomic bombings is "officially condoned" in Japan (108), 
pointing to the founding of the Auschwitz-Hiroshima Committee and the proposal to 
build a Holocaust memorial near to the city of Hiroshima as evidence of this sanction 
(92). There is a Holocaust Education Centre located in Tokyo, and the Japanese 
Holocaust Centre in Fukuyama, forty-five minutes away from Hiroshima. Yet this 
linking of the atomic bombings with the Holocaust has been challenged as a 
misrepresentation of Japan's history. The connection between the atomic bombings 
and the Nazi persecutions in Europe both contributes to and emphasises a Japanese 
wartime discourse that identifies the Japanese solely as victims of atrocity. Lisa 
Yoneyama points out that Japanese memory of the war is dominated by A-bomb 
remembrance which has led to "a national victimology and phantasm of innocence 
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[developed] throughout most of the post war years" (13). By centralising the 
experience of the atomic bombings, Yoneyama argues that Japan recognises itself as a 
victimised nation, and so creates a wartime memorial discourse which excludes 
Japan's history as an imperial aggressor. Indeed, the notorious "textbook trial" which 
ran from 1965 until 1993 demonstrates the extent to which atrocities committed by the 
Japanese in Asia were excised from the collective memory of the war. In 1952, 
Japanese historian Ienaga Saburo wrote a textbook for use in secondary schools which 
offered a detailed account of Japanese atrocities, including the Unit 731 medical 
experiments on Chinese civilians carried out by Japanese Imperial Army medics 
between 1942 and 1945, and the so-called "comfort women" forced into military 
brothels. The Ministry of Education disapproved of Ienaga's representation of 
Japanese wartime history, and demanded that he rewrite it, omitting any references to 
Japanese atrocities. Ienaga initially complied and submitted a revised version of his 
book in 1962, but the Ministry of Education maintained that it still had a disagreeably 
anti-Japanese tone to it, and demanded a further revision. Frustrated by this decision, 
Ienaga decided to sue the government on the grounds of unconstitutional censorship. 
The case first came to court in 1970, and the judge found in favour of lenaga. 
However, following an appeal made by the Ministry of Education in 1974, this 
decision was reversed. Subsequent appeals throughout the 1970s and 1980s resulted in 
rulings which accepted that the Ministry of Education was over-zealous in its 
censorship of Japanese history, but that it had not acted unconstitutionally. Ienaga 
took his case to court for a final time in 1992 - and lost once again. However, a year 
later, the Tokyo High Court reversed the 1992 decision and ruled that censorship of 
Japanese wartime atrocities was unconstitutional. Yet, writing in 1999, Yoneyama 
asserts that despite an official recognition of Japanese atrocities, A-bomb 
remembrance is still dominant in a Japanese wartime memory that identifies all 
Japanese as victims. The link between the atomic bombings and the Holocaust serves 
to bolster this perception. 
Problematically, then, the claims for both uniqueness and comparison are 
revealed to be flawed. Yet discussions in this area centre primarily on the grounds of 
the historical (non)-relation between the Holocaust and the atomic bombings. As a 
critical comparison of the testimonial literature emergent from these events, this thesis 
represents a departure from this historical perspective. However, as Treat 
acknowledges, "the atomic bombings and the Nazi atrocities differ in significant 
historical ways that have determined that their literatures would be different as Well" 
(Writing Ground Zero 14). Therefore, prior to embarking upon a literary analysis of 
testimonial accounts of these atrocities, it is necessary to explore in more detail these 
arguments for uniqueness and comparison. 
Historical and Literary Contexts: Exploring Uniqueness and Comparison 
The claim for historical uniqueness is troublesome from the perspective of the 
literary critic. Its ubiquity in Holocaust studies has arguably hindered the 
development of comparative literary studies in particular. There is a risk that the 
emphasis on the historical uniqueness of the event will be translated into a false 
assumption that by virtue of the subject, any representation of the event must be 
considered as unique. This restrictive critical philosophy makes it taboo to compare 
Holocaust literature with any other form of literature, as it is tantamount to 
comparing, and thereby potentially trivialising, the historical event itself. Certainly, 
this taboo has problematised previous attempts at comparative literary studies, a key 
example being Sheng-Mei Ma's "Contrasting Two Survival Literatures: On the 
Jewish Holocaust and The Chinese Cultural Revolution. " 
Written in 1987, Ma's paper represents one of the earlier attempts to compare 
Holocaust literature with that emergent from another atrocity. His selection of these 
two events for comparison is based on the understanding that they are both examples 
of mass murder in the twentieth century that gave rise to a large body of survivor 
narratives. However, Ma's comparative approach is hampered by his adherence to the 
credo that the Holocaust is unique. "The Holocaust, " he argues, "is understood as an 
incomparable event and the literature that describes it is unique" (82). In contrast, he 
suggests that the Chinese interpret the Cultural Revolution as "only one of many 
violent waves in the ceaseless tides of Chinese civilisation. It represents less of an 
independent and devastating watershed than an inevitable twist in the cycle of time, 
in which peace and chaos succeed and generate each other" (82). Ma's insistence on 
the uniqueness of both Holocaust history and literature frustrates his attempt at 
comparison, and he concedes that "little similarity can be found between them" (8 1). 
In contrast to the approach taken in this thesis, Ma focuses exclusively on the 
differences between these literatures. My concern here is to focus not only on 
difference, but also on commonalities between the literary responses to the atrocities 
of the Holocaust and the atomic bombings. Whilst maintaining an awareness of the 
historical specificities of each event which inevitably condition the nature of 
testimonial responses to a certain extent, I argue that these eye-witness narratives 
reveal points of similarity in their responses to atrocity. 
As the assertion of historical uniqueness potentially j eopardises the possibility 
of comparative literary study, it is appropriate to preface the forthcoming chapters 
with an interrogation of some of these claims for uniqueness, with a focus on 
historical coincidence between the Holocaust and the atomic bombings. 
The historical uniqueness of the Holocaust in comparison to other events in 
history is still frequently debated. Some of the more recent significant works in this 
field include a collection of essays, entitled Is the Holocaust Unique? Perspectives on 
Comparative Genocide. Edited by Alan Rosenbaum, this book includes essays that 
consider the uniqueness of the Holocaust in comparison to African American slavery, 
the Armenian Genocide, the Stalinist Terror and wartime Japanese atrocities. The 
Holocaust: The Unique and the Universal is a collection of essays which once again 
deals with questions of uniqueness and comparison, including considerations of the 
theological uniqueness of the Holocaust. In Rethinking the Holocaustl Yehuda Bauer 
devotes an entire chapter to "Comparisons with other Genocides, " before reaching the 
conclusion that the Holocaust is uniquely unprecedented (39-67). For Bauer, the 
central aspect of this claim for uniqueness is the "Nazi racial antisemitic ideology" 
(44). It this ideology which conditions both the motivation behind, and the 
implementation of, the genocide in Europe. In "Political Functions of Genocide 
Comparisons, " Helen Fein has eloquently discussed the ideological politics that lie 
behind comparing the Holocaust to other atrocities, with particular reference to the 
Armenian genocide, the Khmer Rouge, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the 
Stalinist Gulags. 
In the context of the atomic bombings, there are significant historical parallels 
to be drawn in relation to the Holocaust. The most notable, of course, is their shared 
reliance on what Lifton has referred to as "technologies of murder, " for it was the 
technological advances in the modem age that made these atrocities possible in a way 
which would have been inconceivable even fifty years earlier (qtd. in Treat, Writing 
Ground Zero 9). However, whilst the manifestation of these atrocities was grounded 
in technological progress, care must be taken not to overstate the significance of 
technological advances when considering the underlying motivational factors behind 
the Holocaust and the atomic bombings. As Berel Lang points out, the absence of 
such technology would not necessarily have averted the catastrophes. Yet at the same 
time, they could not have happened as they did without such technological 
developments. "The argument presented, " Lang explains, "is not that genocide and 
omnicide have followed necessarily from the advances of technology, only that there 
is a material and conceptual connection between the two lines" (Genocide and 
Omnicide 120). 
A further point to consider is that neither the Holocaust nor the atomic 
bombings could have taken place without full governmental complicity, and without 
a strong bureaucratic framework to support their implementation. Certainly, the 
dropping of the atomic bombs would not have been possible without the mutual 
cooperation of scientists, military strategists and politicians. For Zygmunt Bauman, 
the Holocaust was "clearly unthinkable without such bureaucracy" (17). It is this 
feature that identifies the Holocaust, and equally the atomic bombings, as events 
concomitant with the modem world. 
Both the Holocaust and the atomic bombings were made possible by 
depersonalisation; the development of the gas chambers enabled the SS and other 
Nazis to perform acts of mass murder without suffering the psychological damage 
incurred through individual shootings, and the killing of over half the population of a 
city by a pilot in an aircraft high above. Both also depersonalised death, as any 
mourning for the loss of an individual became lost in a mass bereavement for whole 
families, whole communities and a whole way of life. 
Yet it would be inaccurate, and damaging to the memorialisation of each 
event, not to acknowledge the factual specificities which were exclusive to both the 
Holocaust and the dropping of the A-bomb. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
experience of every survivor of each event was different in some way, there were 
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major distinctions between the two, most significantly the aim of the perpetrators. 
The aim of the Nazis in the Holocaust was genocide, which led to a stepping up of the 
murders, even when Germany was losing the war. Conversely, the dropping of the 
bomb on Hiroshima was rationalised as a way actually to save lives, as the casualties, 
both civilian and military, during the Pacific War were so immense. Indeed, in a 
newspaper interview conducted to commemorate the anniversary of the dropping of 
the bomb, Paul Tibbets, pilot of the Enold Gay, said: 
I knew we did the right thing because when I knew we'd be doing that I 
thought, yes, we're going to kill a lot of people, but by God we're going 
to save a lot of lives. 
We won't have to invade [Japan]. (Tibbets 4) 
Of civilians caught in the crossfire of any war, he remarked, "That's their 
tough luck for being there" (4). Tibbets' comments are informed by an extremely 
prejudicial perception of ethnicity. Official estimates place the number of dead in 
Hiroshima between 32,000 and 133,000; it is difficult to reconcile these figures with 
Tibbets' view that "by God we're going to save a lot of lives". Implicit in his 
statement is that the lives saved are those of Allied troops, rather than Japanese 
(civilian as well as military) lives. The view that the atomic bombing was necessary 
to bring an end to the war still holds currency in some circles today. Buruma, for 
example, asserts that whilst "there can be no justification for Auschwitz unless one 
believes in Hitler's murderous ideology, the case for Hiroshima is at least open for 
debate" (105). Yet military analysis of the event contradicts this claim. The 1946 US 
Strategic Bombing Survey concluded: 
Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the 
testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's 
opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability 
prior to I November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the 
atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the 
war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated. (qtd. in 
Treat, Writing Ground Zero 7) 
However, whilst acknowledging the role of perceptions of ethnicity in the dropping 
of the bomb, it is important to maintain the distinction between this and the 
motivation behind the Holocaust, to acknowledge the difference between a 
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militaristic strategy influenced by ethnic discrimination, and a genocidal strategy 
predicated solely on ethnicity. 
Comparing Literatures 
The focus of this thesis, however, is to examine the claim for uniqueness not 
from a historical perspective, but from the point of view of the literary critic. The 
comparative approach to testimonial literature has few precedents; a specific 
comparison between Holocaust and A-bomb testimonies as considered in this thesis, 
even fewer. In addition to Ma's thwarted attempt at comparing Holocaust survival 
literatures with those from the Chinese Cultural Revolution as mentioned above, Kelly 
Oliver has posited a comparison between Holocaust testimony and African-American 
slavery narratives. However, her basis for comparison does not focus on the narrative 
strategies employed by testimonial authors, and explores instead aspects of shared 
authorial motivation. She argues that: 
Testimonies from the Holocaust and slavery do not merely articulate a 
demand to be recognised or to be seen. Rather, they witness to pathos 
beyond recognition. The victims of oppression, slavery and torture are 
not merely seeking visibility and recognition, but they are also seeking 
witnesses to horrors beyond recognition. (78) 
For Oliver, it is the shared need to 'tell the tale' that allows for a comparative reading 
of these texts. Chapter two of this thesis, "Absence and Presence: The Role of Silence 
in Testimonial Writing, " identifies this narrative impulse as a site of commonality 
between Holocaust and A-bomb testimonies. However, for both hibakusha (A-bomb 
survivors) and Holocaust survivors, this urge to "tell the tale" is compromised by their 
shared inability to express their experiences of atrocity in narrative form. Chapter two 
focuses on interpretations of the "unrepresentable" nature of the experience of 
atrocity; of the way in which language is perceived to fail as a tool of communication 
in these narratives, and the subsequent utilisation of silence, in its many different 
forms, as a form of expression. 
A-bomb literature has also been the subject of previous comparative readings. 
Ernestine Schlant and IT. Rimer co-authored Legacies and AmbiRuities: Postwar 
Fiction and Culture in West Germany and Japan, a book which dealt with A-bomb 
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literature and post-war German literature. However, in contrast to this thesis, they 
focussed exclusively on works of fiction, and shied away from any direct comparative 
readings of these two literatures. Inspired by Schlant and Rimer's approach, Reiko 
Tachibana's Narrative as Counter-Memory: A Half-Century of Postwar Writing i 
Germany and Japan focuses on the similarities and differences between genbaku 
bungaku ('atomic bomb literature') and the Trammerliteratur (Tterature of the 
rubble') of post-war Germany, exploring both testimonial and fictional works. 
Tachibana's comparative approach to these literatures is rooted in the fact that they 
both represent a response to the national and individual trauma of defeat in WWII. 
Buruma has also commented on this relationship between A-bomb literature and 
Thimmerliteratur, noting that these texts are commonly characterised by a tone of 
nihilistic despair (47-68). 
However, little critical attention has been focussed on comparative approaches 
to testimonial literature emergent from the Holocaust and the atomic bombings. 
Robert Jay Lifton concludes his book Death in Life: The Survivors of Hiroshima with 
a discussion of creative responses to the A-bomb, in which he acknowledges that both 
A-bomb and Holocaust writers confront shared problems when trying to narrate their 
experiences of atrocity, but as a psychologist/historian his interest in literature is 
restricted to the way in which it reveals the psychology of survival. Writing 
exclusively on A-bomb testimonies from a literary perspective, in Writing From 
Ground Zero, Treat acknowledges his debt to critics of Holocaust testimonies, in 
particular Lawrence Langer, who provided him with a basic conceptual framework 
with which to approach testimonial narratives. In common with Lifton, Treat 
comments briefly on the fact that A-bomb and Holocaust writers share the problem of 
trying to represent the unrepresentable in their narratives. However, whilst both Lifton 
and Treat comment briefly on a potential relationship between A-bomb and Holocaust 
testimonies, neither follows this through with a comparative exploration of specific 
examples. 
The specific scholastic contribution made by this thesis is then, as the title 
suggests, to develop a comparative analytical approach to eye-witness narratives 
emergent from the Holocaust and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
By drawing on the work of Treat and Lifton who have made gestures towards such a 
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comparison, this thesis offers the first sustained analysis of thematic and stylistic 
commonalities present in these testimonial narratives. This focus has influenced the 
structuring of the material herein, in that each chapter addresses both Holocaust and 
A-bomb testimonies. Through exploring narratives from each event from a common 
perspective, (the representation of the self in chapter one, narrative strategies in 
chapter two, and an exploration of women's narratives in chapter three) points of 
convergence and divergence between Holocaust and A-bomb testimonies can be more 
clearly identified. 
Recognising Testimony 
The primary concern of this thesis is to identify points of commonality (and 
difference) between A-bomb and Holocaust eye-witness accounts, and in so doing 
move towards a clearer understanding of what constitutes a testimonial genre. This 
focus on a comparison of narratives represents a significant departure from previous 
comparative approaches as outlined above, which consider the relationship between 
the Holocaust and atomic bombings from primarily historical and philosophical 
perspectives. 
The recognition of testimony as a distinct genre in its own right forms the 
basis of chapter one. The attempt to distinguish between autobiographical and 
testimonial modes of writing informs the choice of texts in the analysis of Holocaust 
testimonies. Both Primo Levi and Elie Wiesel have authored works which I argue can 
be compared in such a way as to reveal autobiographical and testimonial ways of 
emplotting the history of the self. The question as to what constitutes testimonial 
writing is also brought to the forefront by an exploration of the A-bomb eye-witness 
accounts collected in The Witness of Those Two Days. Each account is very brief and 
anonymously authored, and they arguably bear few of the stylistic hallmarks that have 
come to be identified as typical of testimonial writing through an analysis of 
Holocaust narratives. Their inclusion, therefore, potentially challenges the tentative 
assumptions that have been made about the testimonial genre. Such brief accounts are 
actually quite characteristic of A-bomb testimonies, as many were written primarily in 
order to support applications for medical or financial aid in the austere post-war years. 
This motivation again adds another dimension to what it means to write testimoniallY. 
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There is a relative paucity of atomic bomb accounts compared to those dealing 
with the Holocaust, and even fewer that lend themselves to sustained literary 
criticism. This problem is intensified for non-Japanese speaking scholars, as 
comparatively few accounts are available in translation. This could be one reason why 
atomic bomb literature is currently quite neglected outside of Japan. Certainly there 
are very few critical works that focus on A-bomb testimonies from a literary 
perspective, the notable exception, of course, being Treat's Writing Ground Zero. My 
aim with this thesis is to contribute towards rectifying this problem. In addition to a 
lack of literary criticism, my research has suggested that the history of the atomic 
bomb, particularly in terms of its aftermath, is largely unfamiliar in the West. 
Available historical accounts tend to focus primarily on the act of dropping the bomb; 
history is therefore written from the perspective of the perpetrator rather than the 
victim, a markedly different approach to that taken with Holocaust studies. For this 
reason, I have provided relevant historical contextualisation for many of the A-bomb 
narratives discussed. 
When referencing the texts by Japanese authors discussed in this thesis, I have 
adopted the Japanese convention, and placed surname prior to first name. 
Autobiography as a generic term is widely accepted to cover a wide variety of 
subsets of life-writing. In the attempt to identify testimony as a genre it becomes 
apparent that there are distinctions between different forms of testimonial writing and 
it is this that informs the discussion in chapter three on women's narratives as 
potentially stylistically and thematically distinct from those authored by men. 
Through a critical comparison of testimonial literatures emergent from the 
Holocaust and the atomic bombings, it is hoped that the understanding of testimony as 
a distinct genre will be furthered. 
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Chapter I 
Autobiograph-v, Testimony and Constructions of the Self 
The act of autobiographical storytelling constructs and in fact, 
constitutes the self. (Lear and Sharrad vii) 
1.1 Introduction: Defining Autobiography, Defining Testimony 
The latter decades of the twentieth century have seen a noticeable increase in 
interest in life writing and texts that deal with self-representation, resulting in a 
literary phenomenon that Leigh Gilmore has termed as the "memoir boom" (1). In 
support of this, Gilmore has pointed to the increased popular and scholarly interest in 
autobiographical literature of all kinds. Yet the very term "autobiographical 
literature", however broadly applied, is misleading in its suggestion of a stylistic 
and/or thematic homogeneity inherent in all forms of narrative self-representation; 
testimony, memoir, diary, autobiography to name but a few examples. Identifying 
each of these forms as either distinct subsets of autobiographical literature, or even as 
separate literary genres in their own right is, however, complicated by the fact that the 
term "autobiography" itself does not offer a fixed definition of genre. As James 
Olney astutely observes, "everyone knows what autobiography is, but no two 
observers, however assured they may be, are in agreement" (7). 
Etymologically, the term "autobiography" stems from the Greek 
autosIbiosIgraphe, meaning self/life/writing, and critical interpretation of what 
constitutes autobiography is dependent upon the relative significance ascribed to each 
of these components. Leigh Gilmore defines the traditional interpretation of 
autobiography as a "discourse of self representation", which "features a rational and 
representative 'F at its center" (2). Indeed, Roy Pascal, writing in 1960, argues that it 
is the presence of the "I", of a coherent sense of the self, that separates autobiography 
from other forms of life writing: "in the autobiography proper, attention is focussed 
on the self, in the memoir or reminiscence on others" (5). Explicit in both Gilmore's 
and Pascal's definitions is an assumption of a pre-existing narrating self which 
provides a solid (if not always reliable) perspective from which the story of the life, 
or bios can be narrated. This traditional focus on the bios aspect of autobiography has 
created a narrow definition of who may participate in autobiographical practice. 
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Georges Gusdorf s now strongly criticised interpretation of autobiography presents it 
as a product of Western Enlighterunent culture, and the preserve only of those who 
are sufficiently developed to arrive at a consciousness of self and an awareness of 
their place in history. In this context, the autobiographical subject should have a story 
worth telling, a bios that reflects and contributes to a sense of historical significance. 
In his defence of this restricted eligibility for autobiographical practice, Pascal 
explains that: 
Autobiography means [ ... ] discrimination and selection in face of the 
endless complexity of life [ ... ] everything depends on the standpoint 
chosen; and it is clear that the more arbitrary the standpoint, the 
greater is the likelihood that the autobiography will be one-sided, 
blinkered or downright false. This is the reason, I believe, why the best 
autobiographies are written by men and women of outstanding 
achievement in life. Their standpoint is not as it were chosen by them 
[ ... ]: 
it is there, the indubitable result of their life's work, often 
acknowledged publicly, but at any rate for them the concrete reality of 
the meaning of their life. (10) 
In Pascal's bios-centred perspective, the value of the autos appears to be dependent 
upon the acts and the achievements of the individual. The way in which the autos is 
represented in the text is apparently the product of the "standpoint" or perspective 
from which the story of the bios is told: the self could be represented in a multitude of 
different ways depending upon which aspects of the bios are emphasised or omitted. 
The bios also influences the quality of the narrative and as such lies at the heart of 
autobiographical literature. Whilst it would be overly simplistic to categorise all early 
autobiographical criticism as bios-centric, and contemporary criticism as autos- 
centric, there has been, as James Olney has noted, a significant "shift of attention 
from bios to autos - from the life to the self' (19) and it is no coincidence that a 
scholarly interest in testimony has accompanied this. Addressing the self, the "I", as 
the most significant element within the autobiographical trinity allows for a wider 
qualification of what constitutes autobiographical literature and admits discussion of 
trauma narratives. The majority of trauma narrative authors cannot be considered to 
have reached "outstanding achievement" in Pascal's sense, and thus the focus on bios 
excludes them for consideration in the canon of autobiographical writing. Through 
shifting the critical emphasis from bios to autos, Pascal's autobiographical 
prerequisite is removed, thereby broadening the autobiographical canon and 
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pennitting an exploration of texts by authors who have been historically marginalised 
by their failure to satisfy the narrow requirements of bios-centred autobiographical 
works. 
A singular focus on autos, however, does not necessarily open pathways into 
the critical analysis of testimony. Indeed, Bella Brodzki argues that the defining 
feature of testimony is that it "tests the prescriptive and descriptive boundaries of the 
autobiographical genre by presenting extreme-limit cases of what could constitute 
self/life/writing" (870). When self-representation encounters the experience of 
trauma, singular approaches to a definition of autobiographical writing which focus 
on only one aspect of autoslbioslgraphe compromise a full analytical appreciation of 
the text. More helpful is Sidonie Smith's approach, which rejects placing a focus on 
simply one constituent part of autobiographical writing. This approach masks what is 
actually a symbiotic relationship between autos, bios, and graphe. It is this combined 
approach that is particularly appropriate for the critical study of testimony as a genre 
distinct from autobiography. Smith contests the view that there is an inherent 
autonomous self which can offer a narratorial account of the bios. In fact, Smith 
notes, "there is no essential, original, coherent autobiographical self before the 
moment of self-narration" (Performativity 1); the "I" comes into existence only 
through the narrative process of self representation. If the construction of the self is 
to be perceived as a narrative act, then the mode of narration is key to the way in 
which the self is portrayed. 
When looking at personal accounts of the Holocaust and the atomic 
bombings, however, the precise mode of this narration is under question. Writing of 
Holocaust testimonies, Lawrence L. Langer makes the point that: 
Tragedy as a literary form offered catharsis to men contemplating with 
pity and terror the image of their own mortality; but we have not yet 
discovered a form to fuse six million deaths into a reflection of our 
destiny in the modem era. (Divided Voice 34) 
Here, Langer is implicitly positing a distinction between literary traditions of tragedy 
and trauma. Classical catharsis offers the prospect of an end to a tragedy; through the 
literary articulation of pain, grief and terror, recovery is made possible. The 
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experience of trauma, on the other hand, is frequently characterised by the fact that it 
is unending; the impossibility of bearing witness to the reality of trauma through 
literary expression recurs throughout trauma narratives. The experience of trauma 
thus denies the possibility of catharsis. If the experience of trauma cannot be 
adequately dealt wi th using classical modes of cathartic writing then, Langer 
concludes, the development of a new form of writing is necessitated. 
The term most commonly used to describe this new form is "testimony", and 
a primary concern of this chapter will be to establish exactly what defines this mode 
of narration and distinguishes it from other forms of literature. The ambiguity 
surrounding the definition of this genre lends credence to Shoshana Felman's 
interpretation of the problems associated with regarding testimony as a literary genre. 
She acknowledges that whilst "testimony has become a crucial mode of our relation 
to the events of our times ... .. the more closely we look at texts, the more they show us 
that unwittingly, we do not even know what testimony is and that, in any case, it is 
not simply what we thought it was" (Felman and Laub 5,7). The OED offers the 
definition that a testimony is " I. a statement under oath or affirmation. 2. a 
declaration or statement of fact. " Whilst this is undeniably a defining feature of 
testimonial writings, especially when individual testimony is considered in the 
context of the valuable role it played in post-war prosecutions (most significantly in 
the 1961 Eichman trial in Israel ), the OED's definition is complicated by 
contemporary understandings of factuality, and the potentially compromising 
relationship between factual authenticity and individual memory and recollection. Yet 
the style of legal testimony is often considered to be the appropriate stylisic pattern 
for literary testimony. Indeed, in his foreword to Filip MUller's testimony Eyewitness 
Auschwitz: Three Years in the Gas Chambers, Yehuda Bauer commends the plain 
and factual style of the narrative and in so doing distinguishes clearly between 
testimony and art: "he tells his story in a simple, straightforward language. There is 
no embellishment, no deviation. This is not a work of art. It is a testimony" (MUller 
ix). 
Attempts to define the characteristics of testimony which distinguish it as a 
genre separate from other forms of autobiographical writing have usually centred 
around Holocaust narratives. Critics have repeatedly made attempts to identify 
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features which distinguish personal accounts of the Holocaust from other forms of 
autobiography. Lawrence L. Langer suggests that the primary difference lies in the 
fact that "the content of a written survivor memoir may be more harrowing and 
gruesome than most autobiographies, " but that the narrative features, such as 
chronology, description and characterisation remain the same (Holocaust Testimonies 
41). Mirna Cicioni concurs with Langer, noting that whilst Holocaust narratives may 
detail horrific events, they nevertheless conform to conventional linear chronology: 
Most memoirs, however, have similar structures in that they describe 
the same sequence of events (arrest, journey to the camp, arrival, 
initiation, conditions, liberation). (26) 
Robert Eaglestone, however, contests this, arguing that: 
whilst most testimony narratives follow an autobiographical 
chronology, several have moments where the flow of the narrative 
stops and the text, in its style and content becomes 'historical', 
offering descriptive history or reportage. (119) 
This form of disruption in chronology, style and genre is frequent; Primo, Levi often 
interrupts his accounts of his Holocaust experiences in If This is a Man with attempts 
to interpret his experiences, drawing on both philosophical and scientific theories. In 
Landscapes of Memory: A Holocaust Girlhood Remembered, Ruth KlOger blends the 
story of her wartime childhood with vignettes from her adult life and feminist 
ideology which she uses as a tool to understand her experiences. Charlotte Delbo, a 
French political prisoner in Auschwitz, deliberately abandons simple chronology in 
Auschwitz and After, creating a very self-consciously styled text, fragmented in 
structure and jumping in style from straightforward first-person prose chapters, to 
challenging poetic interludes, to seemingly detached (although not dispassionate) 
observations, to non-contextualised isolated passages of dialogue. Lea Wemick 
Fridman suggests that Delbo makes a "technical and philosophical choice to scrap 
narrative or story" (112), but it is more complicated than this. Delbo is not eschewing 
narrative, but rather employing the literary device of fragmenting her narrative to 
mirror the chaos of her experience. This is a deviation from "normal" 
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autobiographical practice which seeks to impose order and coherency on the 
uncertainty and disorder of real life experience! 
Although directly referring to accounts of the Holocaust, many of these 
features, which together begin to form a style that can be defined as specifically 
common to testimonial writing, can also be identified in experiential accounts of the 
2 
atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. John Whittier Treat suggests that 
"testimonial literature is the earliest and still most voluminous genre of atomic bomb 
literature" (Writing Ground Zero 49), and whilst it is important to maintain an 
awareness of the historical specificity of each event, it is possible to identify 
likenesses in the structures of testimonial accounts emergent from the Holocaust and 
the atomic bombings. Whilst the content of A-bomb accounts is evidently very 
different to Holocaust accounts, they also reveal a "more harrowing and gruesome" 
content than other forms of autobiographical writing. They also often share common 
chronological outlines, usually beginning with a brief insight into an everyday 
morning, followed by an account of their direct experience of the bomb, followed by 
a series of episodic descriptions of what they saw on that day. The narrators often 
conclude their testimonies with accounts of how the mental and physical effects of 
the bombing still affect their lives on a daily basis. Equally frequently, however, these 
fragile chronologies are interrupted, as Eaglestone argues to be the case with 
Holocaust testimonies. The nature of these interruptions is quite different to that in 
Holocaust narratives. Most commonly, interruptions in A-bomb narratives take the 
form of repeated intedections of scientific an!,, geographical information, 
demonstrating a dependence upon objective data as descriptive language fails the 
author. Authors frequently provide precise data regarding, for example, their exact 
distance from the epicentre and the heat of the bomb blast. 
Also common in testimonial accounts of the atomic bombings is a reaction 
against the order and coherence provided by straightforward linear narrative. In 
Summer Flowers, Hara Tamiki exemplifies this narrative approach by opening with 
1 See Chapter Three for a more detailed exploration of Charlotte Delbo's Holocaust narratives. 
2 The characteristics which can be considered to identify testimony as a distinct genre can also be 
noted in the narration of other traumatic experiences, such as illness, sexual and physical abuse and 
other historical events. For the purpose of this thesis, however, discussion will remain centred on 
testimonial narratives emergent from the Holocaust and the atomic bombings. 
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an account of the bombing which leads into a description of life in the following 
days. He then subverts the reader's narratorial expectations by concluding his 
narrative with a section entitled "Prelude to Annihilatiow', the final words denying 
the prospect of completion: "There were still more than forty hours to go before the 
atomic bomb paid its visit" (113). The ending becomes irresolute as linear 
progression is rejected in favour of a returning, or cyclical, structure which denies an 
exit from the text, and so the event. 
Identifying points of stylistic commonality between Holocaust and A-bomb 
testimonies must not only be tempered by an awareness of the historical specificity of 
each event, but also by an understanding of the different literary contexts from which 
the authors emerge. Whilst those who try to record their experiences of the Holocaust 
and the atomic bombings are equally faced with the challenges of trying to represent 
events that defy representation, the differing literary traditions of Europe and Japan 
result in authors facing challenges that are unique to each event. Kurihara Sadako, an 
eminent poet and critic of post-Hiroshima Japanese culture, takes account of these 
differences, commenting: 
European post-war literature could confront the fact of Auschwitz 
because throughout the Second World War there had existed, 
especially in the cultural tradition of France, a resistance movement 
born of humanite. Japanese culture, however, with its dilettantish 
concern for elegant pursuits and the beauties of nature has never 
known such humaniti. Consequently there has been no soil for a 
literature of defiance to take root and grow, and postwar literature in 
Japan has continued, unchanged, to be dominated by quotidian, 
domestic and egocentric fiction. Perhaps nothing can be done about 
this lack of a historical sense, a lack which means that atomic-bomb 
literature cannot be seen as anything other than a literature of pariahs. 
(qtd. in Treat, Writing Ground Zero 104-5) 
For Kurihara, the existence in Europe of a twentieth-century literary tradition that 
attempts to deal with the complexities of the representation of atrocity, a tradition that 
goes back at least to the First World War, eases the burden of incommunicability. 
Indeed, it is this European heritage of a literature of atrocity that contests Wiesel's 
point that it is the generation of Holocaust survivors who invented the testimonial 
genre. Whilst Kurihara could be accused of presenting a Japan-centric perspective 
that minimises or even overlooks the significant problems faced by European 
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survivors who tried to narrate their wartime experiences, the fact that A-bomb writers 
believed themselves to be forging an entirely new literary space must be taken into 
consideration when reading A-bomb testimonies. 3 
Concomitant with the attempt to define "testimony" is, however, the question 
as to whether such a definition is desirable, or even useful. Julian Wolfreys argues 
that "any gesture in the direction of regulating a response to trauma or establishing a 
methodology or mode of analysis should be resisted, if one is to do justice to trauma 
and the work of testimony" (126). By framing his response in this way, Wolfreys 
intimates that to taxonomise testimony as a distinct genre constitutes a betrayal of the 
experience, a betrayal that Wiesel is actively seeking to avoid by the process of 
writing and the invocation of the testimonial genre. Wolfreys continues: 
Testimony, in order to be such, cannot be calculated, for every 
testimony must respond to the singular specificity of the traumatic 
experience [ ... ] Testimony is irreducible to some concept or figure, 
some genre or species of narrative within historical narrative or 
literature. (130) 
3 This is not to suggest that Japan does not have a thriving tradition of autobiographical authorship. 
The tradition of nikki bungaku, or 'diary literature, ' dates back to the tenth century. Stylistically distant 
from Western interpretations of life-writing and autobiography, nikki bungaku can be more accurately 
described as a form of literary memoir as it was usually written long after the events it describes. 
Written primarily by aristocrats and female courtiers, nikki bungaku is characterised. by careful 
composition, reflections and meditations on the emotional inner self, and multiple narrating voices. It 
was not until the seventeenth century that Japanese writing developed a stronger historical 
consciousness and became more self-reflective in style. Yet little in this autobiographical tradition 
paved the way for an authentically Japanese literature of atrocity. Writers aimed towards achieving a 
miyab! or 'courtly' style, attempting to evoke philosophical thought and reflection on beauty and 
manners through a condensed and economic use of language. This style clashed with the attempt by 
hibakusha authors to represent horror and violence in a context where language failed, and could no 
longer evoke meaning (see Chapter 2 for further discussion of the relationship between language and 
trauma narratives). A further key characteristic of Japanese literature is that of emulating, and so 
honouring, the style and sensibility of earlier writers, an approach which is of little use to those who 
needed to develop new forms of writing in response to an unprecedented event. As Japanese culture 
was increasingly exposed to Western influences throughout the Meiji Restoration period of 1868-1911, 
the literary forms of Japanese naturalism and realism emerged. One of the most significant genres to 
emerge from this new forms was shish5setsu of the 'I-novel, ' a form of fictive autobiographical 
writing. Written from the perspective of a single authoritative narrative voice, I-novels often focus 
tightly on the details of everyday life. Whilst the traditions of the I-novel and nikki bungaku offered a 
basic model for hibakusha authors, there is little in Japanese literary culture that offered a stylistic 
solution to the difficulties, impossibilities even, or representing atrocity. For Kurihara, this is why the 
experience of the hibakusha author is so different to that of the European Holocaust survivor author. 
For a more detailed discussion of pre-WWII Japanese literary style, Donald Keene's Japanese 
Literature: An Introduction for Western Readers remains a classic account. 
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Whilst it is to be accepted that each testimony is unique in that it is responding to an 
individual experience of a specific event, the fact that not every narrative confornis to 
a prescribed pattern is not in itself a denial of genre. As Tzvetan Todorov points out: 
The fact that a work 'disobeys' its genre does not mean that the genre 
does not exist. It is tempting to say 'quite the contrary' for two 
reasons. First because, in order to exist as such, the transgression 
requires a law - precisely the one that is to be violated. We might go 
even ftirther and observe that the norm only becomes visible - comes 
into existence - owing only to its transgressions. (196) 
Wolfreys' objection to the development of testimony as a genre is based on the 
Derridean theory that genre places a limit on texts, "and when a limit is established, 
norms and interdictions are not far behind: 'Do', 'do not' says 'genre', the word 
6genre', the figure, the voice or the law of genre"' (Derrida, Law of Genre 56). 
However, as Todorov points out, it is only by contravening these "norms" that genre 
can be recognised at all. 
Todorov continues that as much as a genre comes to be recognised as such 
through the discourse upon it - the authority that imposes the norms - it is not simply 
metadiscursive. For example, the volume of writing on the tragedy genre that 
seemingly sets its limits "does not mean that the tragedies themselves lack common 
features" (198). As much as codifying these common features into a recognisable 
genre, Todorov argues that the genre theorist should also be engaged in a search for 
narrative commonalities. It is in this way that testimony can be engaged with as a 
genre or, perhaps, a potential genre. The repetition of certain narrative elements 
indicates that personal accounts of the Holocaust and the atomic bombings share 
certain characteristics that set them apart from other forms of literature. 
1.2 Fragmented Selves: A Comparison of the Testimonial and Autobiographical 
Writings of Primo Levi and Elie Wiesel 
If the Greeks invented tragedy, the Romans the epistle, and the 
Renaissance the sonnet, our generation invented a new literature, that 
of testimony. (Wiesel, Holocaust as LiterM Inspiration 9) 
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In a lecture entitled "The Holocaust as Literary Inspiration7' delivered at 
Northwestern University in 1977, Elie Wiesel directly confronts the seeming 
impossibility of the Holocaust as a narratable event. 
There is no such thing [as literature of the Holocaust], not with 
Auschwitz in the equation. "The Holocaust as Literary Inspiration" is 
a contradiction in terms. As in everything else, the Holocaust negates 
all systems, destroys all doctrines. (7) 
For Wiesel, the very extremity of the Holocaust denies the possibility of traditional 
literary conventions, compromising both fictional and non-fictional modes by the 
restrictions it places on language, identification and imagination. The "sacred awe" 
(9) that Wiesel claims the Holocaust evokes prohibits the translation of this particular 
experience into literature. He questions the moral and ethical difficulties of narrating 
the Holocaust, commenting: 
Wouldn't that mean, then, that Treblinka and Belzec, Ponar and Babi 
Yar all ended in fantasy, in words, in beauty, that it was simply a 
matter of literature? (7) 
"And yet", to cite Wiesel's self-confessed "two favourite words, applicable to every 
situation, be it happy or bleak, " there is, indisputably, Holocaust literature in the form 
of the writings of witnesses and survivors (All Rivers 16). It is these writings that 
Wiesel claims constitute a "new literature", and that shall be the concern of this 
chapter. 
Wiesel names this new literature "testimony" (Holocaust as Litem 
Inspiration 9). For Wiesel, the classification of witness and survivor writings as 
"testimony" positively brands these forms of writing as distinct and unique as he 
perceives the Holocaust itself to be. However, such an emphatic declaration of a new 
genre is not unproblematic. Wiesel is attempting to fix a definitive label to a form of 
writing that so far eludes a concrete definition. Indeed, Wiesel's own narrative style 
problematises any simple categorisation. Critics frequently respond to Wiesel's entire 
body of work, both fictional and non-fictional, as autobiographical. Robert McAfee 
Brown writes that "the story of Elie Wiesel is the story of his characters, and the story 
of his characters is the story of Elie Wiesel" (12). David Daiches, in a review of 
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Wiesel's novel The Gates of the Forest, clarifies this point even further, claiming that, 
"all his works are clearly autobiographical, directly or indirectly, and they represent a 
genuine and sometimes painful endeavour to come to terms with post-Auschwitz life" 
(qtd. in Downing 1442). Irving Abrahamson concurs, commenting that "in a very 
special and complex sense, all that Wiesel has written is 'autobiography' [ ... ] 
autobiography constitutes an integral element of Wiesel's work and plays a central 
and complex role in if' (3). However, these multiple confirmations of Wiesel's work 
as autobiographical, speaking of both his fiction and non-fiction as they do, serve 
more to complicate the question of genre rather than clarify it. Central to this 
complication is that the term "autobiography" is in itself fluid and indefinable. As 
James Olney points out: 
there is no way to bring autobiography to heel as a literary genre with 
its own proper form, terminology and observances [ ... ] all sorts of 
generic boundaries (and even lines dividing discipline from discipline) 
are simply wiped away. (4) 
Such flexibility, Olney continues, makes real the possibility of every narrative being 
interpreted as autobiographical, in that "all writing that aspires to be literature is 
autobiography and nothing else" (4). Conversely, he argues, that in the wake of 
deconstructionist criticism and the dissolution of the self into the text, it is equally 
valid to argue that the loss of the self has resulted in the death of autobiography (22). 
Wiesel's work is, it appears, at once definable and indefinable, an ambiguity 
that he adds to with a personal interpretation of his work. In concordance with those 
who critique his work, he comments that, "I would say ... that the mood of all of my 
books is autobiographical" (qtd. in Downing 1443). However, despite this 
understanding of his work as autobiographical, he seems to be curiously resistant to 
using this term to describe his most conventionally autobiographical work, All Rivers 
Run to the Sea: Memoirs. In the first chapter of this book, Wiesel offers an 
explanatory description of his intentions: 
I mean to recount not the story of my life, but my stories. Through 
them you may understand the rest a little better. Some see their work 
as a commentary on their life; for others it is the other way around. I 
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count myself among the latter. Consider this account then, as a kind of 
commentary. (17) 
This statement presents an ambiguity about the text from the beginning. "The story of 
my life" seems to be, superficially at least, the simplest rule for defining an 
autobiographical narrative. By rejecting this description, Wiesel appears to be 
attempting to define his work as something other than autobiography. The grey area 
generated by his comment that the text is not "the story of my life" but rather "my 
stories" prohibits simple classification. Yet, as the passage continues, Wiesel claims 
that his life is a commentary on his work. By asking the reader to consider this text to 
be a commentary, he is, then, asking implicitly that it be perceived as his life, thereby 
seemingly returning the text to the fold of autobiographical narratives. The 
complicated questions that this produces about genre and literature, and in particular 
about Holocaust literature, appears to be an extension of his call for the recognition of 
a "new literature". Not only is Wiesel proposing that testimony should be considered 
as a new form of literature, he also appears to be suggesting that all previously 
recognised literary genres need to be reconsidered and re-evaluated in the aftermath 
of the Holocaust. 
Wiesel is not the only author to reject the simple classification of his personal 
narrative. Levi is equally ambiguous about the nature of his "autobiography", The 
Periodic Table. The text is structured as a series of chapters detailing Levi's life, each 
titled for a different element within the periodic table. In the final chapter, "Carbon7', 
he attempts to give his own definition of his text: 
The reader, at this point, will have realised for some time now that this 
is not a chemical treatise [ ... ] Nor is it an autobiography, save in the 
partial and symbolic limits in which every piece of writing is 
autobiographical, indeed every human work; but it is in some fashion a 
history. (224) 
In common with Wiesel, Levi is swift to deny that he has written his autobiography, 
but he is keen to describe it as "a history". This is as equivocal as Wiesel's "stories"; 
an autobiography, after all, can be defined as a history, a history of the self, but Levi 
is keen to draw a line of distinction between the two. Levi's preference for the term 
"history" rather than "autobiography" seems to indicate a supposition that "history" 
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permits a greater engagement with the place of the self in the world than 
autobiography allows. If autobiography proper is 
, 
an account of the private history of 
the self, then perhaps a "history" permits a greater collusion between private and 
public history, and so Levi's personal history is not the only story revealed in The 
Periodic Table. Despite his insight that all writing is autobiographical to some extent, 
he is wary of definitively categorising this account of his life as such. However, again 
in common with Wiesel, Levi later blurs this distinction. During an interview with 
Philip Roth, Levi submits that all of his past work is for the most part "plain or 
disguised autobiography" (Roth 15). 
The comparison between Levi and Wiesel is apt, as in addition to these books 
which are conventionally recognised as autobiographies (regardless of authorial 
interpretation), both have also written personal Holocaust narratives which are 
regarded as "testimonial". Wiesel's Night details the occupation and ghettoisation of 
his home town of Sighet, and his family's deportation to Auschwitz. Separated from 
his mother and sisters on arrival, the rest of the narrative is concerned with his and his 
father's experiences in the camp. Wiesel attempts his own definition of this text, 
describing it as "an autobiographical story, a kind of testimony of one witness 
speaking of his own life, his own death" (qtd. in Downing 1450). Wiesel's cautious 
use of the word "testimony" seems to contradict his confident call for testimony to be 
recognised as a "new literature". However, it is at the point when he suggests that as a 
form of testimony Night is a narrative concerned with a story of death, a 
thanatography, rather than simply a story of life, that potential distinctions between 
autobiography and testimony begin to emerge. Wiesel frequently recognises his work 
as a means of bearing witness to those who died, as opposed to a personal account of 
the self. The subtle, but significant, distinction between witnessing and testifying will 
be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
In the introduction to Levi's The Drowned and the Saved, Paul Bailey writes 
that in this book, "as always, Levi assumes the role of the witness" (xv). In common 
with Wiesel once more, Levi takes on the position of a witness, seemingly reluctant 
to employ the term "testimony". Indeed, in the preface to If This is a Man, Levi is 
keener to explain what his work is not, rather than what it is: 
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As an account of atrocities, therefore, this book of mine adds nothing 
to what is already known to readers through the world on the 
disturbing question of the death camps. It has not been written in order 
to formulate new accusations. (15) 
The closest that Levi comes to defining his text is in describing it as "an interior 
liberation, " suggesting a classical cathartic intention in his writing (15). He sees its 
purpose as being able to "fumish documentation for a quiet study of aspects of the 
human mind" (15); indeed, it is in many ways a philosophical investigation into what 
it is to be a man, as is implied in the title (an implication that is lost in the clumsy re- 
titling of the book as Survival in Auschwitz for the American market). 
Writing the Self and Authenticity 
George Yddice presents the following definition of testimony: 
an authentic narrative, told by a witness who is moved to narrate by 
the urgency of a situation (e. g. war, oppression, revolution etc. ) (44) 
In this definition, Yfidice argues for three features which must be present for a work 
to be considered testimonial: it must be an authentic narrative; it must be created by a 
person who witnessed the event, (be it as a victim, a perpetrator or a bystander); and 
it must emerge from a traumatic event. Each of these three points may be present in 
any form of life-writing, or littirature intime as Philippe Lejeune terms it, but it is the 
combination of the three that, for Yfidice, determines a work as testimonial. However, 
each point also needs to be examined more carefully if Wiesel's claim that testimony 
is a "new literature", distinct from other forms of life writing, is to be justified. 
The ascertaining of authenticity is a preoccupation which stretches across all 
modes of life writing, as demonstrated by Philippe Lejeune's efforts to determine a 
definition of autobiography as: 
A retrospective prose narrative produced by a real person concerning 
his own existence, focussing on his individual life, in particular on the 
development of his personality. [ ... ] For there to be autobiography 
(and more generally littirature intime), there must be identity between 
the author, the narrator, and the protagonist. (193) 
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However, Lejeune's central thesis that identity between author, narrator and 
protagonist is a guarantee of authenticity is problematic. He continues with a 
definition of this tripartite but unified "identity": 
The narrator and the protagonist are the entities referred to, within the 
text, by the subject of the speech act, i. e. the utterer, and the subject of 
the utterance; the author, who is represented on the outer edge of the 
text by his narne, is, then, the referent who is designated, through the 
autobiographical contract, by the utterer. (211) 
Essentially, for Lejeune, the utterer, or narrator, is confirmed as having the same 
identity as the author by way of the declaration of the author's name on the title page 
of the text. By using the term "I", the narrator is then transferring this authenticity of 
authorship to the subject of utterance, or protagonist. Whilst significant dissimilarities 
between narrator and protagonist may be present in the narrative (due to timespan 
between the narrated event and the narrating, memory flaws, and other mitigating 
factors), this does not compromise the identity between author, protagonist and 
narrator which is ultimately authenticated by the author's name on the text. Further to 
this, Lejeune also claims that if the name of the protagonist is not the same as that of 
the author, then "this alone excludes the possibility of autobiography" (204). For the 
autobiographical contract to operate, assumptions of authenticity must rest ultimately 
upon the authorial name, an assumption Lej eune judges as fair, commenting that 
"everyone knows only too well how much each of us values his own name" (202). 
This assumption is, however, misplaced when it comes to reading the 
Holocaust accounts of Elie Wiesel and Levi. The sense of an identical relationship 
between protagonist, narrator and author based upon a uniformity of names is 
jeopardised, particularly in Night and If This is A Man. Rather than being focussed 
on an individual self in the way in which Lejeune intimates as a definitive rule for 
autobiography, these two accounts are based on the recognition of a divided self The 
protagonist does not automatically correspond to either narrator or author. Of course, 
this division, or split self, has been observed as a feature in many autobiographical 
narratives. William Howarth writes of autobiographical writing in general that: 
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We must carefully distinguish this character [Lejeune's utterer] from 
the author himself, since it performs as a double persona: telling the 
story as a narrative, enacting it as a protagonist. Although these two 
figures are the same person, artist and model, we may still distinguish 
their essential points of separation. They share the same name, but not 
the same time and space. A narrator always knows more than his 
protagonist, yet he remains faithful to the latter's ignorance for the 
sake of credible suspense. Eventually the reverse images have to 
merge; as past approaches present, the protagonist's deeds should 
begin to match his narrator's thoughts. (87) 
Whilst Howarth's point is valid, it is essentially an extension of Lejeune's argument, 
in that although there may be "points of separation" between narrator and protagonist, 
these eventually converge, together with the author, to create the unified 
autobiographical persona. However, there is a fundamental difference between the 
way that Howarth and Lejeune envision autobiographical identity and the way in 
which the self is constructed in the Holocaust accounts by Levi and Wiesel which are 
considered to be testimonial. A notable characteristic that sets these accounts apart 
from conventional autobiographical narratives is that in both Night and If This is a 
Man, protagonist, narrator and author are driven apart by the extremity of experience, 
resulting in a text in which the narratable self is constructed as separate from the 
narrated self. Lawrence L. Langer argues that there is no final reconciliation between 
the three in Holocaust testimonies. In Holocaust Testimonies, he distinguishes 
between two, rather than three, personas and writes extensively of the way in which 
Holocaust survivors repeatedly testify to the sense of a past experiential self that lives 
alongside a post-war narratorial/authorial self. The tension between these selves, a 
product of their Holocaust experiences, is never resolved in the way that Lejeune and 
Howarth propose. 
Apropos Lejeune, the significance of naming is crucial to identifying this 
divided self. The fracturing of identity is revealed by the adoption of era-specific 
names in the testimonial narratives of both Levi and Elie Wiesel. 
Naming and the Representation of the Divided Self 
The Nazis were well aware of the value that is attached to personal naming, 
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and the part that an individual's name plays in constructing their identity. From the 
very beginning in 1942, Jewish prisoners in Auschwitz had their prisoner numbers 
tattooed onto their left forearms. Men were tattooed on the outer arm, women on the 
inner arm. The only victims who escaped this were those who were sent directly to 
4 their deaths. This replacement of personal, given names with allocated, identifying 
numbers had a powerful dehumanising effect on the prisoners, as Levi's poem 
"Shema7' demonstrates. The poem is the epigraph to If This is a Man, and its title is a 
post Auschwitz echo of the Jewish prayer, the Shema. The poem contains the lines: 
Consider if this is a woman, 
Without hair and without name (17) 
From the very beginning of his testimony, Levi is calling upon the reader to consider 
the significance of the relationship between naming and identity. Without a name, we 
are asked to consider if this is a woman, if this is an individual. In this way, naming is 
constructed here as something crucial to the definition of an individual self, and the 
loss of name represents a crisis in the understanding of what constitutes an individual 
identity. 
In reading Levi's life writings, it can be seen that the way in which he 
narratively reconstructs his past self centres around his name. From his 
autobiography, or "history" as he prefers to term it, we learn that Levi was 
born into an assimilated Jewish family in 1919 in Turin, north-west Italy. He 
graduated from the University of Turin in 1941 with a chemistry degree, and 
commenced work in a factory in Milan. The fall of Italian fascism in 1943, and the 
subsequent Nazi occupation led Levi to join a partisan resistance group. The group 
was betrayed, and arrested by the Fascists on December 13 1943. Fearing immediate 
execution as a political activist, Levi willingly declared himself to be "an Italian 
citizen of Jewish race" in the hope of leniency (If This is a Man 19). However, he 
was taken to a holding camp in Fossoli in January 1944, and was deported to 
4 French survivor Marie-Claude Vaillant-Couturier, who was a prisoner in Auschwitz, where she 
arrived on January 1 1943, testified to this at the Nuremberg Trials: 
M. Dubost: Then they [those sent directly to the gas chambers, primarily women and 
children] were not registered? 
Vaillant-Coutrier: No. 
M. Dubost: They were not tattooed? 
Vaillant-Coutreier: No, they were not even counted. (qtd. in Arad 360). 
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Auschwitz on February 21 1944, where he remained until he was liberated by the 
Russian army on January 27 1945. 
The first chapter of his autobiography, The Periodic Table, "Argon", focuses 
on Levi's ancestors, and situates him firmly within his family history. As with many 
chapters in the book, the chemical element of the title reflects the content. Nicholas 
Patruno discusses this relevance, arguing that: 
To him [Levi], the family is a noble body whose traits are coincidental 
with those of the element argon. Whereas argon is an inert or 
nonreactive element, however, the family has diverged from this 
characteristic slightly over time in integrating itself into the goyim 
who largely forrn the Turinese population. (59) 
The nobility which Levi perceives within the family is revealed in the affectionate 
familiarity of tone in this chapter, a tone that seems to indicate a unity between Levi 
the author and Levi the narrator. By focussing on both the distant and the close 
members of his family, Levi is constructing a solid heritage from which he has 
descended, providing a familial context for both his identity and his name. Indeed, the 
entire chapter is saturated with the importance of names. He introduces each member 
of the family by name, at times in exhaustively inclusive lists: 
Barbai6tb (Uncle Elijah), Barbasachin (Uncle Isaac), Magnaidta 
(Aunt Maria), Barbasmelin (Uncle Moses) Barbasmelin (Uncle 
Samuel), Magnaviagaia (Aunt Abigail). (6) 
It is tempting to read this inclusivity, this urge to leave no family member 
unmentioned, as reflective of his style and purpose in If This is a Man, where he 
repeatedly describes fellow prisoners in an effort to give voices to his fellow 
5 prisoners. The fact that each family member's name is preceded by a familial 
affiliation - uncle, aunt, and at other points in the chapter, grandmother and 
3 That the Holocaust haunts this chapter is undoubted. He opens the chapter with the migratory history 
of his family before they arrived in Turin, where they encountered anti-Semitism, albeit much less 
violent than in other parts of Europe. He recalls an old anti-Semitic chant "Pig's ear, donkey's ear, 
give'em to the Jew that's here", which was a convoluted insult to pious Jews who would ritually show 
each other the hem of their prayer shawls when called to read the Torah at synagogue. He continues I 
remember here, in passing, that the vilification of the prayer shawl is as old as anti-Semitism - from 
those shawls, taken from deportees, the SS would make underwear which was then distributed to the 
Jews imprisoned in the Lage? '(5). 
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grandfather - serves only to emphasise his attachment to them, and their part in 
constructing his identity as it is to be revealed in the following chapters. The very 
names of his family bear testament to the integration and assimilation referred to by 
Patruno. Levi writes: 
The attribute barba Cuncle"), or, respectively, magna ("aunt") tends 
gradually to merge with the name, and, with the concurrence of 
ingenious diminutives and an unsuspected phonetic analogy between 
Hebrew and the Piedmontese dialect, became fixed in complex, 
strange-sounding appellations, which are handed down unchanged 
from generation to generation along with the events, memories and 
sayings of those who had borne them for many years. (6) 
Inscribed within the very names of the family is both their religious and national 
identity, both of which are passed down to Levi. Patruno claims that "Levi did 
considerable research to uncover the language of his ancestors" (58). The fact that 
Levi the author had to research this unusual heritage, rather than receive it through 
the oral history of his family (as Levi the narrator claims to be the case), suggests that 
the comfortable ease with which Levi the narrator recalls his family history is, in fact, 
an artificial construct. Such a construct reveals an otherwise concealed division 
between Levi the author and Levi the narrator, thereby preparing the reader for the 
catastrophic crisis in identity that came with the Holocaust. 
This crisis is narrated later in the text, in the chapter entitled "Ceriunf': 
At a distance of thirty years I find it difficult to reconstruct the sort of 
human being that corresponded, in November 1944, to my name or, 
better, to my number: 174517. (139) 
The protagonist of this chapter, 174517, is represented as unrecognisable. Cicioni 
observes that in Levi's personal accounts, "his narrated self is one of the characters in 
his narration" and this division between narrated and narratable self is exaggerated 
here (45). The self-aware narration in this extract seems to suggest the intejection of 
an authorial voice which cannot reconcile itself to the subject of narration, and it is 
the difference in name that symbolises this breakdown in the self. This chapter relates 
174517's thefts from the chemical lab in Buna in which he worked as a prisoner. He 
stole some rods of iron-cerium (the element for which the chapter is named) which, 
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with the aid of his comrade Alberto, he managed to file down into cigarette lighter 
flints, which the pair planned to use to buy bread on the flourishing black market. 6 
The plan never came to fruition as the camp was evacuated due to the approach of the 
Russian army, and whilst Levi remained in the camp and was eventually liberated, 
Alberto was lost on the death march. The following chapter, "Chromium", begins 
abruptly: "The entre6 was fish, but the wine was red" (147), describing the menu of a 
post-war dinner, as if Levi is keen to dismiss this crisis in identity which occupied the 
previous chapter. However, the mis-matched wine and fish, which continues to be the 
subject of the narration for some time, seems to echo the mis-matched selves of the 
preceding chapter. 
Evidence of such fracturing in identity is, however, minimal in the first 
chapter, and for the most part Levi is sharing traditional family stories that have been 
passed down through the generations, and so prioritising the familial closeness which 
characterises this chapter. Members of the family are introduced anecdotally, and 
often comically. Amongst others, his Grandmother Fina is remembered as once 
having fed an erudite rabbi a pork cutlet without his knowing, as she had no other 
food to offer. His great-grandfather, Grandpa Leonin, is remembered for his eccentric 
exclamations, including the inexplicable curse: "'Cai takeissa 'na meda meshdna 
faita a paraqua' ('May he have an accident shaped like an umbrella')" (13). As 
Myriam Anissimov points out in her biography of Levi, it is incidental "whether all 
the anecdotes were completely reliable, they belonged to the saga, to the way the 
family saw itself' (17). It is the sense of a preserved and treasured continuity that 
binds the family together that is of significance here. 
Levi the protagonist is not introduced until the end of the chapter, and his 
arrival is heralded by the voice of his father, thereby further cementing his 
relationship with his family. His father, Cesare, proudly declares to Levi's 
grandmother that "He's at the head of his class! " (Periodic Table 19). In this simple 
announcement, Patruno reads a further affirmation of Levi's Jewish identity: 
' This episode is not narrated in If This is a Man. Levi is careful not to repeat material between the two 
books, and twice in "Cerium" he halts his narration with the explanation that what was to follow has 
been narrated elsewhere. 
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Implicit in this statement is the expectation that Levi must fulfil a 
fwnilial promise to carry on the educational and intellectual tradition 
of his predecessors. This is an established and significant aspiration 
for the Jews, who for centuries have been continuously rejected and 
ejected and, both symbolically and in fact, have never been given an 
opportunity to put down roots. (59) 
The chapter concludes with Levi's own childhood memories of the embarrassment at 
being offered a "worm-eaten" chocolate by his grandmother, and so neatly brings the 
narrative to the point where Levi can continue with his own story, securely supported 
in his identity by the family heritage which precedes him. The implicit suggestion 
earlier in the chapter that Levi the author and Levi the narrator are divided is 
overshadowed by the explicit harmony between Levi the narrator and Levi the 
protagonist at the end of the chapter. This permits an ending to the chapter which is in 
accordance with Lejeune's autobiographical pact, thereby seemingly confirming, for 
Lejeune at least, the status of The Periodic Table as autobiography. 
This security of identity, built upon family, and so implicitly upon name, is 
harshly demolished in If This is a Man. Within the first few pages of his testimony, 
Levi narrates the trauma of having his name forcibly removed in Auschwitz, and 
replaced with a prisoner number, 174517. David Patterson comments that: 
T'lle number was calculated to obliterate the name because the name is 
full of memory - the memory of a life, the memory of a tradition in 
which others bore the same name, the memory of the response to the 
name. Stealing away the name, the number murders memory. (165) 
In having his name forcibly removed, Levi lost everything that allowed him to 
recognise himself as Levi. He became dislocated from the family he embraced in The 
Periodic Table, and his number came to represent his new self in the camps. 
Levi soon recognised that the tattooed numbers represent a new genealogy in 
Auschwitz. As the traditional family stories in The Periodic Table told Levi of his 
history, so in If This is a Man: 
to the old hands of the camp, the numbers told everything: the period 
of entry into the camp, the convoy of which one formed a part, and 
consequently the nationality. Everyone Will treat with respect the 
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numbers from 30,000 to 80,000: there are only a few hundred left and 
they represented the few survivals from the Polish ghettos. It is as well 
to watch out in commercial dealings with a 116,000 or a 117,000: they 
now only number about forty, but they represent the Jews of Salonica, 
so take care they do not pull the wool over your eyes. As for the high 
numbers they carry an essentially comic air about them, like the words 
'freshman' or 'conscript' in ordinary life. The typically high number is 
a corpulent, docile and stupid fellow. (34) 
Levi retains the same conversationally anecdotal style in relating this new camp 
lineage. Whereas the anecdotes in The Periodic Table operated to familiarise the 
reader with Levi's family, these anecdotes breed only alienation. It is impossible to 
become complicit in Levi's dark mockery of the "high numbers". The reverence 
accorded to the elderly in ordinary life is horribly distorted into a respect for the low 
numbers, the survivors of the Polish ghettos. Equally, Levi's comic wariness of the 
stereotypically canny Greeks is overwhelmed by the realisation of the statistics of 
mass murder - "they now only number about forty". As Wiesel recognised that hlight 
was a piece of life writing concerned with writing death, so these anecdotes are 
stories of death, in contrast to the vibrancy of the stories of life which feature so 
prominently in the opening chapter of The Periodic Table. 
The Holocaust Encyclopedia cites that 405,000 prisoners were tattooed in 
total at Auschwitz, and the process of being tattooed is narrated in many Auschwitz 
survivor accounts. Miklos Nyisli, a doctor who was forced to work alongside Dr 
Mengele in his pseudo-scientific experiments in Auschwitz, writes of his own feeling 
of loss, of becoming someone other than he had always recognised himself as being: 
"Henceforth I would be, merely, KZ prisoner Number A 8450" (30). Patterson 
interprets the experience of being tattooed as the defining symbol of fractured identity 
in personal accounts of the Holocaust. He observes that: 
The number is the opposite of the name [ ... I used as [a] weapon to rob 
the human being of his or her name and thereby remove any identity 
that may determine the who of the human being. (164) 
This loss of name, argues Patterson, was particularly damaging to Jewish 
understanding of self-identity, for "it is, indeed, a part of Jewish tradition that the 
name and the soul, the name and the person are of a piece" (164). Patterson's 
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interpretation of the Jewish tradition of naming is slightly misleading here. Rather 
than a name asserting identity between name, soul and person, tradition calls for 
patronymic naming which affirms a continuity between individual Jews and their 
ancestors and confirms their commitment to the covenant. In this context, the theft of 
name is symbolic more of a loss of Jewish identity rather than human identity. The 
replacement of the name with a tattooed number is a further violation of Jewish 
identity, for the act of tattooing is forbidden by God in Leviticus 19.28. By removing 
the name, the Nazis were putting into question the very notion of being and selfliood 
in their prisoners. Levi comments specifically on the way in which tattooing 
compromised humanity in The Drowned and the Saved: 
The operation was not very painful and lasted no more than a minute 
but it was traumatic. Its symbolic meaning was clear to everyone: this 
is an indelible mark, you will never leave here; this is the mark with 
which slaves are branded and cattle sent to the slaughter, and that is 
what you have become. You no longer have a name; this is your new 
name. The violence of the tattoo was gratuitous, an end in itself, pure 
offence. (95) 
By interpreting the tattoo as meaning "you will never leave here, " Levi is not merely 
paraphrasing Dante, in whose writings he seeks solace in If This is a Man but also 
echoing those survivors who write that their "Holocaust self' has never left them. For 
instance, Charlotte Delbo writes of her "Auschwitz double, " that lives alongside her 
(Days and Memory 3). For Delbo, and also for Levi, a post-Auschwitz life is 
unattainable, for the self that was born in the camps lives alongside the individual 
forever, testifying to Langer's view of the irreconcilable split self in testimonial 
writing. Levi is also emphasising the dehumanising nature of the tattoo. Without a 
name, the individual is subsumed into a mass, like "cattle". The use of the words 
46slaves" and "cattle" also points to the view of the victims becoming objectified as 
property, an ideology confirmed by the frequent Nazi use of the word "Stacke", 
pieces, to describe the Jews. 
Levi powerfully evokes the experience of being tattooed in If This is a Man: 
I have learrit that I am Haftling. My number is 174517; we have been 
baptized, we will carry the tattoo on our left arm until we die. [ ... ] And for many days, while the habits of freedom still led me to look for 
36 
the time on my wristwatch, my new name ironically appeared instead, 
a number tattooed in bluish characters under the skin. (33) 
Levi's response to this experience bears witness to the dehumanising effect of 
replacing a given name with an allotted number. He opens his account of this 
experience with the bald statement, "I have learnt that I am Haftling". He is not a 
Miftling; such a construction implies that for Levi, Haftling has become his definition 
rather than a description of his status. 7 His new Hqftling identity is confirmed by the 
new name with which he is "baptized"; 174517. Such a phrasing implies the birth of a 
new self, a birth that is both incongruous and paradoxical within the context of the 
death camp. 
This is a significant moment in If This is a Man, for it is here that Lejeune's 
autobiographical contract begins to break down. The name of the protagonist, 
174517, and the authorial name, Primo Levi, have divided. Such a fracturing 
indicates that this text is deviating from "autobiography", implying that this book 
constitutes something else, something that can be termed "testimonial". The name 
"Prinio" does not return for the protagonist until the final chapter, "The Story of Ten 
Days", when Charles, a fellow prisoner, calls to him "Dis donc, Primo, on est 
dehors" 'I say, Primo, we're outside' (173). The significance of the resumption of the 
name cannot be underestimated, for it is on this day, the 23 rd January 1945 that Levi 
emerged from the hospital block, known as Ka-Be, to discover that the camp was 
deserted, that both prisoners and guards had evacuated the site. Although they had not 
been officially liberated at this point, Levi was in effect a free man, and therefore able 
to resume his name. However, this reunion of name between the author's, narrator's 
and protagonist's voice cannot be viewed as a return to the autobiographical contract. 
The tattooed number is inscribed on the body "until we die"; post-Auschwitz, 
therefore, his name "Prinio" will always be shadowed by the indelible numbers on his 
arm, denying continuity between pre-war and post-war identity. 
7 This lack of an indefinite article could be a quirk of translation. In both German and Levi's native 
Italian, this word would not require an indefinite article in this context as it does in English. However, 
the fact that it is preceded by an indefinite article at other points in the translation suggests that its 
absence here is of significance. 
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Tbroughout the text, there seems to be a deliberate plan to refer to fellow 
prisoners by their name, and we are introduced to Steinlauf, Elias, and Alberto 
amongst others. Such an effort is testament to Levi's refusal to comply with the Nazi 
process of dehumanisation through narrative style. If This is a Man is primarily the 
story of people in the camps, and an attempt to understand what happened to 
humanity under such conditions. The retention of names is, then, not simply a sign of 
Levi's familiarity with his co-prisoners, but also part of an actively philosophical 
statement. The significant exception to this rule is Null-Achtzehn, a Muselmann. 8 
Unnamed and unknown, Null Achtzehn is presented not as a prisoner but as a figural 
representation of dehumanisation. Levi writes that it "is as if everyone was aware that 
only a man is worthy of a name, and that Null Achtzehn is no longer a man" (48). 
This episode in the text serves to reinforce the relationship between naming and 
identity; the loss of Null Achtzehn's name is to be recognised as the loss of his 
humanity, of his identity. 
The breakdown of the relationship between naming and identity is also 
central to Wiesel's N ight. Wiesel was deported to Auschwitz in 1944 along with the 
rest of his family. He was separated from his mother and sisters on arrival, but 
managed to stay with his father throughout their internment in the camp. Whilst 
Wiesel does not focus on the process of being tattooed to the same extent as Levi, he 
also clearly presents the way in which the loss of the name compromises 
individuality. He records the experience simply in one line: "I became A-7713. After 
that I had no name" (54). It is, though, the following episode that better illustrates the 
consequences of this loss. During roll call, a prisoner calls out "Which of you is 
Wiesel from Sighet? " Wiesel's father replies "I'm Wiesel of Sighet. " Wiesel's father 
and the man who called out study each other in incomprehension for some time 
before the man speaks out: "You don't recognise me - you don't recognise me. I'm a 
relative of yours. Stein. Have you forgotten me already? Stein! Stein of Antwerp. 
Reizel's husband. Your wife was Reizel's aunt" (54). That Wiesel's father was 
unable to recognise Stein is perhaps not unsurprising; not only was Stein a fairly 
distant relative, but the process of shaving inmates' heads, and clothing their 
' This was the term used to describe those prisoners who were near death who, as a result of the 
brutality of camp life, were physically and mentally unable to hold on to life. The word literally means 
"Muslia'and whilst the reason as to why this word was used remains unknown, it has been suggested 
that the stance of the muselmann was similar to that of a devout Muslim at prayer. 
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weakened bodies in identical uniforms had the effect of making all look alike. Yet 
Stein, desperate to be recognised, clings to his name as the one feature that would 
distinguish him from all others. However, the identifying power of individuals 
names is destroyed in this context, for in the camp "Stein" has ceased to exist, and 
has been replaced by a number. The genealogy which he eagerly recounts is now 
false, unrelated to his new, numbered self. The possibility of knowing and identifying 
the self through name becomes an impossibility. 
Throughout N jght, naming is central to Wiesel's portrayal of the divided self. 
Wiesel's testimony emphasises the division of the self throughout by the adoption of 
era-specific names. Wiesel the adolescent who endured the camps is named Eliezer, 
jg_ whereas Wiesel the narratorial/authorial survivor writing N ht is named Elie. 9 For 
Colin Davies, these must-be read as a unified figure. He terms Night a "tdmoignage" 
'testimony', and claims that: 
for its impact, the text requires our belief in the literal truth of the facts 
that are described. In consequence, we should identify the Eliezer who 
narrates La Nuit with the Elie given on the title page as the author of 
the text. [ ... ] If we do not accept the identification of Eliezer with Elie, 
then the direct link between the text and historical reality will be 
broken. Moreover, the moral urgency of the text depends upon our 
acceptance of it as truthful; without that claim to truthfulness the 
ethical underpinning of the t6moignage would be lost; it would 
become fiction, a novel rather than a historical document. (32) 
In making such an assertion, Davis is reconfirming that textual authenticity is reliant 
on identity between author, narrator and protagonist. The historical truth of the text is 
reliant on the reader's acceptance of the autobiographical contract. The adoption of 
different names functions, for Davis, as a literary conceit rather than as evidence of a 
dualised self. 
Both Elie and Eliezer appear in Night as seemingly different characters, with 
Elie inteýecting parenthetically to comment on Eliezer's experiences. For example, 
9 It is worth noting that Joseph Sungolowsky contests the significance of this discrepancy, noting that 
in the original Yiddish edition of h! ight, both author and protagonist are called 'Eliezer'. However, the 
decision to change 'Eliezer' to 'Elie' in the more widely read English edition cannot be ignored, and to 
me suggests the importance Wiesel attributes to the dissociation between the camp self and the post- 
war self. 
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the account in the text of the imposition of the Nuremberg laws in Wiesel's small 
town in Transylvania records Wiesel's father poignantly commenting: "The yellow 
star? Oh well, what of it? You don't die of it ...... Elie the narrator deposes the position 
of Eliezer the adolescent, replacing any words the son may have spoken to his father 
at the time with hindsight, commenting: "(Poor Father! Of what then did you die? )" 
(21). Significantly, these retrospective comments on the father's naivety in the face of 
oncoming catastrophe are absent in his autobiographical account, All Rivers Run to 
the Sea. Indeed, the narratorial voice in All Rivers Run to the Sea is contemporaneous 
igh-1, commenting "The yellow star? That scarcely bothered me" with his father's in N 
(61). In the same text, he writes again of his father's initial disregard for the dangers 
of the growing anti-Semitism: "Never mind, my father said, it will pass. Everything 
passes, even the thirst for Jewish blood" (57). His father's (mis)understanding of the 
situation here is not corrected by a narratorial voice. 
This is not to suggest that retrospective commentary is exclusive to Wiesel's 
testimonial writing. Indeed, in relating his mother's response to the Warsaw ghetto 
uprising in All Rivers Run to the Sea, he adopts a very similar style: 
"Why did our young Jews do that? " she mused. "Why couldn't they 
have just waited calmly for the war to end? " That was the word she 
used - calmly. 
My poor mother. (38-39) 
Retrospective commentary is, then, a feature in both his testimony and his 
autobiography, but it is only in his testimony that this narratorial voice interacts as a 
character by actually responding to his father. The participatory nature of this 
intedecting voice emphasises duality in testimony, and prioritises the sense of the 
split self to a far greater extent than in autobiographical writing. 
The distinction between the narrated, experiential self and the narrator 
becomes further exaggerated by the conclusion of Night: 
One day I was able to get up, after gathering all my strength. I wanted 
to see myself in the mirror hanging on the opposite wall. I had not 
seen myself since the ghetto. 
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From the depths of the mirror, a corpse gazed back at me. The 
look in his eyes, as they stared into mine, has never left me. (126) 
This passage evokes a sense of the uncanny in the form of the living corpse that gazes 
back from the mirror. It is the corpse of the experiential self that can never be fully 
laid to rest, and returns as an animate object to haunt the narratorial self, resulting in a 
permanent doubling of the traumatised self. In The Uncanny Freud refers to the 
figure of the double as the "uncanny harbinger of death" (142). In Wiesel's 
construction of the dualised self, however, the double is less a portent of death, and 
more a symbol of the inability to escape from trauma. Robert Jay Lifton comments on 
the widespread phenomenon of the sense of a split self in survivors of trauma: 
Extreme trauma creates a second self. [ ... ] in extreme trauma, one's 
sense of self is radically altered. And there is a traurnatised self that is 
created. Of course, its not a totally new self, it's what one brought into 
the trauma as affected significantly and painfully, confusedly, but in a 
very primal way, by that trauma. And recovery from post-traumatic 
effects, or from survivor conflicts cannot really occur until that 
traumatic self is reintegrated. It's a form of doubling in the traurnatised 
person. (qtd. in Caruth, Interview 137) 
Much of Lifton's previous research into the phenomenon of doubling focussed on the 
perpetrators, most notably in his book The Nazi Doctors which sought to use 
doubling as an explanation as to how educated people could perform acts of barbarity 
in the name of medicine in the camps. However, Lifton recognises here that the 
survivor of trauma can also be subjected to a sense of duality, which can be 
reconciled only through recovery from the trauma. Wiesel's later works, however, 
testify to the impossibility of recovery. He returns to the image of the reflected 
double in his fictional novel Dawn. Despite the fictional nature of this book, there is, 
Colin Davis argues, identification between the author Wiesel and the young 
protagonist Elisha, and seems to represent a fictional progression from Night. The 
action in Dawn takes place over one night in a house in Palestine, during which 
Elisha contemplates the execution that he must perform at dawn. His victim is John 
Dawson, a British officer who has been taken hostage and is to be executed in 
retaliation for the execution of David, a young Israeli, by the British. Elisha, a 
Holocaust survivor, is visited throughout the night by the ghosts of the dead who 
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haunt his thoughts. The figure of a beggar reveals a secret to Elisha which invokes the 
uncanny spectre that haunts Wiesel at the end of Night: 
"I'm teaching you the art of distinguishing between day and night. 
Always look at a window and failing that look into the eyes of a man. 
If you see a face, any face, then you can be sure that night has 
succeeded day. For, believe me, night has a face. " (Dawn 126) 
The double is manifested as night in the beggar's tale, night that is the symbol of the 
Holocaust, of death, Wiesel's Kingdom of Night. The presence of night as it succeeds 
day is the presence of the living corpse, the symbol of the impossibility of Lifton's 
"recovery" from the trauma of the Holocaust. The novel ends with an echo of Night's 
concluding passage, serving to ftirther blur the definition of Dawn as purely fictional: 
I [Elisha] went to the window. [ ... ] 'I'lie night lifted, leaving behind it 
a greyish light the color of stagnant water. Soon there was only a 
tattered fragment of darkness hanging in midair, the other side of the 
window. Fear caught my throat. The tattered fragments of darkness 
had a face. Looking at it, I understood the reason for my fear. The face 
was my own. (204) 
The fear that Elisha feels is the uncanny fear of the recognition of the double. Here, 
the face can be recognised in a way that is impossible for Wiesel at the end of Night. 
The unrecognisable living corpse of Night is recognised in Dawn as the self. It is the 
awareness of the Holocaust experiential self that lives parallel to the survivor self. 
This recognition of the dualised self is testified to by many Holocaust survivors. 
Survivor Irene W. similarly tries to explain this haunting presence as: 
a sort of division, a sort of schizophrenic division, you know, a 
compartmental isation of what happened, and it's kept tightly 
separated, and yet as I said, it isn't. There is this past of daily living 
that one has to attend to and adhere to, and family and children and 
everyday needs and work and so on, and that must not interfere, the 
other must not become so overwhelming that it will make normal life 
unable to function. Yet it's always there. (qtd. in Langer, Holocaust 
Testimonies 59) 
The "other" to which Irene W. refers to is an other that refuses to remain so. It cannot 
be "compartmentalised" and kept separate. The double is manifested not as an other, 
but as part of the self 
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Wiesel returned to this sense of duality in his 1986 Nobel Peace Prize 
acceptance speech: 
I remember: it happened yesterday, or eternities ago. A young Jewish 
boy discovered the Kingdom of Night. I remember his bewilderment, 
I remember his anguish. It all happened so fast. The ghetto. The 
deportation. The sealed cattle car. The fiery altar upon which the 
history of our people and the future of mankind were meant to be 
sacrificed. 
I remember he asked his father: "Can this be true? This is the 
twentieth century, not the Middle Ages. Who would allow such 
crimes to be committed? How could the world remain silent? " 
And now the boy is turning to me. "Tell me, " he asks, "what 
have you done with my future, what have you done with your life? " 
And I tell him that I have tried. That I have tried to keep memory 
alive, that I have tried to fight those who would forget. Because if we 
forget, we are guilty, we are accomplices. 
And then I explain to him how nSfve we were, that the world 
did know and remained silent. And that is why I swore never to be 
silent whenever wherever human beings endure suffering and 
humiliation. 
The demarcation between man and boy, between past and present self is emphasised 
through the conceit of a conversation between Wiesel's experiential self and his 
survivor self. Wiesel's Holocaust self is literally constructed as another, referred to 
throughout only as "him", or even more impersonally, as "the boy". The adult Wiesel 
seems to exist only as a response to the child Wiesel, emphasised by "the boy .. s 
reproachful questioning: "what have you done with my future, what have you done 
with your life? " Wiesel's detachment from his past seems complete with the 
suggestion that his father is related only to his past Holocaust self- "the boy" asks 
"his father". The survivor Wiesel seems unrelated to this man, the father/son 
relationship belongs to the past. Yet the concept of the past too is distorted, with the 
events of Wiesel's Holocaust happening both "yesterday" and "eternities ago". He 
echoes this sentiment in All Rivers Run to The Sea, writing that "Elsewhere I have 
told of what happened next - or rather I have tried to tell it. But it feels like yesterday. 
It feels like now" (76). 
The Holocaust is represented as an event that can never be over. Robert 
Eaglestone argues that "the impossibility of closure is simply a fact of life for the 
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survivors" (134), a perspective he supports by referencing the number of survivors 
who return to their experiences again and again in successive testimonial and fictional 
narratives. This impossibility of understanding the Holocaust as a past event and 
resultant sense of incompleteness surrounding the catastrophe disturbs the chronology 
of testimonial narratives. Such a disruption in the temporal order feeds into the 
complexities of representing the self in Holocaust testimonies, as the linear 
progression through life is disrupted, and the sub ect of the testimonial narrative fails 
to be recognised by the narrating self. 
"An Event Without Witness": Testifying and Witnessing 
For George Widice, the second defining feature of a testimony is that it must 
be written by a witness. The Holocaust, however, by its very extremity complicates 
the process of witnessing. Dori Laub regards the Holocaust as an event without a 
witness, a criterion which he judges to be central to the claim of uniqueness. "A 
witness, " claims Laub, "is a witness to the truth of what happens during an event" 
(Felman and Laub 8 1). However, he claims that it is "inconceivable" that any 
individual would have been capable of perceiving this "truth". The extremity of the 
experience means that no 
historical insider could remove herself sufficiently from the 
contaminating power of the event so as to remain a fully lucid, 
unaffected witness [ ... ] No observer could remain untainted, that is to 
maintain an integrity -a wholeness and a separateness - that could 
keep itself uncompromised, unharmed, by his or her very witnessing. 
(81) 
The impartiality of the witness which enables the perception of the truth of the event 
is made impossible, since there is no "unviolated, unencumbered, and thus sane, point 
of reference in the witness" (8 1). Evidently, it is the case that for every event the act 
of witnessing cannot be completely objective; for Laub however, the extremity of the 
Holocaust exacerbates the impossibility of objectivity. Paradoxically, then, the 
experience of being present and therefore capable of being a witness is exactly what 
prevents the possibility of witnessing. 
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Laub's understanding of "witnessing" is based on the idea of historical 
witnessing, that the witness must recount the historical truth of an event. This form of 
witnessing belongs, however, to historical discourse, rather than testimonial 
discourse. For Paul Veyne, "history is simply an account of the past, all else flows 
from that" (19). Veyne's configuration of "history" is concomitant with Laub's 
understanding of witnessing, in that it is the "relating of true events" (11). Felman 
points out that whilst on initial observation "the essence of the testimony is historical, 
and that its function is to record events and to report the facts of a historical 
occurrence, [ ... ] the historical eventfails to exhaustively account for the nature of the 
testimony" (Felman and Laub 8). This is not to contest the significance of history, of 
the event, in testimonial writings but rather to point out that the historical event alone 
does not shape the literary form of the testimony. Yfidice's third defining feature of 
testimony is that it is directly spawned from a specific historical event; indeed, it is 
this very historical specificity which complicates any simple comparison of 
testimonies emergent from the Holocaust and the atomic bombings. The focus on a 
specific event has been noted as a feature which distinguishes testimonial writing 
from conventional autobiographical writing. In his analysis of Holocaust 
autobiography, Joseph Sungolowsky states that: 
While autobiography may choose to embrace a greater or smaller part 
of one's life, Holocaust autobiography will essentially deal with the 
period marked by the events of the Nazi genocide. Just as any 
autobiography related to a troubled historical period acquires an added 
significance, so does Holocaust autobiography exert a unique 
fascination upon the reader because of its central motive. (137) 
Although Sungolowsky chooses to use the term "autobiography- to define the genre 
he is discussing, it is clear that he sees a significant distinction between 
autobiography concerning accounts of the Holocaust and other forms of 
autobiography. This differentiation can be recognised as one of the features that 
marks the testimonial genre as separate from other forms of life-writing, suggesting 
that texts which he labels "Holocaust autobiographies" could be more accurately 
termed "testimonies". For Sungolowsky, the authorial decision to focus on a distinct 
aspect of the past life is a crucial and defining feature of the testimonial genre. 
Autobiography, he argues, is a tale of a life; testimony by contrast is the narration of a 
specific event in a life, be it the Holocaust or any "troubled historical period. " For 
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Sungolwosky and Yfidice, testimonial writing can be identified through its focus on 
the event. 
However, as Felman acknowledges, this focussing on the historical event does 
not fully reveal the nature of testimony. There is disparity, it would seem, between 
witnessing and testimony, a distinction clarified by Michael Bernard-Donals and 
Richard Glejzer. Witnessing, they argue, is the "moment of seeing in which the 
witness is confronted with the [ ... ] event renders him speechless and terrified, " 
whereas testimony is the "witness's obedience to the compulsion to speak, though 
what the witness says is neither a reflection of the event [ ... ] nor unaffected by if' 
(xii). As codified here, testimony is not simply the narration of an event, but rather a 
narrative representation of the witnessing of an event. According to Bernard-Donals 
and Glejzer's formulation of testimony, it is not focussed on the event in the 
simplistic way suggested by Sungolowsky and Yfidice. Rather, the event haunts the 
narrative representation of the self at a particular point in history, making testimony a 
narrative composite of an account of the event itself, and an account of the event as it 
is Perceived by the witness. 
Such a perspective reinforces the centrality of the representation of the self 
and the experiences of the self when comparing autobiographical and testimonial 
narratives. In reviewing Wiesel's Night and All Rivers Run to the Sea, it becomes 
clear that each account renders somewhat different versions of his Holocaust 
experiences. In each book, the experiences of the experiential self, or protagonist, are 
related differently by the narratorial self. The experiential self is named Eliezer in 
both texts. Significantly, in All Rivers Run to the Sea, the experiential self is referred 
to as "Eliezer, son of Shlomo" (21), thereby reinforcing the father/son bond that is so 
crucial to the construction of the experiential self. Eliezer's identity in Night, (and 
also in the Nobel speech) is bound up with his relationship with his father; the 
experiential self is a son. In All Rivers Run to the Sea, Wiesel returns to the 
significance of the father/son relationship, stating, "in the camp I had no more 
childhood. I had only my father, my best friend, my only friend" (50). Whilst the 
narratorial voice does address the father, Elie is never so explicitly configured as a 
son. The familial bonds are broken, leaving Elie with a different heritage to that of 
Eliezer. 
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As previously noted, Wiesel sees a clear difference between his two accounts. 
In his autobiographical account, All Rivers Run To The Sea, he writes: 
My intent here is not to repeat what I recounted in N ight, but to review 
that testimony as I see it now. Was I explicit enough? Did I miss what 
was essential? Did I serve memory well? In fact, if I had to do it over, 
I would change nothing in my deposition. (79) 
Not only is this comment significant in that it is one of the few occasions on which 
Wiesel directly refers to Night as a testimony, but his use of the word "deposition 99 is 
also interesting as it reinforces the definition of testimony as a legal document. From 
his words, it is clear that Wiesel sees All Rivers Run to the Sea as a form of clarifying 
appendix to Night. Written at a date closer to the event, Night stands as a narrative 
representation of his witnessing of the Holocaust: a testimony. All Rivers Run to the 
Sea functions as a commentary on this former representation, situating his 
autobiographical narrative as twice removed from the event itself. 
The very structure of the two books reflects the different representations of 
witnessing that are to be found in Wiesel's autobiographical and testimonial texts. 
Night opens with the return of Moch6 the Beadle. Having escaped as the only 
survivor from a transport of murdered Jews, Moche has returned to wam the 
remaining Jews of Sighet of their impending fate. His warning is repeatedly ignored 
until eventually he falls into silence. The figure of Moch6 also appears at a later stage 
in All Rivers Run to the Sea, where Wiesel refers to him as "the first survivor, " a man 
who "lived our destiny before any of us" (60). As such he represents an end, a 
destiny, and his presence at the beginning of -Night 
heralds the impossibility of simple 
linear chronology in the text. It begins with an end. Mochd serves to invert the Jewish 
story of exile and return, where the return symbolises not the end of exile, but only 
the beginning. Significantly, however, this was not Wiesel's planned opening to the 
book. The original manuscript began with "two pages which sought to describe the 
premises and early phases of the tragedy" (All Rivers 319). At his editor Jdr8me 
Lindon's suggestion, Wiesel excised these two pages and opened with the story of 
Moch6. Wiesel notes that many survivors open their testimonies in way he had 
planned to, "evoking loved ones as well as one's hometown before the annihilation, 
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as if breathing life into them one last time" (319). Such an affirmation of life at the 
beginning of the text could be read as contradicting the published testimony which 
opens with a confirmation of death. However, this invocation of the presence of a 
town and community at the inception of the testimony would in actuality not offer a 
significantly different beginning to the narrative. Destroyed in the Holocaust, the 
description of the town and its community would stand as a reminder of the presence 
of an absence, and this is exactly the function fulfilled by Mochd's story. His 
presence serves to make clear the absence of the murdered Jews on the transport he 
escaped. Read with either Wiesel's planned opening or with the opening as published, 
Night thus becomes a cyclical text, where death is present at both beginning and end, 
and the very structure of the narrative comes to represent the inescapability of the 
Holocaust. At the same time, as a survivor, Mochd represents life, structurally setting 
up the motif of doubling which dominates Night. 
In contrast to this cyclical structure in the testimony, Wiesel's autobiography 
struggles to maintain a conventional linear chronology. The narratorial voice 
outwardly and openly battles to keep events in their place. Of his little sister Tzipora 
0 he says: "My (the only one of his three sisters whose fate is made known in Night 
little sister was a blessing. But-no, no buts. Not yet. Everything in its time" (All 
Rivers 25). He later speaks of his grandfather, "my maternal grandfather, Reb Dovid 
(Dodye) Feig, lived until ... But no, let us not yet speak of his death. First I need to see 
him alive" (41). Through the ellipses the narratorial voice censors itself. The urgency 
of the intedecting, retrospective parenthetical voice in N-ight is denied in Wiesel's 
autobiography in order to sustain the linearity of the narrative. 
Whilst the structure of the texts may alter from a cyclical testimonial narrative 
to a linear autobiographical narrative, so too does the focus of the content differ. 
Wiesel's home town Sighet haunts his writing: "in all my novels, it serves as 
background and vantage point [ ... ] even when I tell Biblical, Talmudic, or Hasidic 
tales, it is from my town that they take flight" (AILRI= 32). However, it is 
something of a phantom town, an imaginal place that is a site of duality in itself. 
Transitory country borders shift its name repeatedly from the Romanian Sighet to the 
Hungarian Mdramarossziget, and Wiesel's representation of the town shifts equally in 
jght and All Rivers Run to the Sea. The Sighet of Night is a peaceful town, where N 
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Wiesel's father owns a shop, and Wiesel is left free (despite his father's disapproval) 
to study Kabbalah. Even after the trauma of the expulsion of the foreign Jews, life 
returned to normality: I continued to devote myself to my studies [ ... ] My father was 
occupied with his business and the doings of the community. [ ... I My mother began 
to think it was high time to find a suitable young man for Hilda" (Night 18). The 
tranquillity of Sighet was destroyed only with the arrival of the occupying German 
forces and the swift formation of the two ghettos in 1944. 
The Sighet of All Rivers Run to the Sea is painted as a very different place, 
strewn with hostility and antisemitism. Wiesel writes of violent pogroms, launched 
d6on the slightest pretext. " "My sisters, " he continues, "often didn't go to school. On 
those days the store was bolted shut [and] at the slightest warning we rushed to the 
cellar, though I had no idea why [ ... ] We couldn't rely on the police, who not only 
failed to protect us from these murderers but helped them. We lived in terror" (18). 
Wiesel fails to date these occurrences, but the ordering of the text places them firmly 
in the pre-war period. Why is there such a marked difference between the Sighet of 
testimony and the Sighet of autobiography? Understanding testimony as the narrative 
representation of the witnessing of an event, and autobiography as the narrative 
representation of a life is key to interpreting these opposing representations of the 
town. Night is the story of Wiesel's Holocaust experiences, and to portray Sighet as a 
peaceful idyll accentuates the horror of the Holocaust that follows. The representation 
of the town can be interpreted as a narrative shorthand to stress the violent rupturing 
in life brought about by the Holocaust. Autobiography, conversely, need not focus 
expressly on a specific event, indeed All Rivers Run to the Sea covers Wiesel's post- 
war experiences as a displaced person, as a student in Paris and as a writer. The 
author of an autobiography, then, can be considered to be freer in what he writes, not 
needing to prioritise any event over another. Yet with Wiesel, it is difficult to 
maintain such a claim, as his Holocaust experiences are central to his understanding 
of his self, and so must be considered to be central to any life-writing that he has 
produced. 
One of the most significant episodes to be excluded from N ht is e est of ig- th arr 
Wiesel's father. His father worked with the underground network in Budapest aiding 
Polish refugees. He arranged to supply the refugees with foreign currency, having 
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discovered that anyone caught in possession of such monies would be sent directly to 
the counterespionage bureau in Budapest, rather then being deported directly back to 
Poland. Once in Budapest, other members of the underground would help the 
refugees. This measure, according to Wiesel, ensured the survival of almost all whom 
Wiesel's father helped. Unfortunately, one refugee was arrested, and gave up 
Shlomo's name under torture. His father was arrested, and held in prison in Sighet, 
and then in Debrecen for several weeks. He was eventually released, thanks to the 
efforts of his underground contacts who bribed various officials, and returned to his 
family in Sighet. 
This episode has haunted Wiesel throughout his life, as he reveals in All 
Rivers Run To The Sea: "I will never forget my father's arrest, nor the look on his 
face after his release; all the things he never said could be read in his eyes" (3 1). In 
these words, Wiesel once again resurrects the image of the eyes that gaze back as a 
symbol of something that cannot be escaped. Whilst he writes that his father's 
unspoken experiences could be read through his eyes, Wiesel cannot escape from the 
fact that he does not know what happened to his father during his imprisonment. 
Wiesel's elder sister Bea, a marginal figure in Nigh collected their father on his 
release, and it was to her that he imparted the secrets of what he endured. These 
experiences were, however, to remain hidden always from Wiesel, for his sister died 
without revealing them to her brother despite his pleas for her to tell him. In All 
Rivers Run To The Sea, he berates himself, "I could have asked him in the camp, 
where we shared our grief and fear, but I was too shy even to mention his 
imprisonment. I told myself it wasn't the time or the place. I was wrong" (3 1). 
The fragmentation of the self as represented in both autobiographical and 
testimonial narratives is the product of the encounter with trauma. Similarly, 
testimonial accounts of the atomic bombings reveal that the experience of atrocity 
transforms the self, denying the possibility of identity between the pre-bomb and 
post-bomb selves. Indeed, in a post-nuclear world, it will be argued, the very concept 
of the self is compromised to the extent that it is not only fragmented, but utterly 
absented. 
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1.3 Anonymous Selves: Representing the Hibakusha Experience 
Narrating one's own experience of surviving the bomb, whether in 
speech, in writing or in pictorial forms, is inextricably tied to the 
construction of a narrator's subjecthood. (Yoneyama 85) 
Yoneyama adds a historical specificity to Anne Lear's perspective that the 
construction of the self is revealed through the act of autobiographical storytelling. 
However, as with Holocaust testimonies, the "I" that is constructed is difficult to 
locate. John Whitter Treat considers the identification of a "self' to be rendered 
nearly impossible in the context of the A-bomb. "Atomic-bomb literature, " he argues, 
"asks of us to accept a post-Hiroshima imperative to use culture, and with its 
ideology of the self, to represent the antithesis of culture implicit in our use of total 
weapons on 'populations' within which the 'self is an irrelevant, anachronistic word" 
(Writing Ground Zero 79). The presence of the A-bomb must, then, result in the 
absence of an individual self. The recognition of the self is further complicated by 
anonymity of testimonial voices that is frequently encountered in collections of eye- 
witness accounts. The Witness of Those Two Days, a collection first published in 
1989, is characterised by the absence of an author's, narrator's or protagonist's name. 
In these anonymous narratives of the atomic bombings, the narration of experience 
appears as detached from an experiential self. This situation is not confined to this 
collection of testimonies; of the many survivors interviewed in Robert Lifton's 
seminal work on A-bomb survivors, Death in Life, many are left as anonymous 
voices whose words support the psychological theorising of the author. Numerous 
other collections, such as Hibakusha: Survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Children 
of Hiroshima, and Hibaku: Recollections of A-bomb Survivors give the names of the 
authors, but no other information. The names become free-floating, attached only to 
the experience of the A-bomb, restricting the authors to a single identity, that of the 
survivor. Whilst considering the way in which the absence of any name affects the 
representation of the self in personal accounts, the historical context of testifiers 
concealing their names must not be overlooked. Many hibakusha faced 
discrimination in their post-war lives, encountering difficulties in post-war 
employment and social relations, and so attempted to hide their A-bomb experiences. 
Shizue Koga, one of only three in her seven-strong family to survive the Nagaski 
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bombing, speaks of her sister's concealment of her hibakusha identity from even the 
closest members of her family: 
My sister [ ... ] has keloid scars on her right arm and never wears short- 
sleeved clothes, even in summer. She does not want her children to 
know that she is an A-bomb survivor, and therefore she has never 
applied for her health allowance even though she was eligible for it. I 
finally did the application for her, and she started getting it only last 
year. She is still adamant that her children should not know that she is 
an A-bomb survivor. (114) 
Dehumanisation, Objectification and Hibakusha Identity 
The Japanese term "hibakusha"10 was coined in direct response to the 
dropping of the atomic bomb, and its literal translation reads as "explosion affected 
person7, or "exposed one". David L. Swain and Eisei Ishikawa, translators of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical. Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic 
Bombins, a volume compiled by The Committee for the Compilation of Materials 
on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, translate 
hibakusha simply as "A-bomb and H-bomb victims" (592). Whilst the literature, 
from personal narratives to scientific investigations, almost invariably employs the 
term hibakusha when using Japanese terminology, Robert Jay Lifton, following 
extensive interviews with survivors of the atomic bombing, claims that the term 
"hagalsha", an extant Japanese word meaning "victim' ' or "injured party", is 
commonly used alongside hibakusha (Death in Life 13). The term most frequently 
used in reference to those who lived through the Holocaust, "selzonsha" 'survivor', is 
almost never used in the context of the atomic bombings, and Lifton reports that: 
I was told that Japanese avoid seizonsha because it emphasises the 
idea of being alive - with the implication that this emphasis is unfair 
to the less fortunate people who were killed. (13)" 
Pronounced hi-bak'-sha 
The problematics of terminology recur with equal frequency in studies on the Holocaust. Primo Levi 
in particular returns to this question of how to describe those who lived through the Holocaust, sharing 
the concern that the word "survivoe' is in some way triumphal, and thus dictates an image of those 
who lived as superior to those who perished. This is a theme that he returns to repeatedly, most 
significantly in If This is a Man and The Drowned and the Saved. Such an attitude complicates the 
retitling of the former text as Survival in Auschwitz for the American market. Interestingly, Lifton 
points out that Americans tend to translate hibakusha as meaning "survivor", a fact that he attributes 
largely to "the American tendency toward 'detoxifying' the experience". Using the word "survivoel 
has the effect of focussing on the living, at the risk of dismissing the dead, and as such its usage is 
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The sensitivity surrounding the name given to those who lived through the atomic 
bombings is not simply a matter of semantics. Firstly, the definition of hibakusha is 
not stable. It is used to refer to both direct and indirect victims, that is those who were 
actually caught in the explosion of the bomb, and those who came into the cities to 
give aid afterwards, as well as to those who suffered in utero exposure to the bomb. It 
is also used to describe those born to hibakusha parents years after the event, who 
suffered from deformities and health complications as a result of their parents' 
exposure. Treat stretches the definition even further, claiming that in a world where 
nuclear strikes are still possible, "the concept of the potential hibakusha now has to 
extend to everyone alive today" (Writing Ground Zero x). Secondly, just as the 
process of tattooing in Auschwitz impacted upon the individual's recognition of self, 
so does the attribution of the term hibakusha affect the self-formulation of those who 
lived through the atomic bombings. "Exposure to the atomic bomb, " claims Robert 
Jay Lifton, one of the first scholars to draw parallels between the experiences of the 
Holocaust and the atomic bombings, "changed the survivor's status as a human being, 
in his own eyes as well as in others'. He assumed the identity of the hibakusha" 
Death in Life 176). 
The defining centrality of being a hibakusha in the post-war identity of those 
who lived through the bomb is starkly revealed in Hong Kai's play, I am a 
Eibakusha. Hong's intention with the play was to illuminate the plight of the Korean 
victims of the bomb, whose experiences have been largely marginalised in the 
memory of the event. The following scene is set in an American hospital in Japan, 
where Youngjoo, a young Korean hibakusha, has gone to seek treatment for "A- 
bomb disease" after her first child died hours after birth due to Youngjoo's exposure 
to the bomb. Her nSfve expectation that she will be cured is shattered by the angry 
response of Shimura, a Japanese hibakusha and self proclaimed "prophet of the 
atomic age" (134): 
Shimura: Now you want to be cured so that you can be normal 
again. To be a woman just like any other woman. 
(more coughs) 
significant in recent debates on the "detoxification", or domestication of hoffor, exemplified by the 
ongoing argument that the remembrance of the Holocaust is becoming "Americanised". 
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How dare you? You are a hibakusha, don't you forget. 
Once a hibakusha, always a hibakusha. As you cannot 
escape being a Korean, so you cannot escape being an 
atomic man. (120) 
Hibakusha identity is showed here as inescapable, equated with national identity. TO 
become a hibakusha is to be othered by the dominant norm of culture, from which the 
hibakusha is permanently exiled. The use of the term "atomic man" is particularly 
significant, as it suggests a gendered understanding of what it is to be a hibakusha. 
Japan's post-war peace movement, largely dominated by women, employs an 
essentialist rhetoric which links peace with femininity, and atomic violence with 
masculinity. Youngjoo's exposure to the bomb has left her unable to bear children, 
and from an essentialist perspective this has compromised her femininity; she can no 
longer be a "woman just like any other woman". Hong's stage directions allow that 
the phrase may be changed to "atomic person" or "atomic woman7, but if this change 
is instigated, the line must be accompanied by a "knowing wink" to the audience. 
This wink functions to suggest that the atomic violence has in some sense 
defeminised Youngjoo, and that exposure to the bomb has compromised her identity 
as a gendered self 
Holocaust testimonies, as previously discussed, often bear witness to the 
sense of a new self that is bom through the experience of the Holocaust. The phrasing 
here, "once a hibakusha, always a hibakusha, " plays on this sense of the event 
creating a dualised self. The hibakusha self as represented here, however, seems to 
eliminate the self that came before, the preceding pre-war self overwhelmed by the 
hibakusha self Matsutani Sumiko, who survived the A-bombing of Nagasaki, 
testifies to this: "The shock of losing all of my family at once was so great that 
amnesia erased all memory of my life up to the day of the atomic bomb" (128). For 
Matsutani, life began not at her birth, but on August 6 1945. Hayashi Ky6ko, a 
Hiroshima hibakusha comments that "my life has been one built on August 9 th or, to 
put it another way, on my bomb-victim health booklef'(qtd. in Treat, Writing 
Ground Zero I 10). In this understanding of "always a hibakusha, " a phrase that 
permanently detaches the individual from the pre-event self, there can be perceived 
an echo from one historical context to another, in its reflection of the way in which 
Levi perceived the replacement of his name with a tattooed number as detaching him 
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from his Italian-Jewish familial ancestry. Youngjoo is identified primarily as a 
hibakusha, not as a daughter, sister, cousin or. wife, and so emerges from an atomic, 
rather than familial, heritage. 
In his running commentary on the play, Hong suggests that Shimura's final 
line could be extended to include the words "an entirely new species of being not 
quite human kind" (120). This sentiment of being other than "human kind" is echoed 
in the testimony of an anonymous hibakusha interviewed by Lifton: "perhaps 
hibakusha are mentally - or both physically and mentally - different from others" 
(Death in Life 176). Hibakusha identity is configured as a dehumanised other. A 
1978 international investigation in to the social consequences of the atomic bombings 
reported that: 
the very existence and the dropping of the A-bombs are a social and 
political phenomenon. The atomic bomb destroyed the total "society". 
They destroyed "home", "workplace", and even "community" [ ... ] 
Human beings became dehumanised. (Editorial Committee of JNPC, 
Findings 69) 
Whilst the acknowledgement that the effect of the atomic bomb was to dehumanise 
its victims is significant, this report seems to focus more on the dehumanisation of 
individuals as a result of their own behaviour in extremis. It continues, "human 
beings [found] themselves ruled by the instinct for self-preservation and they 
respond[ed] in ways which indicate a complete loss of moral values" (69). This 
curiously condemnatory attitude seems to suggest that individuals became 
dehumanised through their own morally dubious actions. Such ajudgement is at odds 
with both Hong's representation of the dehumanised individual and Lifton's 
anonymous survivor's account, both of which present dehumanisation as central to 
the hibakusha identity, regardless of individual behaviour. 
Lifton's anonymous survivor bears witness to a physical otherness of the 
hiakusha. The most potent visual symbol of this is the keloid, the prominent scar 
tissue formed on the skin, particularly the faces and hands, of hibakusha who suffered 
sever bums in the bombings. Lifton refers to these scars as "A-bomb stigmata7, 
Death in Life 183), a curiously Christian terminology to apply to the physical 
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appearance of, for the most part, non-Christian victims. The keloid as a symbol of 
the physical othering of hibakusha carries echoes of the tattoo as a physical symbol of 
dehumanisation on the body of the Auschwitz survivor. Such a parallel, however, 
cannot be drawn without considerable caution. Whilst the effect of tattooing in 
Auschwitz was to render the individual nameless, paradoxically identifying the 
prisoner and yet also rendering the individual as unidentiflable from any other, as 
shown through Wiesel's account of his meeting with Stein in h! ight, the actual 
process of tattooing was highly personalised. Levi envisions the process as a dialogue 
between victim and perpetrator: "You no longer have a name; this is your new name" 
(Drowned and the Saved 95). The dropping of the A-bomb, conversely, was an 
indiscriminate attack that did not focus on any individual and so precluded the 
possibility of any such dialogue. The personalisation of the process of tattooing in 
Auschwitz constituted an integral part of the offence, a part that it necessarily absent 
for the dehumanised victims of the A-bomb. Whilst the keloid as visual symbol of 
dehumanisation may, then, carry echoes of the Auschwitz tattoo, the historical 
differences crucially disallow any direct comparison of the two. 
The gaze that fell on the visual symbol of dehumanisation serves to objectify 
the hibakusha as a spectacle. The image of the hibakusha as an object of the gaze is 
revealed in the simple one line testimony given by an anonymous female survivor of 
the bombing, recorded in the The Witness of the Those Two Days project. She writes, 
"Camem flashes make my blood freeze" (Nihon Hidankyo 2: 126). The image of her 
blood freezing evokes a sense of the uncanny in her account as it brings together the 
animate in the form of her blood, a symbol of life, and the inanimate, the blood as 
stilled and frozen. The sudden brightness of the flash of the camera revives the fear 
this woman experienced when she witnessed the bright flash, orpika, of the atomic 
explosion. This sudden bright flash is an integral part of the visual remembrance of 
the A-bomb; indeed, many hibakusha refer to the A-bomb as the pikadon, a word 
which roughly translated means "flash-bang". Utilising the image of a camera also, 
however, encourages the hibakusha to be perceived as an image caught in a 
photograph. The fear she experiences is not only a latent fear of the bomb itself, but 
also the fear of the removal of autonomy which leaves the hibakusha as an object of 
the gaze. 
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The creation of the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) in the 
immediate post-war period of occupation was resented by many hibakusha as 
institutionalising the gaze which sought to objectify the victims of the A-bomb. The 
ABCC was conceived of as ajoint venture between American and Japanese scientists 
and physicians to look at the after-effects of the atomic bomb on the survivors. In 
practice, this attempt at coalition was fraught with tensions. M. Susan Lindee refers to 
the venture as an example of "colonial science" (20), a phrasing which confirms a 
process of racial othering, whereby the hibakusha were perceived as objects to be 
studied scientifically by the dominant American colonisers. In practice, however, the 
division between "colonisers" and "colonised", or more appropriately, occupiers and 
occupied, was more blurred than such terminology suggests. Japanese physicians and 
scientists had already begun studies into the after effects of the atomic bomb, and 
their work was vital to the newly arrived American team, none of whom was familiar 
with Japanese culture or fluent in the Japanese language. Lindee points to various 
misunderstandings on the part of the American team that hampered their studies. For 
example, the study of the effects of the A-bomb on infants was confused by the 
American misunderstanding of how the Japanese culture fixed the ages of 
individuals. In Japan, babies are considered to be one year old when they are bom, 
and all the children born in a given year turn two on the following new year. Thus, a 
child born a few hours before the turn of the new year would be considered to be two 
years old according to Japanese calculations, whereas American calculations would 
place the child at less than a day old. In addition to this, the inability of the American 
team to read or write Japanese Kanji also meant that they could not record the names 
of their subjects properly, as many sounds and meanings cannot be transliterated into 
the roman alphabet, thereby complicating attempts to relocate individuals for follow- 
up studies. These factors led to considerable doubts on the part of the Japanese team 
as to the value of American involvement in the project. However, this scepticism 
from the Japanese was matched by an equal mistrust of the Japanese by the 
Americans. The American team was not convinced that Japanese scientific ability 
matched their own, and also doubted the capability of the Japanese to produce 
objective data that was not contaminated by post-war anti-Americanism. As a result 
of the need that the American team had of the Japanese scientists and physicians, 
Lindee redefined the term "colonial science" to give it historical specificity to this 
instance, viewing it as "science, conducted by outsiders, that depends on local 
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knowledge, particularly when that knowledge is invisible to the colonizers 
themselves" (20). 
Tensions between America and Japan were heightened by the controversial no 
treatment policy operated by the ABCC, and fuelled the sense of the objectification of 
the hibakusha. ABCC policy dictated that the victims be studied only; any treatment 
was to be withheld. The first director of the ABCC, Grant Taylor explained the 
policy, saying that "I sympathise with you, but you are not the only ones who 
suffered effects of the war. Therefore there is no cause to render special aid to the 
victims of Hiroshima7' (qtd. in Lindee 123). The occupying forces viewed the A- 
bomb victims as no different to any other victims of the war, and saw no need to offer 
them any special treatment. A finther explanation of the no treatment policy was the 
expense that treating all of the survivors would incur. However, as early as 1956, a 
report argued that the cost of treatment would be only $30,000 (a figure Lindee 
considers to be realistic) and so well within the budget constraints of a project that 
repeatedly spent over $1,000,000 per year (Lindee 132). It was also argued that if the 
ABCC offered treatment, the practices of local Japanese doctors would be destroyed, 
and would therefore impede the economic redevelopment of Japan. Liflon points out 
that the Japanese doctors were actually in agreement with this. Whilst he maintains 
that "American authorities must bear responsibility for the ultimate decision, " he 
argues that Japanese physicians were hostile towards the ABCC offering treatment, 
fearing that it would generate a "professional competition" (Death in Life 3 65). 
However, the underlying reason for the policy, it has been repeatedly suggested, was 
politically motivated. To offer treatment would be tantamount to a tacit admission of 
culpability on the part of the Americans, and was therefore to be avoided at all costs. 
Lindee, however, suggests that the no-treatment policy was not adhered to in 
practice, and points out that the "staff in Hiroshima interpreted it loosely, provided 
occasional chemotherapy, and overlooked the actions of individual physicians who 
chose to ignore the restrictions" (128). Yet regardless of this, the popular perception 
of the ABCC promoted by the Japanese media and accepted by the majority of the 
public was that it used the hibakusha as guinea pigs for scientific study. Outlandish 
rumours emerged, claiming that the A-bomb had been dropped solely to facilitate 
American military research. Such rumours still had credence as recently as 1982 
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when a report on the A-bomb published by Nihon Hidankyo (the Japanese 
Confederation of A-bomb and H-Bomb Sufferers' Organisations) claimed that the 
bomb was dropped in order to: 
do research and study on the power of an atomic bomb in preparation 
for the further use of nuclear weapons in the future. This is why 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were chosen as targets for conducting living 
body tests. For this reason the US kept the damage of the atomic 
bombing a military secret, and refused to aid the Hibakusha in spite of 
an offer made by the International Red Cross. 
The US forcibly took many Hibakusha to military hospitals in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where they took samples of their blood and 
cut off affected parts of their weakening bodies for pathological 
research, treating the victims as 'guinea-pigs'. But they gave them no 
medical treatment. (Hibakusha 17) 
Lifton describes the image of the hibakusha as guinea pigs as being rooted in a 
resentment of being "historically victimised on a racial basis" (Death in Life 362). In 
this discourse, the hibakusha are doubly objectified, firstly on the basis of race, and 
secondly on the basis of being victims. 
This process of objectification appears to begin in the moment of death. The 
overwhelming catastrophe brought about by the atomic bomb distorts any 
understanding of death as a natural part of the life cycle. Lifton explains that: 
only man [ ... ] 'knows death', or at least knows that he will die. To 
which we must add: only man could invent grotesquely absurd death. 
Only man, through his technology, could render the meaningful totally 
meaningless. (Death in Life 572) 
Atomic death contradicts the possibility of our knowledge of death. It is 
unprecedented, extreme, and unknown and in this context death becomes 
unrecognisable as a human experience. At a 1977 symposium held to discuss the 
damage and the after-effects of the atomic bomb, Masahuru Hamatani delivered a 
report on a three-phase study which explored the problems of hibakusha. Masaharu 
described the way in which objectification became embedded in the attempt to 
understand death caused by the atomic bomb: 
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Many h1bakusha spoke of the extraordinary nature of death as they 
had seen it, and the idea of 'death of an object' -'the atrocious way of 
dying' which cannot be called 'death of a human being' - the tortures 
of the A-bomb survivors. (n. pag. ) 
Through the experience of death, victims were both dehumanised and objectified, and 
these attributes are carried over to include not only those who died, but all 
"explosion-affected" people; all hibakusha. Shigeto Fumio, director of the Red Cross 
Hospital in Hiroshima tried to explain the way in which the experience of the atomic 
bomb unified all those present on that day: 
I'm not sure how much people can understand if they haven't 
experienced the atomic bomb. People often say that dying by an 
atomic bomb is no different from dying by an ordinary bomb. Of 
course, dying is the same with either, but in the case of the ordinary 
bombs there was always the hope that you would survive. If you 
suffered a direct hit that was just bad luck. But the atomic bomb 
blasted the whole of Hiroshima so everybody suffered a direct hit. 
That's a fact. (qtd. in Ogura, Atomic Bomb and Hiroshima 71) 
Whilst Shigeto is not historically accurate in suggesting that "everybody suffered a 
direct hit, " he makes the point in order to emphasise his doubts about the capacity of 
those who were not there to understand the experience of atrocity, a sentiment he 
shares with many Holocaust survivors. For Shigeto then, all those in the bombed 
cities shared a unique experience that separates them from all others who were not 
there. From this perspective, the survivors of the bomb have more in common with 
those who died than the living who did not experience the bomb. The dead and the 
survivors experienced equally the trauma of "a direct hit, " and hibakusha thus 
become partially defined through a strong identification with the dead. It is this aspect 
of hibakusha identity that sheds light on Oe Kenzabur6's description of the ABCC 
hospital as "a land of the dead" (qtd. in Treat, Writing Ground Zero 243). The 
presence of hibakusha marked the hospital as a cemetery rather than a site of 
treatment and recovery. Lifton suggests that the bomb precipitated "a widespread 
sense that life and death were put of phase with one another, no longer properly 
distinguishable" (Death in Life 3 1). Certainly, the boundaries between survival and 
death seemed to become fluid, as the after-effects of radiation meant that living 
through the bomb did not assure survival. Many hibakusha testify to life-long fears 
that they are not survivors, but merely waiting to die from the after effects of the 
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atomic bomb. Ota Y6ko felt an urgent need to complete her testimonial account, Cily 
of Colpses, swiftly, fearing that she may die any day. In her testimony, Hosaka 
Sakae, a young nurse working in Hiroshima at the time of the bombing, writes: 
The terrible thing about radiation is that nobody knows how or when it 
will make its effects felt. I have known someone who had virtually no 
health problems in thirty years die suddenly of leukaemia. Whenever I 
fall ill, I am afraid that I will never get well again. (46) 
Much of this fear originated in the fact that the after-effects of radiation, or A-bomb 
disease as it came to be popularly known, were not understood. Particularly 
frightening was the fact that many who came into the cities only after the explosion 
suffered gruesome deaths apparently without cause. Many hibakusha understandably 
became morbidly obsessed with the state of their health, and were consequently 
diagnosed with A-bomb neurosis, a loose term used to cover all aspects of mental 
health problems in survivors, ranging from post-traumatic stress disorder to 
hypochondria. Lifton argues that in fact this fear of A-bomb disease was often 
exaggerated and misplaced, as medical evidence does not support the widely held 
belief that all those who came into contact with the radiation would eventually die 
from its effects. Nevertheless, this "death taint, " as he has termed it, and a resulting 
identification with the dead, dominates hibakusha identity. 
The taint of death dominates not only the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
but also the landscape itself. Shortly after the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, 
rumours began to circulate that the city itself would die, that nothing would grow 
there for seventy years, that the air and water would be contaminated for decades to 
come. Again, scientific evidence and the passage of time has proved this not to be the 
case, but nevertheless fuelled amongst hibakusha an identification not only with 
death but with the extinction of all forms of life. 
This overwhelming encounter with death, Liflon suggests, leads to a "life- 
long identification with death, dying and with an anonymous group of the dead" 
(Death in Life 178). The anonymity of death and suffering is inevitable in a 
catastrophe of this scale. The victims can never been known as individuals; even a 
rough consensus on the number of dead has never been reached, with estimates 
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ranging from 63,000 to 240,000. Yet those who survived are bound by their 
identification with this "anonymous group of the dead" to somehow testify to their 
experiences. Ito Takeshi, secretary general of the Japan Confederation of A-and H- 
Bomb Sufferers Organisation in the 1970s, declared that "to convey to others the 
meaning of those experiences, we believe, is what those who survived the 
conflagration must do on behalf of those who died" (30). Frequently in hibakusha 
testimony, the experience of death and suffering is represented as dehumanised and 
anonymous. 
Hara Tamiki's Summer Flowers: Crises of Witnessing, Identity and Images of 
Anonymity 
Hara Tamiki was born the fifth of twelve children into a wealthy Hiroshima 
family in 1905. Although his family were prosperous for the time, his early life was 
marred by tragedy, losing his father and four siblings before he was nineteen years 
old. Hara eventually left Hiroshima in 1924 in order to study literature at Kei6 
University, where he developed an interest in left -wing and Communist politics. His 
increasingly radical political activism led to his arrest in 193 1, an experience that 
shook Hara greatly, leading him to abandon politics all together. His marriage to 
Nigai Sadae in 1933 marked a period in his life when he largely withdrew from the 
world and focussed on his literary interests, primarily writing poetry. However, 
following the death of his mother in 1936, and the untimely death of Sadae from 
tuberculosis in 1944, Hara decided to return to his family home in Hiroshima in 
January 1945. It was here that he was living on August 6 when the bomb was 
dropped. 
Hara's account of his experience of the bombings, Summer Flowers can be 
read not simply as an eye-witness account of the bombing but rather as a testimony to 
a crisis of witnessing. The three sections which make up the full tryptich were 
published individually in Japanese literary journals prior to the publication of the 
complete text in February 1949. The first two sections, "Summer Flowers" and 
"From the Ruins, " were published in June and November 1947 respectively in Mita 
Bungak . The third and 
final section, "Prelude to Annihilation" was first published in 
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January 1949 in Kindai Bunizaku. 12 "Summer Flowers" gives an account of the day of 
the bombing. "From the Ruins" continues the linear narrative with an account of the 
days following the attack. "Prelude to Annihilation" then returns the reader to the 
days preceding the bombing, ending on August 4, two days before the attack. The 
most widely read Japanese publication of the full text places the sections in 
chronological order, placing "Prelude to Annihilation" first, followed by "Summer 
Flowers" and "From the Ruins". The English translation of the text, however, follows 
Hara's intentions and places the sections in order of composition, concluding with 
"Prelude to Annihilation". 
The structuring of the sections contributes to the sense of a crisis of 
witnessing throughout the text. Inverting the chronological narrative of the event and 
presenting a non-linear account reflects the unending trauma of the atomic 
experience. Neither the experience nor the narrative culminates with a sense of 
resolution, and in being returned to the beginning, the reader is presented with an 
inescapable text. This approach also functions to destabilise the testimonial account 
of the bombing itself. There is an implicit suggestion that the preceding testimony has 
not fulfilled its purpose, has not told the tale that "Prelude to Annihilation" is leading 
into. The "Annihilation7 of the title refers not only to the destruction caused by the 
bomb, but also an annihilation of witnessing and representation. 
As discussed earlier, Laub recognises in the Holocaust a unique crisis in 
witnessing, predicated on the impossibility of anyone present being able to bear 
witness to the truth of the Holocaust. Without any reference to Laub's theory, Kyo 
Maclear argues for a similar crisis emerging from the experience of the atomic bomb: 
These events [ ... ] have produced a unique crisis of witnessing. The 
almost complete vaporisation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki appeared to 
take place in the absence of any outside witnesses. Moreover, those 
12 In common with other hibakusha authors, Hara faced issues of censorship when he tried to publish 
his account of the atomic bomb. Hara had initially hoped to publish all three of the sections in Kindai 
Bunaaku. However, this journal was subjected to the Occupation Press Code which banned any 
unofficial accounts of the bombing. Mita Bungaku, a university affiliated journal with only a small 
occupation escaped the attention of the Occupation Authorities. By 1949, the restrictive policy of the 
Press Code was no longer enforced and it became possible for Hara to publish "Prelude to 
Annihilation" in this journal. See chapter 2 for a more lengthy discussion of Occupation censorship 
and the silencing of hibakusha voices. 
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who survived the atomic bomb experience, those who might have 
acted as inside witnesses to the actual occurrence, were left 
confounded by an event that had no historical precedent. There was 
little in the way of prior imagery that could help lend form to the 
sudden destruction of an entire city by a single weapon. Even the 
tragic effects, which included invisible radiation disease, extended 
beyond the bounds of [ ... ] representation. (5-6) 
Whilst both Maclear and Laub claim this crisis of witnessing to be unique to either 
the atomic bombings or the Holocaust, the similarity of their interpretation of this 
crisis reveals it as a phenomenon which actually unifies those who seek to represent 
these atrocities. The difference in their interpretation of crisis, however, lies in the 
possibility of the act of witnessing. Laub maintains that the act of witnessing was 
impossible for those who experienced the Holocaust, as an account from those who 
were inside the whirlwind cannot testify to the full truth of the event. This then 
jeopardises the possibility of survivor representation of the Holocaust. In contrast, 
Maclear does not explicitly deny the act of witnessing, but argues that those who 
experienced the atomic bombings cannot bear witness in that they cannot describe or 
account for their experiences of such an unprecedented atrocity. 
Maclear makes a distinction between outside witnesses, designated as the 
perpetrators, and the inside witnesses, the victims. Certainly, the nature of bombing, 
an impersonal attack taking place many hundreds of feet above the cities, excludes 
the possibility of the pilots and those on the bombing runs as being witnesses to the 
catastrophe wrought on the ground by their actions. The difficulties faced by the 
Occupying forces in their attempt to investigate the aftermath of the bombings, as 
described above, also compromises their role as witnesses to the event. The absence 
of inside witnesses once again can be seen to parallel the crisis in Holocaust 
witnessing. As it is frequently said with reference to the Holocaust that only those 
who died could be true witnesses to the event, so with the atomic bombings only 
those who perished could bear witness to the totality of the A-bomb experience. 
Hibakusha, then, can offer only a partial and non-representative account, and for 
Maclear even this is rendered impossible by an inability to bear witness to 
unprecedented atrocity. 
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Hara evokes this crisis in witnessing not only the structure of his testimony, 
but also through his representation of his experiences in Summer Flowers. At the time 
the bomb was dropped, Hara was in his outside privy, and this building protected him 
from the immediate impact of the explosion. Apart from an injury to his eye, he was 
fortunate enough to emerge practically unscathed and after surveying the destruction 
around him, he almost immediately came to the conclusion that "I must set these 
things down in writing" (49). Yet this compulsion was clouded with a prescient 
awareness that as an 'inside witness, ' he had "virtually no idea of the true state of 
things brought about by this air raid" (49). In the immediate aftermath of the 
explosion, Hara is unable to reconcile the scene of destruction around him with 
reality: 
As the situation around me, though still hazy, began to resolve itself, I 
soon felt as if I were standing on a stage that had been set for tragedy. 
I had surely seen spectacles like this at the movies. (46) 
Hara identifies the scene before him as a theatrical and cinematic enactment of 
tragedy, a tragedy that he occupies doubly as both a participating actor on the stage, 
and as a spectator in an audience. This description pinpoints a moment of crisis in 
witnessing, in that despite being inside the event, he is only able to describe it using a 
frame of reference which is outside the event - as a spectacle at a movie. 
This crisis in witnessing suggests a concomitant crisis in identity. Hara 
appears to make a division between the self who experienced the atomic bomb and 
the self who struggles to bear witness to the experience. In common with other 
hibakusha, Hara senses acutely the fracturing of identity wrought by the experience 
of atomic catastrophe. In "From the Ruins, " he announces: "I felt almost like a new 
person, someone born with the atomic thunderclap" (62). The transition into this 
"new person" is revealed in "Summer Flowers" through Hara's diminishing ability to 
recognise himself in the aftermath of the bomb. In the seconds immediately following 
the explosion as he struggled out of the small building that had saved his life, Hara 
recounts that "amid the hail of sound, I heard my own voice distinctly" (46). Yet as 
he stands and gradually surveys the destruction around him, this understanding of the 
self as a distinct and unified individual is lost as he cries out again only to discover 
that "my cry sounded in my ear like someone else's voice" (46). It is in this failure to 
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recognise the sound of his own voice that the rupturing of the self becomes apparent. 
The unrecognisable cry is that of the newbom self, Hara's h1bakusha self. 
The sound of voices comes to act as an identifying motif for Hara's hibakusha 
self as the other. Treat suggests that, "since the bombing, everything [Hara] 
encountered seemed radically alien to him, with his past no longer continuous with 
his present, there were no familiar landmarks to guide him" (Writing Ground Zero 
15 1). In the days following the bomb Hara recalls that: 
Every now and then, normal human voices terrified me. When 
someone over at the barn let out a sudden cry, that cry immediately 
called to mind the wailing voices of those dying on the riverbed. (65) 
The voices of living human beings are startling to Hara's hibakusha self, and as his 
own unrecognisable cry heralded the death of his pre-bomb self, so the voices in this 
passage are associated not with life and survival but with death. 
In keeping with his description of the event as a spectacle from a movie, 
Hara's account presents the victims he sees as anonymous objects under his gaze. He 
recounts his slow progress through the city as he sought a place of relative safety, and 
describes in painful detail the suffering of others: 
As we proceeded up the narrow stone path running along the river, I 
saw for the first time a group of people defying description [ ... ] What kind of people? ... Their faces were swollen and crumpled and it was impossible to tell which were men and which were women; their eyes 
were narrowed to slits; their lips were festering horribly. Baring their 
hideously painful arms and legs, they lay on their sides, more dead 
than alive. (52) 
In this description, Hara responds to the physical injuries of the dead with a 
dismembering of their bodies in his prose. Their sex indeterminable and their distinct 
features homogenised by horrific injuries, the victims he describes lose their 
individuality. They "defy descriptiorf 'as people, and instead are described as 
dissembled body parts, dehumanised and inanimate in their appearance. As the 
narrative progresses, the images of dehumanisation intensify, culminating in a 
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passage in which the destruction of human bodies becomes indistinguishable from the 
destruction of material objects: 
This was without doubt a new hell, brought to pass by precision 
craftsmanship. Here everything human had been obliterated - for 
example, the expressions on the faces of the corpses had been replaced 
by something model-like, automaton-like. The limbs had a sort of 
bewitching rhythm, as if rigor mortis had frozen them even as they 
thrashed about in agony. With the electric wires jumbled and fallen, 
and the countless splinters and fragments, one sensed a spastic design 
amid the nothingness. (58) 
Evoking impressions of the uncanny, the figures are caught in a "bewitching rhythm" 
that is characterised by stillness rather than movement. Accompanying this is a 
paradoxical sense of order and coherence in the chaos, the precision of the aerial 
attack matched by a curious design and pattern in the destruction. 
Yet these descriptions of dehumanised individuals should not characterise 
Hara as a detached observer of anonymous death without empathy. Indeed, in his 
poetry Hara sought to revitalise the victims, and reinstate the condition of humanity 
in the hideously disfigured corpses. Echoing Levi's attempt to restore humanity to 
objectified individuals in his post-Holocaust articulation of the Shema, Hara's poetic 
collection Atomic Bomb Landscapes published in 1950 opens with a poem entitled 
"This is a human being": 
This is a human being 
Please note what changes have been affected by the atomic bomb. 
The body is grotesquely bloated, 
Male and female characteristics are indistinguishable. 
Oh that black, seared, smashed and 
Festering face, from whose swollen lips oozes a voice. 
"Help me" 
In faint quiet words. 
This is a human being. 
The face of a human being. (qtd. in Treat, Writing Ground Zero 168) 
Within this poem, the images of dehumanised suffering, familiar from Summer 
Flowers are utilised once again to great effect. The human body is presented again as 
broken down into disfigured body parts, lending an ironic sense to the opening line 
"this is a human being. " The shift from dehumanised anonymity to individual human 
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suffering occurs with the introduction of the voice in line seven. Whereas in Summer 
Flowers the voice is associated with death and is unrecognisable as a human cry to 
Hara, in this poem it is the presence of the voice that determines that "this is a human 
being. " 
"The Witness of Those Two Days" Project 
In 1985, as part of the 40'h anniversary commemorations of the atomic 
bombings, Nihon Hidankyo conducted a survey of some 13,000 hibakusha. Each was 
questioned on their experiences, and according to their responses, 1,000 were selected 
for printing in an initial two-volume project, The Witness of Those Two Dus: 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, August 6 and 9 1945 published in 1989. However, the 
overwhelming response from hibakusha led Nihon Hidankyo to extend its publication 
plans to encompass a further two volume work, The Deaths of Hibakusha: The Days 
of the Bombings to the End of 1945, which followed in 1991. 
In his foreword to The Witness of Those Two Days, Oe Kenzabur6, the 
celebrated author of Hiroshima Notes, wrote that "this witness of the survivors is 
indeed their own" (Nihon Hidankyo, 1: vii). Oe's description of the volume is, 
however, misleadingly simplistic. The anonymity of the accounts complicates the 
provenance of these testimonies. The self who "owns" the witnessing is unknown. 
Instead of naming the contributors to The Witness of those Two Dqys, the editors 
have attributed identifying numbers to them. Each entry is headed with the name of 
the city, either Hiroshima or Nagasaki, followed by the distance of the survivor from 
the epicentre, their gender, their age at the time of the attack, and their identifying 
number. For example, the aforementioned survivor who spoke of her fear of camera 
flashes is labelled simply "Hiroshima, female, 3 km, 22,13-32-037. " Attributing 
numbers rather than names to the individual contributors in these volumes encourages 
complicity with the perpetrator's rhetoric of dehumanisation, which recognised the 
victims only as mass statistics rather than individuals. In The Politics of Memory, 
Raul Hilberg notes that the individuality or otherwise of the victims is dependent on 
the perspective of the narrative, commenting that "the victims do not have much 
individuality in [perpetrator] documents" (32). Speaking explicitly of the 
representation of Jews in German documentation of the Holocaust, he notes that 
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"they are coalesced into categories: foreign Jews, Jewish labourers, Jewish children; 
or into numbers: 20,105 Jews, 363,211 Jews, 1,274,000 Jews" (32). This process of 
categorisation, although derived from very different historical circumstances, can also 
be seen at work in the way in which the victims of the A-bomb are represented. A 
British report for the Home Office written in 1946 refers to 32,959 dead in 
Hiroshima, 9,451 missing. The statistics are broken down further; 95% of those 
within a quarter mile radius of the blast centre were killed, within a half mile radius, 
85% were killed, within a three quarter mile radius, 58% were killed, within a mile 
radius, 35% were killed (Great Britain Home Office 18). The experiences of 
individual hibakusha are subsumed into a generalised notation of death. 
Curiously, The Project Of Those Two Days echoes the method of recording 
these statistics in the way in which the testimonies are organised in the collection. 
Those within a one kilometre range of the blast centre are listed first, followed by 
those within a two to three kilometre radius, and then those who were outside of the 
three kilometre radius. The testimonies of those who entered the cities after the bomb 
to offer aid to the victims complete the volume. As their proximity to the bomb 
affected their actual experience of the event, so does it affect the positioning of their 
testimonies in the volume. The deliberate ordering of the responses in this way 
imposes a false homogeneity on the testimonies, suggesting that all those in a specific 
spatial area shared the same experience of the A-bomb, when this was not the case. 
For example, in his autobiographical graphic novel Barefoot Gen: The DqY Afte , 
Nakazawa Keiji recounts that a woman standing directly in front of him was killed by 
the force of the explosion whilst he escaped unscathed, protected from the main force 
of the blast by his proximity to a wall. Similarly in Summer Flowers Hara explains 
that I too had survived only by chance. The young man on the second floor next 
door had been killed instantly, and he was only the width of a single fence from 
where I was" (63). The ordering of the accounts in The Witness of Those Two Days 
also places an emphasis on the actual explosion, rather than the individual's 
experience of witnessing the explosion, thereby accenting the historical event, rather 
than the individual experience of the event. Taking both Felman's and Bernard- 
Donals and Glejzer's interpretation of testimony being more than just an account of 
history, this structuring of the volumes jeopardises the testimonial status of the 
accounts. 
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By anonymising the accounts and structuring the collection in this way, The 
Witness of Those Two Dgys seems to conceal, rather than reveal, the experiences of 
the self. A female survivor makes a tacit protest against this focus on the historical 
event, writing: "For me it is not just a historical fact, it is something that happened to 
me only a little while ago" (Nihon Hidankyo 1: 107). A male survivor, 28 years old at 
the time of the bombing concludes his brief testimony with the words: I don't want 
to write any further. I would rather keep it to myself' (1: 48). This suggests that the 
account he has given is rudimentary at best, and that the narratorial self has censored 
the experiential self. 
Not only is the experiential self censored to a large extent in this collection, 
but so too is the autonomous narratorial self. The responses were garnered through a 
restrictive and stringent questioning process. This collection represents a form of 
controlled testimony, the voice of the hibakusha filtered through the very specific 
questioning of the anonymous compilers. The explanatory notes that preface the first 
volume of The Witness of Those Two Dqys reveal that the statements were given in 
response to the following question: 
Do you have anything unforgettable, terrifying or regrettable in your 
memory about your experiences on the day when the atomic bomb 
was dropped and immediately after? If you have, what was it? Please 
describe what happened, what were the circumstances and what you 
felt. (1: viii) 
There is an oddly neutral styling in this question. Implicit in the phrasing is the 
suggestion that aspects of the A-bomb experience were forgettable, mundane even, a 
perspective which is undermined by the content of the following statements. The 
contributing hibakusha were asked to relate their experiences "in keeping with the 
following guidelines" (1: viii). The guidelines offered are put in place seemingly to 
aid the witnesses with structuring their responses, requesting that they record: 
A: How people died or were dying. What the victims suffered. 
B: What you felt witnessing it. 
C: If you could not do anything for those crying for help or water, 
what regrets do you feel? (1: viii) 
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Such a specific line of questioning seems to align the following accounts with legal 
testimony, where a specific answer is required. Certainly it is not a method favoured 
by interviewers searching for a personal response to catastrophe. Lifton states that 
when interviewing hibakusha for his book Death in Life he was keen to encourage 
66spontaneous expression of thoughts and feelings of any kind" (16). The 
methodology underlying The Witness of the Those Two Days eliminates any such 
possibilities. Indeed, one contributor actually felt the need to apologise for not 
conforming to the structure advocated by the compilers, beginning her account with 
the words, "I am sorry but I want to answer in the form of 'tanka'[a poem comprised 
of 31 syllables]" (2: 59). A review of the total number of accounts in the first volume 
of The Witness of Those Two Days reveals that 55 out of the 498 narratives are 
structured in the forrn of lettered bullet points, directly corresponding to the forinat 
requested by the compilers. Following these fairly rigid guidelines leads to the 
creation of a very constrained text; what is written is less what the hibakusha feels 
compelled to bear witness to and more simply an account of what the compilers want 
to hear. A male contributor, numbered 34-2623, testifies to this sense of restraint, 
concluding his brief testimony with the words, "that's all I can say on this limited 
piece of paper, though many more things come to my mind intermittently. I'd like to 
write much more on another occasion' ' (2: 17). His anonymity in this collection 
means that it can never be known whether he did record the "many more things" that 
he recalls. 
A female survivor, numbered 13-19-025, further testifies to the narrative 
restraints that such a form of questioning imposes. Seventeen years old at the time of 
the bombing, she was 1.5km away from the epicentre. She begins her testimony: 
I am hesitating whether to write in this space or not, to the last 
extremity. Though I have finished other spaces, I don't feel like 
writing. If I were able to write this page smoothly, I could have easily 
written like a memorandum of 5 or 6 pieces of manuscript during the 
past 40 years. I feel sorry for leaving this space blank as it is the 
widest one. So I will try to write something following the examples of 
A to C. (2: 56) 
She then proceeds to list her experiences in accordance with the requirements. This 
introduction, however, bears witness to the indescribability of what she witnessed. To 
71 
suggest that if she was able "write this page smoothly" she would have already done 
so brings to the fore the unavailability of words to describe her experiences. In 
common with the contributor who responded in tanka, this hibakusha gives an 
apology for the difficulties she faces in trying to narrate her experiences. She is 
unable to respond personally to the event, and can bear witness only in a proscribed 
fonnat. The narration of her experiences is, then, governed by the questions of the 
compilers. As this is a universal fonnat recommended to all contributors, this 
potentially jeopardises the uniqueness which is expected in the narration of the 
experiences of an individual self. It could be the case that the absence of such 
guidelines would have resulted in a very different account; conversely it could be 
that, as she implies, the absence of these questions would have resulted in an absence 
of any testimony at all. Again, the anonymity of this contributor means that any 
attempt to analyse how she may have narrated her experiences outside of the project 
can only be conjecture. 
Significantly, it is possible numerically to address the responses formulated in 
accordance with the A-C guidelines. Looking at the structure of testimonies, of the 
hibakusha who were within 2km of the epicentre, 13.8% responded in a bullet point 
format; of those who were 2-3km away from the epicentre, 10.5% responded using a 
bullet point format; of those beyond Ain of the epicentre, 0% responded using bullet 
points. Such figures suggest that greater proximity to the blast resulted in a greater 
difficulty in creating spontaneous responses to the event. The will to tell the tale, so 
common in hibakusha who have gone on to play a role in post-war peace activism, is 
also notably diminished in the accounts of survivors within the 2km radius of the 
epicentre. The complete account given by one 18-year-old male survivor, numbered 
22-0052, reads: 
1.1 was engaged in the work of pulling corpses out of the Ota river. 
The terrible sight still stays in my memory. 
2. There was a mother who fell to the ground, giving her burnt breast 
to her baby. Please do not make me remember. (;: 16) 
Unable to respond to the required three questions, the author finishes with a request 
to leave his memories untouched and unquestioned. This simple request is 
discomforting for the reader, implying an intrusion into a personal, private experience 
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that the author is reluctant to make part of wider and more public historical record. A 
working document entitled "Atomic Bomb and Human Beings" delivered at a 1977 
symposium on the atomic bomb suggested that "the shorter the distance from the 
center, the greater the shock" (Editorial Committee of JNPC 119). As physical injury 
was nearly always greater the closer the hibakusha was to the epicentre, John 
Whittier Treat suggests that the differing magnitudes of shock can also be traced in 
the narrative representations of the event: 
The geographical difference that determined living from dying is also 
a difference that determines meaning. First there is meaning in 
language, as greater distance from the silent epicenter parallels the 
greater ease with which the victim of nuclear war can speak of the fact 
of that day. (Writing Ground Zero x) 
This idea of the "silent epicenter" can be used to explain the greater use of the 
designated A-C format by those closest to the centre of the explosion. The difficulty 
of spontaneous narrative recreation of the event is heightened by proximity to the 
bomb, and analysing the structure of the testimonies compiled in The Witness of 
Those Two Days leads to the conclusion that responding within strictly set 
parameters is the only way that some survivors can narrate their experiences. 
The following volume, The Deaths of Hibakusha, takes a different perspective 
to that of the preceding two volumes in the project. As the title suggests, the accounts 
in this book focus not on the survivor's experiences, but on those who died. The 
testimonies included were selected from about 13,000 responses submitted to the 
editors, and describe the deaths of close relatives, often in painfully graphic detail. 
The contributions are from hibakusha who were in Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the 
days of the bombings, and also from those who entered the cities after the attacks to 
search for missing friends and relatives. The contributors are once again anonymous, 
identified only by a given number, age, gender and distance from the epicentre. 
Whereas in The Witness of Those Two 12gys, the accounts are ordered according to 
the experience of the hibakusha in terms of their distance from the epicentre, the 
accounts in The Deaths of Hibakusha are, as the title suggests, ordered according to 
the experiences of those who died. Listed first are the accounts concerning those who 
died during or immediately after the bombing, followed by those who died during the 
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days and weeks afterwards. This approach recognises the survivors as representatives 
of those who died, thereby structurally and thematically reinforcing the identification 
with the dead expressed by so many hibakusha in accounts of their personal 
experiences. 
The anonymity of the contributors and the way in which they are identified 
with the dead rather than the living constructs a dehumanised representation of 
hibakusha identity throughout the volume. In his foreword to the text, Takahashi 
Shinji comments that: 
Through the analyses of former Hibakusha surveys I have drawn one 
conclusion. I have come to define the "atomic bomb hell" as a 
condition in which one cannot stay human and remain alive at the 
same time. [ ... ] we learn that the people who saved others or were in 
charge of medical and other relief activities often had to die 
prematurely. In other words, those who stayed human, exactly because 
of their humanness, could not remain alive. Therefore we realise that 
the "atomic bomb hell" long outlasted August 6 1945 in Hiroshima 
and August 9 1945 in Nagasaki. It has persisted throughout all the 
postwar years. (English Translation Group v) 
Takahashi's conclusion presents a damning analysis of hibakusha identity as 
dehumanised, devoid of all finer human feelings such as compassion and sympathy 
for suffering. His condemnation finds the root of dehumanisation not in the act of 
violence perpetrated against the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but rather in their 
responses to the catastrophe. It was only by abandoning the principles of humanity, 
such as saving fellow human beings, that those who survived managed to stay alive. 
Certainly expressions of survivor guilt are frequent in hibakusha testimony in the 
struggle to accept the fact of their own survival when so many perished. Yet much of 
the guilt in testimonial accounts is rooted in the inability, rather than the 
unwillingness, of the survivor to help those who died. Takahashi's radical 
misinterpretation of survivor guilt culminates in his misleading categorisation of acts 
of human and inhuman behaviour by the dead and the survivors. 
Takahashi's conclusions are ultimately drawn from a dehistoricised 
interpretation of the events of August 6 and 9,1945. He constructs a false relationship 
between humanity and survival which does not take into account the harsh realities of 
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the afterinath of the bombings. By removing any trace of a perpetrator from his 
account, Takahashi presents the experience of the atomic bomb as outside of human 
control. In contrast, actions taken by victims in the aftermath are within the limits of 
human control and as such can be subjected to judgement. References to images of 
hell, presented through Christian and Buddhist interpretations, are common in 
hibakusha testimony. Hara describes being "enveloped in the dreadfully gloomy faint 
green light of the medieval paintings of Buddhist hell" (5 1). Umehara Sumiko, a 
female Hiroshima survivor recalls that "What I saw around me was a scene of living 
hell" (13 7). Takahashi's vision of the "atomic bomb hell" however, is extraordinarily 
literal in its scope. There is no space in his atomic landscape of hell for good deeds. 
Those who tried to help others, and in doing so retained their humanity, "had to die 
prematurely, " leaving only dehumanised souls to wander through an earthly hell. The 
reference to premature death implicitly draws on the concept of sacrifice, thereby 
building on the images of hell and judgment which characterise the religious tone of 
Takahashi's foreword. The concept of sacrifice, particularly in terms of Christian 
sensibility, is often introduced in descriptions of the atomic dead. A Catholic nun, 
headmistress of a Nagasaki school, interpreted the deaths of her pupils in terms of 
Christian sacrifice: 
[I myself believe] that those girls were a sacrifice. They were 
sacrificed for human sins; for the sake of others they had to die. They 
took other's places. It was a time of redemption - and their deaths 
were for the sake of other Catholics and all of the Japanese people. 
(qtd. in Lifton, Death in Life 405) 
Another Christian survivor, Hajime Yukimune, believes that the dead were sacrificed 
so that the world may know of the horror of atomic weaponry in the hope that such an 
offence would never again be committed. In this understanding of sacrifice, 
hibakusha "become Christ, having written their dying wishes in order that their tragic 
and painful experiences may save humanity" (47). 
Hajime's interpretation of the concept of sacrifice, however, differs 
significantly from Takahashi's more simplistic definition of individuals who chose to 
sacrifice their lives in order to save others. Such an understanding of sacrifice is 
ahistoric, as those who entered the devastated cities after the bombings had no idea 
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that they were putting their own lives at risk from the residual radiation. Whilst the 
bravery and the compassion of those who went to assist the victims should not be 
underestimated, it is only with retrospect that their deaths can be acknowledged as 
acts of sacrifice in Takahashi's interpretation of the word. His judgement that those 
who did not help others were dehumanised by their failure to act fails to take into 
account the actualities of the aftermath. It was often impossible to provide help; 
survivors were often so badly injured themselves they were unable to help others, 
there was no transport to move the injured, medical treatment was in short supply and 
even when it was available, there was little or no understanding of how to treat the 
injured. A rumour that giving water to the injured would prove fatal spread quickly 
through the devastated city, and so many refused pleas for water from the victims, as 
described by an 18-year-old female survivor, identified as 34-4319: "[my father] 
asked desperately for water, but we were afraid that as rumour had it, if we gave him 
water he would die. I regret now that we could not give him any treatmenf '(English 
Translation Group 82). 13 Many victims were trapped beneath fallen buildings, and it 
was impossible for them to be rescued. In danger from the fires that spread rapidly 
throughout the destroyed cities, survivors had little choice but to flee, abandoning 
trapped relatives and friends. A 27- year-old female contributor to The Deaths of 
Hibakusha, identified as 37-0038, recalls the death of her husband in precisely this 
way: "My husband was seriously injured but I had to leave the fallen house as it was. 
When the fires drew nearer I had no choice but to run. It was a most cruel death 
which makes me cry whenever I think about it" (English Translation Group 68). 
Contextualised historically in this way, Takahashi's categories of human and 
dehumanised behaviour carry little currency. Indeed, in the introduction to another 
collection of hibakusha testimonies, Hibaku: Recollections of A-Bomb Survivors, 
Tao Gotaru presents a counter-argument that in fact it is the experience of surviving 
atrocity that humanises hibakusha: "In their accounts, I find evidence of a deep and 
gentle humanity cultivated by their experience of life's extremities" (Kubo, xv). 
Nevertheless, it is Takahashi's understanding of hibakusha identity as dehumanised 
13 This denial of water to the suffering and dying appears repeatedly as a haunting regret in hibakusha 
testimony. Lifton suggests that this is due to the cultural significance of water in Japanese religion and 
folklore in which water is understood to have magical restorative powers, capable even of bringing life 
back to the dead. In this context, argues Lifton, the pleas for water became "pleas for life itselE The 
survivor's failure to acquiesce to the victim [ ... ] could thus come to have the psychological 
significance for him of refusing the request of another for the privilege of life, whiles he himself clung 
so tenaciously to that privilege" (Death in Life 175). 
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through a selfish will to survive which introduces the testimonial accounts contained 
in The Deaths of Hibakusha. 
Alongside the perceived loss of humanity in the hibakusha authors is a loss of 
autonomy. The Deaths of Hibakusha provides an even stricter set of narrative 
guidelines for the contributors than The Witness of Those Two Days. The 
respondents are presented with a six-point format around which to frame their 
testimonies: 
What was your feeling in the death of the person/persons? Please 
describe it referring to the following expressions as appropriate. 
a. I think his/her death was too terrible. 
b. I wish I could have found him/her sooner. 
C. I am sorry that I could do nothing for him/her. 
d. I regret that I was the only one who survived (in my family). 
e. I wish he/she was still alive. 
f. Give me back my child/children, father, mother and the people 
lost. (English Translation Group xi) 
These points are so specific that they form a generic testimonial template for each 
contributor. In fact, the guidelines can actually be considered as a form of testimony, 
offering a universal account (in that it is not anchored to any specific individual) of 
the hibakusha experience. Yet in providing a testimony-in-waiting, as it were, the 
possibility of distinct narrative voices is removed from the collection and the 
anonymous contributors lose the potential to express their experiences as unique to 
the individual. The representation of the atomic experience is thus anonymised and 
universalised throughout the collection. Following the approach introduced by 
Takahashi's foreword, the suggested template demonstrates a bias towards the 
expression of survivor guilt from the contributors. Implicit in the template is the 
suggestion that those who died did so as a result of the survivors failing to take 
appropriate action to save them. If the dying had been found sooner, or if something 
had been done for them then they too may have survived. The regret or shame in 
surviving referred to in point D is presented as being the inevitable consequence of 
the survivors' failure to help others and of their dehumanised behaviour. 
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Lifton suggests that "no survival experience [ ... ] can occur without severe 
guilf '(Death in Life 516). He describes this guilt as centred around "the survivor's 
unconscious sense of an organic social balance which makes him feel that his 
survival was purchased at the cost of another's" (515). Survival becomes construed 
not as a matter of chance, but rather as a conscious act which led to the death of 
another in place of the survivor. In this way, the survivor may come to feel a 
misplaced sense of complicity in the deaths of the victims. The absence of a visible 
perpetrator in the case of the atomic bombings compounded the sense that it was the 
survivors who were somehow responsible for the deaths of the victims. 
Certainly the expression of guilt is prevalent throughout the collection. A 
particular example is that of a female hibaksusha, identified with the number 34-054. 
24 years old at the time of the bombing, she was 3.0 km away from the epicentre of 
the explosion, and her testimony reveals that she lost her mother, father and elder 
brother. Her account is carefully ordered into three sections describing the deaths of 
each member of her family. Searching among the ruins of the city, she found her 
elder brother badly injured, and he later died on August 7. Although she writes in 
prose form, her account of his death follows the first three points of the provided 
testimonial template almost exactly: 
I can never forget for the rest of my life the cruelty of his death, indeed 
it was hell. Every time I think of my elder brother I am terribly 
distressed that I could not find him earlier. My brother could have 
survived somehow if I had taken him to the hospital. (English 
Translation Group 59) 
In the account of her mother's death she reiterates a wish that she could have found 
her earlier. Yet in both cases, it is unlikely that anything could have been done to save 
either member of her family. Indeed, she herself acknowledges towards the end of her 
account that "no-one could do anything in that desperate situation" (English 
Translation Group 59). This bald statement suggests a defensive posturing in her 
account, confronting the assumption of survivor guilt made by both Takahashi and 
the compilers of the volume. 
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Throughout the collections, there is an attempt to construct hibakusha identity 
as occupying a liminal position between life and death, as dehumanised and 
anonymous. Yet the testimonial accounts, and the work of Hara Tamiki, show that 
through the act of testifying hibakusha struggle against this imposed construction of 
self, revealing through their authorship an attempt to personalise the experiences of 
the anonymous dead as well as reinstating their own individual identity as human 
beings, rather than being recognised solely as hibakusha. 
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Chapter 2 
Absence and Presence: The Role of Silence in Testimonial Writina 
Perhaps Nazi camp survivors [and A-bomb survivors] are the only 
[ ... ] group[s] of modem writers so uniformly and so severely 
restricted by the same material of which they would tell. It is as if the 
paper they face is their enemy as well as their ally, something to be 
feared as the bitter return to the site of their suffering as well as a 
recuperative means for collecting, organising, and passing on the 
lessons of that suffering. (Treat, Writing Ground Zero 29) 
2.1 Introduction: Silence and the Limits of Representation 
To begin, I will examine two responses to catastrophe. The first is taken from 
Holocaust survivor Miklos Nyiszli's testimony, Auschwitz, published in 1946. 
Nyiszli was selected to work alongside Dr Mengele as a camp doctor to assist in 
pseudo-scientific racial studies in Auschwitz. As such he occupied a more privileged 
position than other prisoners, and keenly felt a responsibility to try and remember all 
that he witnessed in order to "give an accurate account of what I had seen if ever, by 
some miraculous whim of fate, I should escape" (49). However, even whilst in the 
camp he realised the impossibility of the task that he had set himself, asserting that: 
word descriptions are quite incapable of furnishing anyone with an 
accurate picture of what goes on here. So my efforts to photograph in 
my mind all I see and engrave it in my memory are, after all, 
completely useless. (66) 
The second response was recorded by A-bomb survivor Kijimi Katsumi in his 1965 
testimony, Eternal Regrets. Kijimi survived the atomic bombing of his home town of 
Hiroshima on August 6 1945. He recalls seeing the Enola Gay, the American B-29 
which carried the atomic bomb flying overhead, and thinking to himself, "Oh look, 
there's another enemy plane coming"; his attempt to represent what followed was 
utterly confounded: "Thereafter there were no more words" (qtd. in Treat, Writing 
Ground Zero 27) 
The testimony of both Nyiszli and Kijimi bears witness to the challenge that 
that the experience of trauma poses to the possibilities of representation. Each focus 
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on the fallibility of language in the wake of extremity, a theme that occupies the 
majority of testimonial texts emergent from both the Holocaust and the atomic 
bombings. Whilst these introductory quotations may suggest a unity between the 
responses to catastrophe offered by Nyiszli and KiJimi, the historical specificities of 
the individual events they attempt to describe warns against a comparison which 
focuses solely on the similarities between their representational efforts. However, as 
Leigh Gilmore observes, it is by exploring "the relation between trauma and 
representation, and especially language, " that we can seek to define "trauma as a 
category" (6). It is through acknowledging this relationship in testimonial texts from 
both events that an understanding of Treat's assertion of the link between Holocaust 
survivors and hibakusha can be reached. 
"Something of a consensus has already developed, " argues Gilmore, "that 
takes trauma as the unrepresentable to assert that trauma is beyond language in some 
crucial way, that language fails in the face of trauma, and that trauma mocks language 
and confronts it with its insufficiency" (6). In The Writing of the Disaster, Maurice 
Blanchot confronts that which Michael Bernard-Donald and Richard Glejzer describe 
as "the unsayable aspects of history" (40). For Blanchot, the incursion of the 
Holocaust into history questions the possibilities of language and the very process of 
writing. Indeed, in her prefatory remarks to the text, Blanchot's translator, Ann 
Smock, argues for the interchangeablity of the words "writing" and "disaster, " 
commenting that: 
the writing of the disaster means not simply the process by whereby 
something called the disaster is written - communicated, attested to, or 
prophesised. It also means the writing done by disaster - by the 
disaster that ruins books and wrecks language. (Blanchot ix) 
According to this formulation, the (failed) representation of the disaster actually 
becomes the disaster. In many examples of testimonial writing it is this disaster of 
failed representation, as well as the disaster of the historical event that occupies the 
author. The disaster, claims Blanchot, "is what escapes the possibility of experience - 
it is the limit of writing. This must be repeated - the disaster de-scribes" (7). It is the 
fact that the disaster "de-scribes" - destroys the possibility of representation - that 
denies the possibility of experience. The subtle distinction between the event and the 
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experience of the event is drawn through Blanchot's understanding of experience 
being predicated on intellectual assimilation and knowledgeable understanding of the 
event. As Ernst van Alphen explains: 
The experience of an event or history is, however, dependent on the 
terms the symbolic order offers. It needs these terms if living through 
the event is to be transformed into an experience ofthe event. [ ... ] The 
problem Holocaust survivors encounter is precisely that the lived 
events could not be experienced because language did not provide the 
terms with which to experience them. This unrepresentability defines 
those events as traumatic. (44) 
The unlived experience, manifested as a failure in representation is, then, for van 
Alphen that which characterises an event as traumatic. The event cannot be 
experienced if it cannot be reconstructed in language. This returns us to Gilmore's 
thesis, that it is the (non) interaction between language and the event that defines 
trauma. Cathy Caruth cements the relationship between language and trauma, 
describing trauma as "the story of a wound that cries out, that addresses us in the 
attempt to tell us of a reality or truth that is not otherwise available" CýLnclaimed 
Experience 4). 
Yet if language fails in its capacity to represent, what is the nature of this cry? 
Blanchot is keen to point out that whilst the disaster "de-scribes", this "does not mean 
that the disaster, as the force of writing, is excluded from it, is beyond the pale of 
writing, or extratextual" (7). He describes the Holocaust as "the absolute event in 
history - which is a date in history - that utter burn where all history tookfire, where 
the movement ofMeaning was swallowed up" (47). Here, Blanchot maintains his 
distinction between the Holocaust as an occurrence -a date in history - and as an 
experience, the possibility of which is compromised by the swallowing up of 
meaning. If the destruction of Meaning is that of the relationship between language 
and that which it seeks to describe, then the possibility of representation must lie in 
the 'Weeing silence of the countless cty" (47). 
Superficially, the absence of language suggests a failure of communication; 
there is, it seems, an inherent conflict between expression and silence. However, a 
reading of testimonial literature forces this assumptive understanding to be 
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challenged. The use of silence in testimonial texts indicates a more covert form of 
communication, for as Blanchot suggests, "to be silent is still to speak. Silence is 
impossible" (11). He points to the paradoxical nature of "the silence of the word 
silence, " recognising that the utterance of the word itself banishes its meaning, and 
suggests that the utterance of silence is in fact a "voiceless cry, which breaks with all 
utterances" (5 1). Blanchot's interpretation of silence forms a basic premise for the 
reading of testimonial literature, as he recognises silence as a form of expression. 
Addressing the Holocaust directly, Blanchot recognises that language fails to reveal 
its meaning. "Work, " he writes, " in societies where, indeed, it is highly valued as the 
materialist process whereby the worker takes power, becomes the ultimate 
punishment [ ... ] The meaning of work then is the destruction of work in and through 
work" (8 1). Under these conditions, language can offer little understanding. "We read 
books, " he continues, "on Auschwitz. The wish of all in the camps, the last wish: 
know what has happened, do not forget, and at the same time never will you know" 
(82). Here, Blanchot recognises that written narrative can never furnish the reader 
with a full understanding of the event. Silence can function as a reminder of what we 
cannot know, and in not knowing cannot experience. The fact that the Holocaust 
cannot be experienced is made manifest through silence. Understanding silence as a 
present absence leads to an awareness of what has been lost and what cannot be 
represented, and so explained, in testimony. Terrence Des Pres characterises the 
silence in Wiesel's writing as exactly this, "not [ ... ]a vacuum or emptiness, but as 
presence- of memory, of the dead, of an evil so overwhelming and unspeakable that 
only silence, in its infinitude, can begin to represent it" (55). This, then, is the core of 
what Bernard-Donalds and Glejzer define as the central "paradox of Blanchot's 
purpose, " the recognition of "the impossibility of speaking of the immediacy of an 
experience while acknowledging that speaking the experience is what constitutes if' 
(42). Speaking in this instance is not restricted to language, as Treat notes in his 
analysis of atomic bomb literature. He claims that is through "the silences, the oft- 
noted lacks and gaps in atomic bomb writing, may be precisely where the 
[testimonial] genre "speaks" to us the most. " (Writing Ground Zero 30). 
As such, silence in testimony cannot be viewed as a void or an absence. 
Conversely, silence can be recognised as the genesis of a text. Elie Wiesel 
acknowledges that "it was by seeking, by probing silence, that I began to discover the 
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perils and power of the written word" (Why I Write 200). The perils, that words can 
only betray the experience, are balanced by the "power of the written word". Yet an 
essential component of this power is the recognition of the role of silence within it. 
There is a difference between silence as an absence, and silence as a presence within 
the written narrative. Viewed in this way, silence comes to represent an active 
presence in testimonial writing, and the way in which language is not prioritised over 
silence comes to be an identifying feature of testimonial literature. 
2.2 Absence as Presence in the Holocaust Narrative 
Telling the Tale 
In a review of Elie Wiesel's work, Terrence Des Pres comments, "if I select 
one single aspect of his writing that gets to the heart of the matter, I would say that 
silence, and the tension between silence and the the need of the witness to speak, is 
the matrix of meaning on which Wiesel's accomplishment lies" (50-5 1). Holocaust 
survivors frequently testify to a compulsion that forces them to tell the tale of their 
experiences. James E. Young has argued that "when survival and the need to bear 
witness become one, [the] desperate urge to testify in narrative cannot be 
underestimated" (17). This intimate relationship between telling the tale and survival 
is revealed by Primo Levi in the preface to If This is a Man, as he represents the urge 
to testify as equivalent to other basic human needs: 
The need to tell our story to 'the rest', to make 'the rest' participate in 
it, had taken on for us, before our liberation and after, the character of 
an immediate and violent impulse, to the point of competing with our 
other elementary needs. (15) 
In his analysis of Levi's writing, Nicholas Patruno concludes that "it is only through a 
constant interface with his recollections that [Levi] sees any hope of surviving his 
survival" (9). However, as Levi makes clear, this association between testifying and 
surviving was not only realised following liberation, but was in fact present 
throughout his time in the camp. He states that "this was the sense, not forgotten 
either then or later: [ ... ] that even 
in this place one can survive, and therefore one 
must want to survive, to tell the story, to bear witness" (If This Is A Man 47). 
Repeatedly in If This is a Man, he refers to his desire to remember and testify. On one 
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occasion, he recalls awakening from a dream in which he was freely talking to family 
and friends of his experiences: 
I am now awake and I remember that I have recounted it to Alberto 
and that he confided to me, to my amazement, that it is also his dream 
and the dream of many others, perhaps of everyone. (66) 
The urge to tell the tale is thus revealed to be a fundamental need shared by many 
prisoners. Levi frequently returns to this compulsion to share his story, casting 
himself as an Ancient Mariner figure, haunted by his past. He uses a verse from 
Coleridge's poem to introduce The Drowned and the Saved with the image of the 
"ghastly tale" that bums within him. In The Periodic Table he writes: 
It seemed to me that I would be purified if I told its [the Holocaust's] 
story, and I felt like Coleridge's Ancient Mariner, who waylays on the 
street the wedding guests going to a feast, inflicting on them the story 
of his misfortune. I was writing concise and bloody poems, telling the 
story at breakneck speed, either by talking to people or by writing it 
down, so much so that gradually a later book was born: by writing I 
found peace for a while and felt myself become a man again, a person 
like everyone else, neither a martyr nor debased nor a saint: one of 
those people who form a family and look to the future rather than the 
past. (15 1) 
For Levi, the urge to write is the urge to survive; to return through words to being a 
man. Through writing he seeks to reject the image of the survivor as a martyr, as 
debased, or as a saint, and assert himself as a "person like everyone else. " His 
refuting of these images of the survivor which define him by his past experiences is 
congruent with his desire to be a man who looks "to the future rather than the past. " 
This desire to tell the tale becomes inextricably bound up with the idea of a 
duty towards those who died. Elie Wiesel expresses this sentiment most succinctly 
when he writes that: 
I am duty bound to serve as their emissary, transmitting the history of 
their disappearance even if it disturbs, even if brings pain. Not to do so 
would be to betray them and thus myself. (Why I Write 202) 
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In "Why I Write", Wiesel constantly returns to the word "duty". He feels "duty bound 
to give meaning to my survival, " and asserts that "for the survivor, writing is not a 
profession, but an occupation, a duty" (200). This feeling of responsibility to convey 
the truth of the event is fraught with the fear of betrayal. To refuse to write evinces, 
for Wiesel, the feeling that he has betrayed those who cannot testify. Yet, at the same 
time, the problem of representation is insurmountable, for as Wiesel writes "we do try 
to put the experience into words. But can we? Language is poor and inadequate. The 
moment it is told, the experience turns to betrayal" (Jewish Values 264). Wiesel is, 
then, confronted with a paradox, summed up by McAfee Brown as "to speak is to 
betray, not to speak is to betray. There is no way not to betray" (25). The source of 
this betrayal is twofold. Firstly, there is the fact that survivor testimony is somehow 
incomplete. Only those who did not survive could narrate the totality of the 
Holocaust, and to represent the Shoah as a story of survival is to deny the truth of the 
event. Levi acknowledges that those who survived weie those such as himself, who 
were "an anomalous minority, we are those who by their prevarications or abilities or 
good luck did not touch the bottom" and that as a result the history of the camps has 
been written by those who "never fathomed them to the bottonf ' Q)rowned and the 
Saved 64). Yet, outside this quite specific argument that it is impossible for a 
survivor to testify to the truth of the Holocaust, there is the larger fact that language 
fails in the face of extremity. The compulsion to tell the tale is hampered by the 
absence of words which can describe these events. In the wake of the horrors of the 
twentieth century, Saul Friedlander perceives a progressive collapse in the descriptive 
power of language: 
The inadequacy grows between language and certain events. That 
began well before Auschwitz, perhaps with the First World War, only 
to reach its culmination with Auschwitz. [ ... ] Events moved faster 
than language. Since Auschwitz, the distance between them seems 
insurmountable. " (93) 
The magnitude of violence in the twentieth century threatens the efficacy of 
language, and compromises the possibility of descriptive testimony. It is in this 
compromise that the fear of betrayal looms large. 
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"Something will happen to it": Silence and the Failure of Language 
It is an obvious observation that where violence is inflicted on man, it 
is also inflicted on language. (Levi, Drowned and the Saved 76) 
Andrea Reiter suggests that the "compulsion to bear witness for murdered 
comrades and for life itself, even the wish to communicate one's experiences to 
others, are not enough to explain the mechanism that led to the writing of a report" 
(Narrating Lhe Holocaust 202). Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi argues that the imperative to 
speak is the culmination of several factors, and lists them as: 
the desire for some sort of revenge; the need to bear witness [ ... ]; the desire to commemorate the dead, the impulse to absolve oneself or 
one's companions of aspersions of passivity or complicity; the sense 
of mission, to warn humanity of its capacity for genocide. (21) 
By identifying the desire to bear witness as only one motive amongst many, Ezrahi 
appears to challenge the relationship between survival and testimony that Young 
understands as crucial to the interpretation of testimonial writing. Whilst she 
acknowledges that "the real victory to which these documents attested was the very 
fact of personal survival, " she reads the urge to testify as a consequence of survival, 
as opposed to Levi's formulation of testimony as an aspect of survival (21). Reiter 
offers a further motivation behind testimony, arguing that the act of writing is itself 
an "attempt to come to terms with the experience intellectually" (Narrating the 
Holocaust 203). Intellectual understanding is, however, dependent on the ability to 
assimilate memory into a coherent representation of experience. Yet attempts at 
representation are j eopardised at the outset by the failure of language to describe 
these events. Elie Wiesel has declared Auschwitz to be the "ultimate event, the 
ultimate mystery, " in that it can never be known by those who were not there 
(Trivializing the Holocaus . Descriptive language simply cannot convey the 
enormity of the Holocaust. Anticipating Saul Friedlander, George Steiner argued that 
"what man has inflicted on man, in very recent time, has affected the writer's primary 
material - the sum and potential of human behaviour - and it presses on the brain 
with a new darkness" Language and Silence 4). Wiesel built upon this idea of a new 
darkness inherent in the writer's task in a 1978 lecture, "The Holocaust as Literary 
Inspiration, " when he declared that "Treblinka means death, absolute death, death of 
87 
language and of hope, death of trust and of inspiration" (7). He continues by arguing 
that in the aftermath of the Holocaust, "language had been corrupted" (8), and it is 
this concept of corruption that forms the basis of Steiner's contentious analysis of the 
German language in particular as becoming somehow deformed in the post-Holocaust 
world. 
The German language was not innocent of the horrors of Nazism 
Gradually words lost their meaning and acquired nightmarish 
definitions [ ... ] Use a language to conceive, organise and justify Belsen; [ ... I Something will happen to it. (Language and Silence: Essays 1958-1967 121-124) 
Steiner proposed this argument in an essay entitled "The Hollow Miracle", and in a 
1982 republication of the essay he added a footnote acknowledging the "hurt and 
anger" that his ideas caused (Language and Silence 117). However, he stood by his 
thesis, arguing that "the matter of the relations between language and political 
inhumanity is a crucial one" (117). In the essay, he argues that historical 
circumstance made the German language a fertile ground for genocidal rhetoric. He 
concedes that "a Hitler would have found reservoirs of venom and moral illiteracy in 
any language, " but maintains that "by virtue of recent history, they were nowhere else 
so ready and so near the very surface of common speech" (12 1). However, Steiner 
offers little to support this assertion; suggesting that recent history in Germany 
provided a fertile breeding ground for virulent antisemitic discourse in the country 
actually overlooks the fact that the experience of the majority of German Jews was 
assimilation rather than isolation, and that antisemitism was actually far more 
rampant in Eastern European countries such as Ukraine. Yet for Steiner, the acts of 
barbarity perpetrated during the Holocaust were conceived of, ordered by and 
recorded in the German language, and it is for this reason that the Holocaust as an 
event is forever bound to the German language. Gen-nan has become, then, a 
perpetrator language, a language that can offer no illumination, no understanding; it 
can communicate, but can give "no sense of communion, " a language summed up in 
the phrase hier ist kein warum (117). Indeed, the phraseology of Nazi camp rhetoric 
demonstrates a dislocation between language and meaning within the German tongue. 
Wiesel recalls the signs that adorned the electrified barbed wire that enclosed 
Auschwitz reading "'Warning. Danger of death'. Mockery: was there a single place 
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here where you were not in danger of death? " (Ni ght 5 1). The words on the sign 
constitute more than a warning of electrocution for Wiesel; they come to stand as 
words which define his whole experience. However, Ruth KlOger's testimony reveals 
a rejection of Steiner's assertion of the German language as permanently damaged on 
the grounds that it is too simplistic. She acknowledges that aspects of German have 
been permanently damaged through the Nazi distortion of language, reflecting that 
"German proverbs nauseate me; I can't hear any of them without seeing its cynical 
application in the death factory" (17). Levi offers an example of this "cynical 
application" with bizarrely cheerful couplet "Nach dern Abort, vor dem Essen/Hande 
waschen, nicht vergessen" inscribed on the wall of the washroom. He recognises that 
this is not simply an incentive for hygiene, but rather a reminder that washing is 
"important as a symbol of remaining vitality, and necessary as an instrument of moral 
survival" (If This is A Man 46). Yet at the same time, Mager is insistent that the 
Nazism should not be regarded as the most influential legacy bequeathed to the 
German language. German, she argues, is also the language of Jewish intellectualism, 
and to ignore this ancestry is to deny these voices their rightftil place in German 
history (257). Taken to its extreme, the erasure of the Jewish German voice is to 
participate in the Nazi aim to eradicate Jewish life and culture from Europe. Steiner's 
account of the German language, then, whilst being a useful starting point for a 
discussion about the relationship between language and violence, can only offer a 
partial interpretation of the effect of atrocity on language and the possibilities of 
representation. 
However, the dislocation between language and meaning that emerged in the 
camps is a common feature of many Holocaust testimonies. Language is rendered as 
silence as it fails to communicate any message; simply, language ceases to make 
sense. Words acquired new meaning under Nazi euphemisms: the showers, 
Sonderbehandlung, Treblinka's Himmelweg. A brief incident in Filip Miller's 
testimony, Auschwitz Infemo, bears witness to this breakdown in meaning. MUller 
was a young Slovakian Jew imprisoned in Auschwitz in 1942. Shortly after his 
arrival in the camp, M111ler was selected for the Sonderkommando, a special work 
detail whose role was to remove the bodies from the gas chambers and strip the 
corpses of any valuables that the victims had attempted to conceal about themselves, 
a duty which included the removal of any gold dental fillings. 'Mey then transferred 
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the bodies to the crematoria for their final destruction. Miller's survival was 
particularly remarkable, as those selected for work in the Sonderkommando could 
generally expect to live for only a few months before they themselves were murdered, 
to deny the prospect of any future witnesses to the Nazi atrocities. In his testimony, 
Mfiller recounts an incident which demonstrates the way in which language ceased to 
have any relevant meaning in Auschwitz. The story that Mfiller tells is that of a new 
prisoner, a lawyer, who demands to speak to the Kommandant after having 
witnessing Vacek, a kapo or block leader, killing a fellow prisoner: 
"Herr Kommandant, as a human being and a lawyer I wish to report 
that the block clerk" - pointing at Vacek - "has arbitrarily killed 
several innocent people [ ... ]I would therefore request you to have this 
morning's events investigated and to see that the guilty are truly 
punished. " (5) 
The lawyer is beaten to death by Vacek for his words. Whilst the terrible murder of 
this unnamed lawyer cannot be interpreted as anything but murder, the representation 
of his death in this particular text becomes a symbol for something greater: the 
collapse ofjustice and civilisation in the world of the camp. 'Me lawyer's words 
belong to the civilised world, rather than the atavistic state in the camp. Words such 
as "human being", "innocent" and "guilty" swing loose from their meanings in 
Auschwitz, and language is recoded to the extent that these words seem to have no 
relevance in Punivers concentrationnaire. 
Structuralist theory has long argued for the arbitrariness of the relationship 
between words (the signifiers) and their meanings, or concepts (the signified). In such 
an approach, then, there is no inherent relationship between glu/i/l/t/y, for example, as 
signifier and "guilty" as a concept. There is no reason to assume that the signifier 
g/u/i/l/t/y has a more privileged relationship with the signified "guilty" than the 
signifier c/o/u/p/a/b/l/c, for example. Yet to argue that the relationship between 
significr and signified is arbitrary is not to argue that it is therefore unstable. Through 
common usage in a language system the signifier becomes anchored to its arbitrarily 
ascribed signified. The practical effect of this, argues John E. Joseph, is that 
"although the linguistic sign is arbitrary, it is impossible for anyone to change it" 
(60). Yet whilst the relationship is resistant to change initiated by an individual, this 
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does not mean that it does not change over time in response to historical and social 
factors. In the context of Miller's testimony, it can be seen that the impact of the 
Holocaust on the language system is to break down the relationship between the 
signifier and the signified in the camps. The experience of the Holocaust (indeed, it 
could be argued, the experience of all forms of trauma), then functions to reinstate the 
arbitrariness of the signifier/signified relationship. The relationship that existed 
between g/u/i/l/t/y and "guilty" prior to the Holocaust is negated through the 
experience of the camps as the Nazi authorities rewrote the meaning of "guilty" as a 
concept. At its most basic level, the pre-Holocaust concept of "guilty" presupposed a 
crime or misdemeanour of some sort; the Nazi system of values (or perhaps more 
appropriately "anti-values') rewrote the concept of "guilty": one was determined to 
be guilty not only on the basis on acts committed, but on the basis of being - being 
Jewish, Gypsy, homosexual, for example, meant that one was "guilty. " Tberefore the 
signif ier g/u/i/l/t/y which was anchored to the pre-Holocaust meaning of "guilty" can 
no longer function as a signifier for the concept of "guilty" as the meaning of the 
signi f icd has been altered in accordance with a Nazi perspective. 
Wiesel's choice to write Night in French is a ftirther manifestation of the issue 
of tainted language. Colin Davis suggests that his decision to write in French was 
motivated by a desire to find a neutral language in which to recount his experiences 
of the Holocaust. French was the first language that Wiesel learned after liberation. 
The decision to write in French instead of his native language seems to be an attempt 
to consciously dissociate from the experiential self of the Holocaust, for as Davis 
suggests, French offered "a medium not directly associated with or compromised by 
previous experiences" (27). It functions to provide a distance between the event and 
its narration. By replacing experiential language with representational language, 
Wiescl works with a language that is untainted, and thus perhaps less doomed to 
failure. Nevertheless, Davis argues that Wiesel's "sometimes torturous French style 
seems to bear traces of the trauma of the Holocaust, " in that it appears "contrived and 
awkward, deprived of fluency and harmony; his texts stutter rather than flow" (27). 
Wiesel himself comments briefly on his style in All Rivers Run to the Sea, 
acknowledging his difficulties in writing in a foreign language: "I write in French, but 
I learned the language from books and therefore I am not good at slang" (321). The 
suggestion that the vocabulary available to Wiesel the author differs from that of the 
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experiential Eliezer reinforces the understanding of the dualised self as discussed in 
chapter one. Barbara Engelking, however, suggests that the adoption of foreign 
languages by survivors to describe their experiences threatens the authenticity of their 
testimony. Somewhat subjectively, she argues that: 
I am convinced that it is easier to relate wartime experiences in the 
language that was used at that time, in which the world was named. 
For this reason, I believe that accounts given by Polish survivors in 
Polish are more valid, nearer to the inner truth, than accounts given in 
other languages. (15) 
This assertion is difficult to justify, as it fails to take into account the significance of 
the employment of a neutral language. To suggest that testimonies written in the 
native language of the survivor have a greater validity is to distort the meaning of 
authenticity. Arguing that authenticity is conferred primarily through the use of time 
and space specific language - through the employment of what could be termed the 
6'language-scape" of the event - offers a very restrictive interpretation of what it 
means to record an experience authentically. Her argument is also hampered by the 
absence of a fixed definition of what it means to write "authentically. " For example, 
whereas for Engelking, Wiesel's decision to write in French would diminish the 
authenticity of his account, it could be equally argued that his rejection of the 
Holocaust language-scape is actually an authentic part of his response to his 
experiences. His use of French could be viewed as symbolic of his survival and 
escape from the Holocaust, and thus an "authentic" part of his Holocaust experience. 
Yet Engelking continues to argue: 
were they [survivors writing in a foreign language] able to 
communicate emotions and nuances of meaning, as well as elements 
of wartime life, in languages which had no words which could 
precisely convey these meanings? Every language determines an 
appropriate area of meaning and emotions; it determines ways of 
naming and communicating the world. (15) 
Engelking's analysis is further flawed in that it fails to take into account the nature of 
language and communication in the camp. In arguing that there is a possibility of a 
64prccisc" correlation between language and meaning, she neglects to acknowledge 
the dcstabilisation of language in the camps. Her view is also based on the idea that 
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there was a consistency of language in the camps which was continuous with 
language outside of the concentrationary universe. This assumption conflicts with 
survivors accounts of language in the camps. 
Kitty Hart, for example, recalls the bewilderment she experienced on arrival 
in Auschwitz: 
Muselmann? What on earth does that mean? I could not make it out. 
This place seemed to have its own vocabulary, a complete language of 
its own. But I realised that we shall get acquainted with it before long. 
Soon we shal I know everything. (5 1) 
Testifying to the singular language of the camps, Hart also constructs a relationship 
between knowledge and language. Through knowing the language, she will come to 
know "everything. " In suggesting that the camp can only be understood through its 
own language, Hart's testimony contradicts Engelking's assertion that it is the native 
language of survivors, specifically Polish survivors, that has a more privileged 
position in representing the camps. Hart continues to describe the language in the 
camps, recalling "They [the other prisoners] were of all nationalities, but we had no 
language difficulties, for one soon got acquainted with the camp slang which was 
common to all" (56). The native language of the survivors is, then, arguably not the 
language of the Holocaust experience. The language-scape of the Holocaust was not 
for any individual a specific national language but rather a combination of different 
elements of the native languages of all the prisoners. In fact, for Engelking's view to 
ring true, the only "authentic" narrative would be one written solely in camp argot. 
Testimony reveals however, that this notion of a stable camp argot is in fact 
false. I lart's representation of a "camp slang which was common to all" sits uneasily 
with other survivor's recollections of the camps. Levi in particular characterises 
Auschwitz as "perpetual Babel, " a place where language is never fixed and 
communication constantly marred by linguistic confusion (Drowned and the Saved 
55). The majority of the camp language that he includes is, however, German. Odd 
exceptions such as Selekcja, a word he describes as a Polish Latin hybrid occur, but 
the language of Levi's Auschwitz is primarily the language of the perpetrators. As 
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well as drawing words from existing languages, new words emerged such as 
Muselmann, and Levi concludes that: 
If the Lager had lasted longer a new, harsh language would have been 
born; and only this language could express what it means to toil the 
whole day in the wind, with the temperature below freezing, wearing 
only a shirt, underpants, cloth jacket and trousers, and in one's body 
nothing but weakness, hunger and knowledge of the end drawing 
nearer. If This is A Man 129) 
The existence of a distinctive camp vocabulary is well documented by survivors, but 
a closer reading of Levi's and Hart's testimonies reveals subtle variations in the 
language. For example, Hart unfailingly refers to the camp hospital as the Rewir, 
whereas Levi names it Ka-Be. The different experiences of Hart living in the 
women's camp and working in the Kanadakommando compared to Levi living in the 
mens camp and working in Buna is the most likely explanation for this discrepancy, 
yet even this small lexical distinction suggests that there was no uniform camp 
language. 
Levi testifies to the fact that the development of a camp vocabulary did not 
necessarily ease communication in the camps in Moments of Reprieve. In the short 
tale entitled "The Juggler", he writes about an encounter between himself and a 
German prisoner, Eddy. Eddy slapped him, and from this blow Levi understood that 
Eddy was telling him, "watch out, you've really made a big mistake this time, you're 
endangering your life, maybe without realising it, and you're endangering mine as 
well" (3 1). Violence in the camps became a form of language that did not rely upon 
words and their distorted meanings. Levi recognises that a spoken exchange between 
Eddy and himself "would have been useless, (not understood if nothing else, because 
of language problems), out of tune, and much too roundabout" (3 1). Physical 
violence became a substitute for words in the language of the camp, and Levi records 
that: 
A slap inflicted in the Camp had a very different significance from 
what it might have here among us in today's here and now. Precisely: 
it had a meaning; it was simply another way of expressing oneself. 
[ ... ] Punches and slaps passed among us as daily language, and we 
soon learned to distinguish meaningful blows from the others inflicted 
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out of savagery, to create pain and humiliation, and which often 
resulted in death. A slap like Eddy's was akin to the friendly smack 
you give a dog, or the whack you administer to a donkey to convey or 
reinforce an order or prohibition. Nothing more in short than a non- 
verbal communication. Among the many miseries in the Camp, blows 
of this nature were by far the least painful. Which is equivalent to 
saying that our manner of living was not very different from that of 
donkeys and dogs. (3 1) 
The violent language of the camp is as filled with tones and inflections as verbal 
communication. In referring to these blows as "the least painful", Levi is speaking 
solely in terms of physical bodily pain. The pain accorded by the dehumanising effect 
of the blows likened to those inflicted on animals cannot be underestimated. 
Elsewhere Levi writes that "all human species know how to speak, no non-human 
species knows how to speak7 (Drowned and the Saved 69). To take away this 
differentiation, precisely, to take away the power of language and replace it with acts 
of violence is to reduce the victims to a sub-human, animalistic existence - to the 
status of donkeys and dogs. Language in the form of blows dehumanises the 
individual, and this active dehumanisation came to be reflected in the casual speech 
of the Kapos. Levi recounts the call given at mealtimes: 
The kapo comes to us periodically and calls: 'Wer hat noch zu 
ftessen? ' He does not say it from derision or to sneer, but because this 
way of eating on our feet, finiously, burning our mouths and throats, 
without time to breathe, really is 'fressen', the way of eating of 
animals, and certainly not 'essen', the human way of eating, seated in 
front of a table, religiously. 'Fressen' is exactly the word, and is used 
currently among us. (If This is a Man 82) 
As Levi argues, where violence is inflicted on humanity it is also inflicted in 
language; at the same time, it is when language is destabilised and its meaning is 
perverted that it becomes possible to inflict such violence on man. Wiesel makes 
explicit the link between dehumanisation and violence, explaining that: 
Strange as it may sound, there was no hate involved in the relationship 
between Jew and German. We didn't hate the Germans, and the 
Germans didn't hate us. It was worse. You can only hate a human 
being. To them we were objects. Man doesn't hate objects. (Wiesel 
and Rubenstein 364) 
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Objectification of human beings was made possible the way in which language was 
used during the Holocaust. Indeed, Richard Rubenstein centralises the objectifying 
nature of Nazi language in his analysis of the Holocaust, stating that: 
Part of the technology of mass slaughter involves a process of so 
laundering the language used to describe the process that it appears to 
be a technological and not an act which takes place between human 
beings. (Wiesel and Rubenstein 357) 
Whilst contesting Engelking's view of a consistent experiential language 
within the camps, Levi's testimony also challenges Engelking's assumption of 
continuity of language from the camps to the post-war world. He writes: 
Just as our hunger is not that of missing a meal, so our way of being 
cold has need of a new word. We say 'hunger', we say 'tiredness', 
'fear', (pain', we say 'winter' and they are different things. They are 
free words, created and used by free men who lived in comfort and 
suffering in their homes. If This is a Man 129) 
Charlotte Delbo also picks up on the emptiness of post-Holocaust language, 
implicitly acknowledging this emptiness as the product of the failed relationship 
between the signifier and the signified, commenting that: 
Because when I talk to you about Auschwitz, it is not from deep 
memory my words issue. They come from external memory, if I may 
put it that way, from intellectual memory, the memory connected with 
thinking processes. Deep memory preserves sensations, physical 
imprints. It is the memory of the senses. For it isn't words that are 
swollen with emotional charge. Otherwise, someone who has been 
tortured by thirst for weeks on end could never again say "I'm thirsty. 
How about a cup of tea. " This word has also split in two. Thirst has 
turned back into a word for commonplace use. But if I dream of the 
thirst I suffered in Birkenau, I once again see the person I was, 
haggard, halfway crazed, near to collapse; I physically feel that real 
thirst and it is an atrocious nightmare. If, however, you'd like me to 
talk to you about it... " (Days and Memory 3-4) 
For Delbo, the possibilities of language are irretrievably bound to the processes of 
memory. The distinction between external memory and deep memory is crucial to her 
understanding of the possibilities of representation. Lawrence Langer renames 
external memory "thinking memory, " and suggests that the words that emerge from 
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this memory allow the listener to "imagine the worst. " The key word here is 
"imagine, " for whilst the words that emerge from external memory can describe what 
is stored in deep memory, they cannot reveal the meanings that the experience of the 
Holocaust maps onto them. Only deep memory, argues Langer, can represent the 
"physical imprint" of the experience. (Delbo, Auschwitz and After xiv) This, 
however, is the crux of the incommunicability of the Holocaust. As the memory of 
the senses, deep memory is personal, individual and cannot be communicated to 
others through language, as indicated by the silent ellipsis that follows Delbo's offer 
to try to tell the reader of that "atrocious nightmare. " Delbo's distinction between the 
words of external memory and the meanings found in deep memory evokes once 
again the failure of the relationship between the signifier and the signified. In Delbo's 
account, the Holocaust has created new signifieds, for which no signifier exists - 
thirst exists as a concept in the context of the Holocaust, but there is no signifier, no 
matter how arbitrary, that is capable of relating to it. Implicit in this passage is 
Delbo's frustrated call for a new signifier that can express the concept of "thirst" as it 
exists in her deep memory. The experience of trauma brings into existence signifieds 
that can have no signifiers. It seems, then, that in a post-Holocaust language system, 
the relationship between the signifier and the signified is characterised not by 
arbitrariness but by absence. 
The post-Holocaust death of the signifier/signified relationship contradicts 
theories such as Engelking's which call for the acknowledgement of the continuity of 
language from the camps to the post-Holocaust world. Wiesel argues that: 
[concentration camp language] negated all other languages and took 
its place. Rather than link it became wall. Could it be surmounted? 
Could the reader be brought to the other side? I knew the answer to be 
negative, and yet I also knew that 'no' had to become 'yes'. (Why I 
Write 201) 
The journey from "no" to "yes" must be traversed through the inclusion of silence. 
The necessity of silence, then, undermines Steiner's assertion that the German 
language is forever tainted by its association with the Holocaust. As Wiesel 
acknowledges, the Holocaust challenges "all other languages. " The Holocaust 
emerges as an event which challenges the possibility of any language and therefore 
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posits the possibility that in the absence of language, silence can become a form of 
expressive communication. 
Silence as Language 
What matters is to struggle against silence with words or through 
another form of silence. (Wiesel, My I Write 206) 
In direct response to this concept of failed language, Levi wrote that that "To 
say it is impossible to communicate is false: one always caif ' (Prowned and the 
Saved 69). The true fallacy actually lies in the assumption that communication is only 
possible through language. In the words of Steiner: 
We should not assume that a verbal matrix is the only one in which the 
articulations and conduct of the mind are conceivable. There are 
modes of intellectual and sensuous reality founded not on language, 
but on other communicative energies. [ ... ] There are actions of the 
spirit rooted in silence. (Language and Silence 12) 
It is by stepping outside the "verbal matrix" that the communicative power of silence 
within testimonial writing can be recognised. To paraphrase Wiesel, silence 
constitutes part of the struggle for expression, rather than a hindrance to it. In reading 
Wiesel's work, Robert McAfee Brown identifies three forms of articulate silence; the 
silence born, of frustration, the silence of communicative power and the silence born, 
of respect (30). The silence of frustration is a consequence of that which Brown 
denotes the "incommensurability" of the Holocaust, that is the fundamental inability 
to understand the event from the outside. This is essentially the silence of failed 
language, the frustration emerging from the perceived impossibility of representing 
the Holocaust in existing forms of language. "In the Jewish tradition, " argues Mary 
Gerhart, "the reluctance to speak an event into language can be so strong that it 
imposes a dramatic or ritual banning of naming. " Speaking specifically of Holocaust 
diaries, although making a point which expands to cover testimony as well, she 
continues that "this reluctance to speak proceeds not only from horror at the 
degradation of the human being but out of a disjunction of experience from 
credibility" (76). It is this disjunction, or incommensurability, that creates the spectre 
of silence that is perceived as haunting Holocaust narratives. Ruth Klilger, however, 
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questions the existence of this form of silence, since "any event you can turn into 
literature becomes, as it were, speakable" (14 1). Yet in arguing that the Holocaust 
must be "speakable", KlUger is not denying the possibility of silence in Holocaust 
narratives. The specific event to which she refers is the gynaecological experiments 
carried out on women in the camps, experiments that were not conducted for even 
pseudoscientific reasons, but rather to ensure that the women had not hidden any 
valuables in their bodies. In her testimony, she acknowledges that "I find it difficult 
to write this down and notice that I have done so in a rather circuitous way. [ ... ] 
Later, in college, I was oddly relieved to find similar scenes in that great satirical 
classic, Voltaire's Candide" (141). The discovery that the representation of her 
experience had a literary precedent seems to comfort Klilger, as it places her 
experiences in the realm of the known and so the "speakable. " Significantly, 
however, Klilger notes that "it was not a traumatic experience; it was just 
humiliating" (14 1). The experience of trauma that has no literary precedent cannot be 
so easily represented, and KlUger makes an implicit distinction between the 
humiliating which is "speakable, " and the traumatic which belongs to the realm of 
silence. 
Brown's second pategory is that of expressive silence, a silence of 
"communicative power, " and it is this mode that Wiesel favours most prominently in 
his Holocaust writing. Wiesel asserts that: 
sometimes, when no words are possible, silence can be an alternative 
language. It is possible to transform silence into a language, to have a 
language of silence. [ ... ] We must always ask ourselves what is the best language to let suffering speak. Sometimes our answer may be 
silence. (Wiesel and Beal 35) 
In this formulation, silence becomes not an absence but the presence of that which 
cannot be spoken. Brown argues that "It is the silence within his [Wiesel's] speech, 
the silence between the words, that communicates to us. What is not said is as 
important as what is said. Perhaps more so" (3 1). Daniel Schwarz reacts to this by 
&ht: considering the very structure of N 
Perhaps we should for a moment think of Wiesel's text as a physical 
object and note its slimness, its titleless chapters, its breaks between 
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anecdotes. We wonder what could be -added in those white spaces - 
whether his loss of faith, for example, is gradual? (54) 
Schwarz suggests that the very brevity of Night encourages the reader to focus on that 
which is absent. In essence, the absence of an exhaustive narrative text calls for a 
greater presence of engagement from the reader. 
In his novel A Beggar in Jerusalem, Wiesel specifically links language with 
destruction, writing "I don't like words! They destroy what they aim to describe, they 
alter what they try to emphasise. By enveloping the truth, they end up taking its 
place" (13 5). For Wiesel, language conceals rather than reveals truth, in that language 
will always distort, destroy even, the relationship between representation and the real. 
if language is linked in this way with destruction, then for Wiesel silence provides a 
space which the real can inhabit. 
But this reliance on silence as a form of communication can be dangerous. As 
Brown points out, "the distance between what the storyteller says through silence and 
what his listeners may hear may be too great" (32). If silence can be interpreted as 
imbued with meaning, then there is also the risk that it can be interpreted as 
emptiness. 
In accepting that the failure of language is due to the radically different 
frames of reference between the survivor and non-survivor, where experience distorts 
the meaning of words, then surely the meaning of silence too is jeopardised by the 
distance between the survivor and non-experiential reader. The intention behind the 
silence of the witness may be as unrecognisable to the reader as the meaning 
conferred onto words such as "hungry" and "thirsty" by the experience of the 
Holocaust. The crisis of representation intensifies as the witness becomes doubly 
challenged by the failure of language and silence. The only response to this 
challenge, argues Brown, is "to break silence, to be a messenger. [ ... ] One 
becomes a 
messenger, then, because one cannot not speak" (3 6-3 7). The witness cannot simply 
remain silent, cannot refuse to testify, but must rather create a testimonial space in 
which silence can be acknowledged, a narrative in which expression and silence are 
allowed an equal status. Although Brown's argument is valid, it fails to offer a 
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solution to the original problem that whilst silence may be acknowledged, its 
meaning may remain unintelligible to the reader. Yet perhaps this unintelligibility is 
essential to the Holocaust narrative, for to replace it with understanding would be to 
betray the experience of the Holocaust. Paradoxically then, the Holocaust narrative is 
at once an act of representation and an admission that representation is not possible. 
The third form of silence that Brown identifies is that which is bom out of 
respect, "a silence that honours, the dead too much to profane their memory by using 
words already doomed to fail" (30). This silence bom from respect emerges from the 
sense of duty to the dead which dominates the desire to tell the tale. As discussed 
previously however, the fear of betraying the dead co-exists with the desire to tell 
their story and make them present. In this formulation, the presence of silence in the 
testimonial text accords the dead a place in the survivor narrative. 
Silence and the Voices of the Dead 
Why I write? To wrench those victims from oblivion. To help the dead 
vanquish death. (Wiesel, Why I Write 206) 
In writing the preface to Moments of Reprieve, a collection of short stories 
about his time in Auschwitz published in 198 1, Levi looked back to his account of 
Auschwitz in If This is a Man and reflected on the individuals who populated his 
testimony: 
A great number of human figures especially stood out against that 
tragic background: friends, people I'd travelled with, even adversaries 
- begging me one after another to help them survive and enjoy the 
ambiguous perennial existence of literary characters. This was no 
longer the anonymous, faceless, voiceless mass of the shipwrecked, 
but the few, the different, the ones in whom (if only for a moment) I 
had recognised the will and capacity to react, and hence a rudiment of 
virtue. (10) 
This passage demonstrates Levi's commitment to rescuing the dead from oblivion by 
bearing witness to the experiences that they were unable to tell. The testimonial 
practice that Levi exhibits in If This is a Man represents an attempt to replace the 
silence of the deaths of the sommersi with a narrative account of their experiences. 
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Reasserting the individuality of the victims through narrating their personal 
experiences is an act of resistance against the process of dehumanisation. Thus, we 
are told the stories of the bestial and atavistic Elias who thrived in the camps; of 
Steinlauf who retained his dignity as a man through his insistence on cleanliness; of 
Null-Achtzehn, whose brief story attempts to counter the anonymity his number 
bestowed upon him; and of Alberto, Levi's companion throughout their time in the 
camp. 
However, the selection of anecdotes included is not completely arbitrary. 
Those who Levi chooses to write about are included as examples to illuminate his 
own philosophical and sociological attempts to understand Auschwitz. For example, 
his account of Null Achtzehn, called only by his tattooed camp number rather than 
his name, as "no longer a man. [ ... ] empty inside, nothing more than an involucre, 
like the slough of certain insects which one finds one the bank of swamps, held by a 
thread to the stones and shaken by the wind" immediately follows a passage of his 
own thoughts in which he describes Auschwitz as utterly hostile to human life, 
rendering individuals only as masters or slaves with no individuality (If This is a Man 
48). Similarly, his account of Steinlauf, a "man of good will" (47) who washes every 
day to remind himself that he is a man, is interspersed with Levi's understanding of 
Auschwitz as a social experiment which seeks to dehumanise the individual. 
Steinlaufs story is a modem parable, explicating Levi's view that: 
precisely because the Lager was a great machine to reduce us to 
beasts, we must not become beasts; that even in this place one can 
survive, and therefore one must want to survive, to tell the story, to 
bear witness; and that to survive we must force ourselves to save at 
least the scaffolding, the form of civilisation. (47) 
Indeed, the analogy with a parable is apt, as Levi himself considers that the stories he 
tells are the "stories of a new Bible" (72). By viewing his testimony in this way, Levi 
is connecting himself to the Jewish tradition of midrash, seeking to banish absence by 
encouraging a continuity within Jewish history. For Levi, the dead are not simply 
gone without trace, but rather become incorporated into a continuing Jewish heritage 
that cannot be destroyed. By acknowledging their absence, he makes the sommersi 
present. 
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Yet Levi is also cautious to acknowledge that he cannot speak for the dead, 
and that although by writing he can conjure a presence, words cannot defeat absence 
completely. In the preface to Moments of Reprieve he comments on the dubious 
ambiguity of the dead living on through the text. He confronts this paradoxical 
relationship between life, death and the text in The Periodic Table when he spends a 
chapter trying to flesh out a friend from university, Sandro Delmastro. Delmastro was 
caught and killed by the Fascists in April 1944 when fighting with a resistance group. 
Levi sadly concludes the chapter in the realisation that "Today I know it is a hopeless 
task to dress a man in words, words to make him live again on the printed page" (48). 
Despite this, for Levi it is crucial that these fragments of people's lives be told, if the 
experience of the Holocaust is to be conveyed. For Levi, survivor testimony is 
somehow incomplete. Only those who did not survive could narrate the totality of the 
Holocaust. In order to convey any understanding to those who were not there, it is 
necessary to reveal the absence of those murdered, and to make that absence felt as an 
overwhelming presence in the text. In If This is a Man, we are introduced to a number 
of nameless individuals, whose stories are never told, most probably because Levi 
never knew them. Yet the silence of these barely introduced figures communicates 
their presence. He mentions a one man, a Pole named Rynek with whom he briefly 
shared a bed. We are given little information about him; he spoke impeccable French, 
was about thirty, "but like all of us, could be taken for seventeen or fifty" (71). Like 
all people, Rynek had a story, but: 
Ile told me his story, and today I have forgotten it, but it was certainly 
a sorrowful, cruel and moving story; because so are all our stories, 
hundreds of thousands of stories, all different and all full of a tragic, 
disturbing necessity. (71-72) 
The acknowledgement of the silence surrounding Rynek, and the hundreds of 
thousands of others is a powerful expression of their existence. Through the absence 
of their stories, Levi emphasises the significance of silence in testimonial writing. 
Maurice Blanchot regarded silence as being "linked to the cry, the voiceless cry, " the 
voice of those who cannot speak, the voices of the dead (5 1). Thus by accepting 
silence into the text, it is acknowledged that the testimony of the survivor experience 
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is, as felt by Wiesel and Levi amongst others, incomplete without the presence of 
those who were the true witnesses. In The Survivor, Terrence Des Pres notes writes: 
Silence, in its primal aspect, is a consequence of terror, of a 
dissolution of self and world that, once known, can never be fully 
dispelled. But in retrospect it becomes something else. Silence 
constitutes the realm of the dead. It is the palpable substance of those 
millions murdered, the world no longer present, that intimate absence 
- of God, of man, of love - by which the survivor is haunted. In the 
survivor's voice, the dead's own scream is active. (36) 
Through acknowledging the silence of the dead, and allowing their tangible absence 
to constitute a large proportion of his test, Levi's testimony metaphorically comes to 
be a multi-authored piece of work, encompassing both the living and the dead. The 
silence in Holocaust testimonies is in part the silence of a deferred presence; it is the 
cry of the dead through the voice of the living. 
This desire to give a voice to the dead also informs the structure of testimonial 
writing. Robert Eaglestone has noted that "many [Holocaust] testimonies end with 
specific acts of remembering individuals who were murdered" (126). Testimonies 
frequently return to the dead, allowing to them the final words of the text. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, Wiesel ends his testimony Night with an 
understanding of himself as one of the dead. Levi concludes his account of his days in 
as a prisoner with the hanging of a fellow prisoner for his part in the revolt in 
Auschwitz. The final chapter of his testimony, "The Story of Ten Days", records the 
limbo-like state in which Levi existed between the evacuation of the camp and the 
arrival of the Russians. Although the text ends on a seemingly optimistic note as Levi 
writes that he hopes to meet one day with another man who shared those final days 
with him, this hopeful conclusion is overshadowed by the death of S6moygi, a 
I fungarian Jew, during the night before liberation. The afterword to Levi's testimony 
is concluded with the starkness of death: "of the Italian deportees, for example, only 
about 5 percent returned, and many of those lost families, friends, property, 
equilibrium, youth" (If This is a Man 398). As such, the end of the book, that is the 
end of the words, does not constitute the end of the testimony. The silence which 
signals the completion of the written text comes to constitute part of the testimony, 
for that silence is the representation of the stories that could not be told. Testimony, 
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then, can never be completed as the silence continues to relate the presence of the 
dead. Eaglestone suggests that the testimonial genre is characterised by what he terms 
a "lack of closure, " the narration of the Holocaust can never be completed (13 3). This 
is indicated by the frequency with which survivors revisit their past in further 
accounts of their memories. In Moments of Reprieve, Levi explains his compulsion to 
revisit Auschwitz in narrative form, twenty years after the publication of his first 
testimony: 
I realised that my experience of Auschwitz was far from exhausted. I 
had described its fundamental features, which today have a historical 
pertinence, but a host of details continued to surface in my memory, 
and the idea of letting them fade away distressed me. [ ... ] The reader 
may be surprised at this rediscovered narrative vein, thirty or forty 
years after the events. Well, it has been observed by psychologists that 
the survivors of traumatic events are divided into two well-defined 
groups: those who repress their past en bloc, and those whose memory 
of the offense still persists, as though carved in stone, prevailing over 
all previous or subsequent experiences. Now, not by choice but by 
nature, I belong to the second group. (9-11) 
Levi's explanation reveals the haunting presence of a dualised post-Auschwitz self, as 
discussed in chapter one. It echoes Delbo's description of her Auschwitz self that 
lives alongside her everyday self, and colours her day-to-day existence. Levi refers to 
an outside authority, the nameless "psychologists, " to legitimise his own feelings of 
the double that manifests itself as the memory of the offence. It is this memory that 
fuels his responsibility to narrating the stories of the sommersi. In The Periodic Table 
he comments that "the things that I had seen and suffered were burning inside of me: 
I felt closer to the dead than the living" (15 1). His affinity to the dead is revealed 
through his incorporation of their experiences and their stories into his own. 
Speech and Silence in the Holocaust Text 
The failure of language and the attempt to create a communicative silence that 
incorporates the voices of the dead all represent aspects of silence in testimony. 
However, exploring Holocaust testimonies as narrative texts reveals that silence also 
functions more overtly in theme and speech. When Wiesel refers to the "death of 
language, " he is referring to the incapacity of words to be able to describe events. It 
was on arrival in Auschwitz that Levi carne to understand that words alone are 
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insufficient, writing "then for the first time we became aware that our language lacks 
words to express this offence, the demolition of a man7 (If This is a Man 32). 
Holocaust narratives confront the reader with people who cannot speak, or whose 
speech is repressed by circumstance or by a refusal on the part of the listener to 
acknowledge speech. Throughout Night, Wiesel traces the declining eloquence of his 
father who serves as a model for Wiesel's belief that the Holocaust resulted in the 
death of language. At the beginning of Night, his father is a well respected figure in 
the established Jewish community in Sighet, often consulted for advice on public and 
personal affairs. Wiesel describes him as "a good story tellee', a cultured and 
sophisticated man (23). However, the experiences his father underwent in Auschwitz 
broke not only his spirit as his father became more and more childlike and dependent 
on his son, but also his power to communicate. As the tide of war was turning against 
the Germans in 1945, Wiesel learned that there was to be a transport leaving 
Auschwitz for an unknown destination. Facing the choiceless choice of either leaving 
with the transport or staying in the camp with an uncertain fate at the end of either 
decision, he rushed to consult his father: 
"What shall we do? " 
My father did not answer. 
"What shall we do father? " 
He was lost in thought. The choice was in our hands. 
"Well, what shall we do father? " 
He was silent. 
"Let's be evacuated with the others, " I said to him. 
He did not answer. (94) 
His father is silenced; how to reason such a decision, how to communicate thoughts 
when faced with such a choice? His father's speech is broken, and in Auschwitz it is 
characterised by broken and fragmented language. Wiesel himself was not exempt 
from this inability to communicate. Early on in his testimony he recalls the 
suffocating silence that consumed him when he tried to wam his neighbours of the 
impending liquidation of the ghetto: "my throat was dry, the words choked in it, 
paralysing my lips. I could not say anymore" (26). It seems that there are simply no 
words to express events. This is not simply a crisis in the individual. Levi records the 
curious silence that descended when his transport first arrived at Auschwitz. Standing 
on the ramp, the prisoners were confronted with a violent reality they could not have 
imagined, and were left simply incapable of responding to events: 
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We were afraid to break that silence: everyone busied himself with his 
luggage, searched for someone else, called to someone else, but 
timidly, in a whisper [ ... ] Everything was as silent as an aquarium, or 
as in certain dream sequences. If This is a Man 25) 
The use of the term aquarium renders an element of the exotic in the description of 
the silence. Everything is strange, surreal to the new prisoners, and they are unable to 
grasp any words to describe it. 
Dori Laub argues that the act of testifying is dualistic in nature, in that it 
requires both a speaker and a listener. When the listener is absent, then the testimony 
is rendered mute, and Holocaust testimonies often describe witnesses who are 
effectively silenced by those who refuse to listen. Wiesel opens Night with one such 
character, Moch6 the Beadle. Moch6 was a foreign Jew in the town of Sighet, and as 
such was deported with all the other foreign Jews before the ghettos were even 
established in the village. Miraculously, he managed to escape and returned to Sighet 
to try and wam the Jews of their inevitable oncoming fate: 
Through long days and nights, he went from one Jewish house to 
another, telling the story of Malka, the young girl who had taken three 
days to die, and of Tobias the tailor, who had begged to be killed 
before his sons... 
Mochd had changed. There was no longer any joy in his eyes. 
He no longer sang He no longer talked to me of God or the cabbala, 
but only of what he had seen. People refused not only to believe his 
stories, but even to listen to them. (17) 
Mochd's words become as silence when people refuse to hear his warnings. 
Eventually, Wiesel writes "even Moch6 the Beadle was silent. He was weary of 
speaking" (19). By having his words rendered metaphorically absent by ignoring 
them, Mochd finally falls into a literal silence, his testimony silenced by the absence 
of willing listeners. Schwarz suggests that through the figure of Moch6, Wiesel steps 
outside the narrative in order to address the reader and focus attention on their moral 
responsibility to the text: 
Wiesel is using him [Moche] as metonymy for himself in his present 
role as narrator who is, as he writes, calling on us to listen to his words 
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as he tells his relentless tale of his own miraculous escape from the 
Nazi terror. Implicitly, he is urging us that it is our ethical 
responsibility not to turn away from the witnessing voice. (50) 
Wiesel returns to this image of the voice repressed through the absence of a receptive 
listener in the figure of Madame Schdchter. Her appearance in the testimony as a 
premonitory figure adds to the mysticism that pervades the testimony. During the 
transport to Auschwitz, Madame Schdchter grew hysterical, screaming a warning that 
she could see fire. Terrified, the occupants of the cattle car forced their way to the 
window to see for themselves. There was no fire, and in anger at the panic she had 
caused they turned on her, silencing her with blows and tying her up. Like Mochd she 
falls into silence, only for her terrible warning to come true on their arrival at 
Auschwitz when they saw for the first time the flames of the crematorium. 
Textual Silence 
As silence becomes prominent thematically in the silencing of speech, it also 
breaks out visually on the written page. Wiesel writes that in Auschwitz, "silence 
grew oppressive" (MiZht 49). The configuration of silence as oppressive constitutes a 
reading of silence as presence rather than absence, and this presence is reflected in 
the structure of the text. The text is constructed in an awkward, stuttering fashion. 
Brief chapters are complemented by the brevity of individual statements. Sentences 
are made up of short barking isolated phrases such as: "The military march. The gate. 
The camp. I ran to Block 36" (87); "1 repeated to myself. Don't stop. Don't think. 
Run" (97). This sparseness of style seems to suggest the presence of unspoken words 
behind those expressed. There is no time to stop, no time to think; also it seems there 
is no time to speak, for it seems that even though Wiesel returned repeatedly to his 
Holocaust experiences in subsequent autobiographical and fictional narratives, there 
is never enough time or space to fully represent his experiences. Silence also breaks 
out in the text more explicitly in the form of frequent ellipses and pauses. Towards 
the end Wiesel's father's speech becomes broken: "I can't go on .... Have mercy on 
me .... I'll wait 
here until we can get to the baths .... You can come and find me" (116). 
These pauses in direct speech are common, but there are also such moments in the 
straight narrative, for example, on the occasion of an Allied bombing raid on Buna, 
Wiesel writes: "The raid lasted over an hour. If it could only have lasted ten times 
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more hours! ... Then silence fell once more" (72). The unnatural silence in the camp is 
made more vivid to the reader through the unexpected break in the narrative. Levi 
adopts this same technique in If This is a Man, recalling: "... And for the first time 
since I entered the camp the reveille catches me in a deep sleep and its ringing is a 
return from nothingness" (56). Whilst the harsh interruption of the reveille is 
reflected in the structural disjunction between the silent ellipsis and the comparative 
din of linguistic expression, this sentence is also representative of the rupture 
Auschwitz generated in Levi's life. The opening caesura intimates a fracturing 
between two lives, a life outside the camp being reduced to "nothingness" as Levi 
becomes assimilated into an existence in Auschwitz. 
Wiesel interprets these silences in the text from a theological perspective, 
linking the silences in Holocaust testimony to Jewish traditions of sacred writing: 
The space between any two words is vaster than the distance between 
heaven and earth. To bridge it you must close your eyes and leap. A 
Hasidic tradition tells us that that in the Torah the white spaces, too, 
are God-given. Ultimately, to write is an act of faith. (All Rivers 321) 
This theologically inflected understanding of textual caesura invites the reader of 
testimony to explore the significance of silence in testimony. Jewish tradition 
associates the sacred with the unspeakable, evidenced through the written 
representation of God as YHWH. White spaces in the text reflect , 
then not an absence, 
but an unspeakable presence in the Torah and also within Holocaust testimony. This 
connection with the sacred has been noted by survivors; just as Levi has speculated 
that the stories of the Holocaust constitute the "stories of a new Bible" (If This is 
Man 72) so Wiesel has called for a "new Talmud" in the wake of the Holocaust 
(Jewish Values 285). Ernst Van Alphen argues that if "the extreme horror of the 
historical reality causes language to fall short [ ... I the Holocaust assumes 
metaphysical dimensions: it becomes the absolute symbol of Evil, and hence it is as 
unrepresentable as Yahwelf ' (43). However, van Alphen characterises this approach 
as "undesirable and even dangerous because it ultimately makes it impossible to see 
the Holocaust as a moment, albeit apocalyptic, in human histo? y' (43). For van 
Alphen, constructing the Holocaiist as a metaphysical phenomenon threatens to 
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excise it from history altogether, as the Event cannot be recognised as the 
consequence of human actions, as part of "human history. " 
Drawing on theories of memory and trauma, Mieke Bal offers a different 
interpretation of the "white spaces" in the Holocaust testimony. Bal argues that "in 
narratological terms, repression results in ellipsis - the omission of important 
elements in the narrative [... ] repression interrupts the flow of narratives that shapes 
memory" (Bal, Crewe and Spitzer ix). Whilst Bal employs the term "ellipsis" more 
generally to mean any omission in the narrative, rather than only textual pauses, the 
suggestion that ellipses are a consequence of the repression of traumatic memories 
offers a useful approach to Kitty Hart's testimony I am Alive. I am Alive is the first 
of Hart's Holocaust testimonies and was written, according to the dedication, to tell 
the story of her experiences to her children. The story of Hart's survival is almost 
incredible: her family fled from Bielsko in Silesia in 1939 to Lublin, hoping for safer 
conditions in central Poland. As the situation began to deteriorate in Lublin with the 
implementation of the Nuremberg Laws and ghettoisation in 1940, her family 
attempted to flee over the German-Russian border, but were forced back to the Lublin 
ghetto. Recognising the danger they were in as the ghetto round-ups increased, the 
family chanced an escape from the ghetto by removing the armbands that identified 
them as Jews, and boldly walking out of the ghetto gates. They briefly sought refuge 
in small village to the south named Zabia Wola, but were all too aware of the 
precariousness of their situation. Her father managed to obtain false ID papers for 
them, and they returned to the comparative safety of Lublin under assumed identities. 
On arriving there, the family decided to separate in order to remain safe. Hart 
remained with her mother, and together they found places on a transport of Poles 
being taken to work in Germany. They worked for IG Farben for some time but in 
1942 their true identity was discovered and they were arrested by the Gestapo and 
deported to Auschwitz. In 1944, Hart and her mother were transported to Gross 
Rosen, and then onto a small labour camp called Reichenbach in south east Germany. 
In February 1945, the order was given to evacuate the camp and she and her mother 
were forced into a long and dangerous death march. The approaching end of the war 
brought chaos as the prisoners were marched from place to place as their guards 
sought to evade the Allied advance. Liberation finally came in April of that year, and 
Hart and her mother worked for the American troops who liberated them for some 
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time as interpreters. It was in 1946 that they finally discovered that they were the only 
survivors from their family. 
Yet Hart's story of a series of almost miraculous escapes is told in a carefully 
measured and restrained style. The introduction to her testimony, written by Lord 
Russell of Liverpool, speaks of a "complete lack of emotion in her fascinating 
account of those terrible years, " and attributes this sparse style to Hart's repression of 
emotions, since "a saturation point is reached when all feelings of love and hate are 
killed and all that is left is a kind of indifference" (9). It is possible to detect this 
repression in her use of ellipses in the text. Recalling her time in Auschwitz, Hart 
writes: 
Only sheer faith and willpower could keep one alive. Death seemed an 
easy way out. All that was needed was a slight touch of the electrified 
fence which held us prisoner and finish.... Every day girls were found 
dead near the fence. (66) 
In this description, Hart uses the ellipsis to move from an action performed by the 
living - the touching of the fence - to the image of corpses lain on the floor. The 
ellipsis represents a repression of the unspeakable, the moment of transition from life 
to death. Yet whilst the passage does not - cannot - represent this moment, the 
enforced pause created by the ellipsis focuses the reader's attention on what is meant 
by the oddly neutral word "finish. " She returns to this use of ellipsis as repression 
when describing her work in the Kanadakommando in Auschwitz. She was working 
there in 1944, and recalls the preparations that were made for the arrival of the 
Hungarian Jews: "another party of girls was brought out from Lager BII - there 
would be so much more to be sorted" (10 1). The dash seems to signal an inability to 
confront what the arrival of more labourers signified. The imminent murder of 
thousands of Jews in what would later be understood as one of the most intense 
periods of liquidation in Auschwitz is represented obliquely with a reference to the 
additional labour that would be forced upon the Kanadakommando. Whilst this does 
not seem to be repression exactly, it is an acknowledgement that some things 
seemingly cannot be described directly. 
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Hart's use of dashes also draws attention to the actual process of writing, 
highlighting, probably unwittingly, the conflict between narrative techniques and the 
story that the narrative seeks to reveal. In an attempt to describe the area where the 
Kanadakommando worked, Hart exposes the inadequacy of simile in her writing: 
At the bottom on the left hand side, by the last huts, was a huge heap - 
it really looked like a mountain - as high at least as a three storey 
building. [ ... ] These were the belongings of those already dead. (85) 
The dashes function to separate the mountain simile from the rest of the descriptive 
text in this passage, suggesting that this narrative technique is somehow out of place 
in her testimony. A later comment also functions to reveal the redundancy of simile, 
when she writes "it seemed as if blood was coming out, as indeed it was" (87). Alvin 
H. Rosenfeld asserts that the failure of metaphor and simile is one of the "abiding 
laws" of Holocaust writing. He argues: 
There are no metaphors for Auschwitz just as Auschwitz is not a 
metaphor for anything else. Why is that the case? Because the flames 
were real flames, the ashes only ashes, the smoke always and only 
smoke. [ ... ] the burnings do not 
lend themselves to metaphor, simile, 
or symbol - to likeness or association with anything else. They can 
only 'be' or 'mean' what in fact they were: the death of the Jews. (19) 
However, Rosenfeld's prohibition on the use of metaphor in Holocaust narratives 
misinterprets the way in which metaphor can function within these accounts. 
Rosenfeld justifies his argument on the basis that metaphor can only fail in a narrative 
which deals with the horrors of the Holocaust. Yet, I would argue, it is precisely this 
failure of metaphor which confirms their value in these texts. It is through the 
recognition of the failed metaphor and a realisation that metaphors are inadequate for 
the task of describing the Holocaust that the reader moves towards an understanding 
of the unrepresentable nature of the Holocaust and so closer to an understanding of 
the reality of the Holocaust. However, this is not to suggest that the use of metaphor 
in Holocaust narratives is always characterised by failure. In a discussion of the 
writing of Tadeusz Borowski, Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi argues that metaphor succeeds 
only when "images of comparison [ ... ] are [ ... ] similes borrowed from the same 
realm of experience" (55). Although Hart uses metaphor and simile sparingly 
throughout her account, there are occasions when it seems to work effectively. Hart's 
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successful metaphors work precisely because she writes from within her experience, 
and so seems to seal the narrator into the world she represents in her narrative. Her 
description of the SS guards in the final days of the death march as "lost sheep" 
serves to dehumanise the guards in the same way that Nazi rhetoric sought to 
dehumanise the Jews by likening them to animals (142). The juxtaposition of these 
dehumanised guards with the prisoners who were "singing and laughing, " joyous in 
the knowledge of their imminent liberation adds to the power of the simile (142). 
The pause is a stumbling point, a point at which the reader can hear silence as 
a tangible presence. Silence in the performative text takes on a dual reality; it is both 
a relation of the real silence of the Holocaust, and it is part of the text as a real and 
physical entity, a material trace of the Holocaust. Maurice Blanchot wrote that "the 
disaster happens after the event" (5 1); the possibility of experiencing the disaster lies 
in its physical trace. Thus, the physicality of the text becomes participatory in the 
Holocaust, and indistinguishable from it. The fragmented construction of the text 
allows the chaos of the Holocaust to enter into its contemporary physical trace, and 
thus the text becomes not an interpretative representation of the past, but rather a 
presentation of itself as the disaster. 
In exploring these different forms that silence takes in Holocaust testimony, it 
can be seen that silence operates as a present absence that bears witness to the unlived 
experience, to the failure of language and unspeakability of the event, to the 
connection of the Holocaust to Jewish history, and to the voices of the sommersi. To 
return to Treat who links the incommunicability to the Holocaust to that of the atomic 
bombings, silence is a primary theme in the writings of hibakusha. However, the 
composition of the silence in these writings differs to that in Holocaust testimonies. 
The event, the representation of the event, language, and silence interact in different 
ways in genbaku bungaku (atomic bomb writing) in a way which I have defined in an 
opposing manner as "presence as absence. " 
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2.3 Presence as Absence: Writing the Japanese Experience 
Silencing the Atomic Voice 
The bond between hibakusha and testimonial practice is expressed through 
the appellation kataribe or storyteller. In common with Holocaust survivors such as 
Primo Levi who keenly felt the need to tell their tale, many A-bomb survivors testify 
to the same. "I feel an urgent need to pass on to others what happened, " writes 
Masaki Sachiko, "I want to stand before each and every person on the face of the 
earth and tell of the madness and horror of war" (146). Yet, as is the case with 
Holocaust testimonies, this compulsion to tell the tale is compromised by the inability 
to find words to describe the experience. Masaki was fourteen at the time of the 
bombing, and along with many other schoolchildren of her age had been mobilised as 
part of the war effort to work in a Nagaski torpedo factory. She was in the factory 
when the bomb fell and whilst she was fortunate not to be badly injured herself, she 
witnessed much suffering as she struggled back to her home that day. In the 
aftermath, she fell victim to A-bomb disease which disabled her for a year, and 
continued to plague her throughout her life, culminating in the need for an operation 
for cancer as an adult. "I always find myself in a quandary when I try to talk about 
my experiences as a victim of the atomic bomb, " she writes. "I want to tell what it 
was like but I cannot find the words. How can I possibly make others understand? I 
tend to give up halfway" (146). As John Whittier Treat suggests, it is at this point of 
inexpressibility that Holocaust survivors and hibakusha find unity. Whilst the 
difficulties of finding a way to represent the trauma of the atomic bomb, such as the 
failure of language, are often immeasurable for hibakusha, these are not the only 
barriers to expression that they face. Specific cultural, social and historical factors 
lend this thwarted compulsion to tell the tale has a further dimension. Silence 
ftinctions; as a measure of authenticity for the hibakusha, in the commonly held belief 
that those who genuinely experienced horror would not speak of it. This belief is 
most explicitly stated by a second generation survivor, whose father never spoke to 
him about his experiences of "that day", as hibakusha came to term the day the 
atomic bomb was dropped. The son saw his father's silence as evidence of the truth 
of the trauma he endured, saying "Those who really suffered cannot talk about it [ ... ] 
for if you knew the real experience of the nuclear annihilation, you would not even 
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wish to recall if' (qtd. in Yoneyama 88). According to this perspective, silence 
becomes evidence for the truth of experience. The silencing of the experience is 
actively encouraged by the potential listener. 
This silencing of the victim is also encountered in Holocaust narratives. For 
example, Ruth KRIger recalls her aunt telling her after the war not to speak of her 
experiences, exhorting her to "erase from your memory everything that happened in 
Europe. You have to make a new beginning. You have to forget what they did to you. 
Wipe it off like chalk from a blackboard" (219). Dori Laub argues that such enforced 
silence does not authenticate the truth of the story, but rather annihilates the story 
itself: 
The absence of an empathetic listener, or more radically, the absence 
of an addressable other, an other who can hear the anguish of one's 
memories and thus affirm and recognise their realness, annihilates the 
story. (Felman and Laub 68) 
The possibility of testimony is destroyed by the refusal to hear it. "For the testimonial 
process to take place, " Laub continues, "there needs to be a bonding, the intimate and 
total presence of an o1her - in the position of one who hears. Testimonies are not 
monologues; they cannot take place in solitude" (70). Denying the possibility of 
dialogue by imposing silence makes testimony impossible. Whilst both Holocaust 
survivors and hibakusha testify to being told to remain silent about their experiences, 
the nature of this injunction is subtly different. For the Holocaust survivor, there is 
little to suggest that revealing their experiences would compromise the authenticity of 
their account. For the hibakusha, this is a primary motivation for the concealment of 
traumatic memories. Criticism of hibakusha who speak out about their experiences of 
the A-bomb is widespread, and has become a commercial and industrial concern. 
Yoneyama points to the antagonism the hibakusha faced from post-war urban 
redevelopers who objected to the city of Hiroshima's image being forever tainted by 
its terrible past, a particular example being the "Peace Tower". Planned to be the 
world's largest skyscraper, it was proposed to be a centre of entertainment and 
commerce that would rejuvenate Hiroshima's prosperity. The plans included a 
monument to the atomic bomb in the form of a "light of peace" within the 
development. Objections to the inappropriate nature of the building were greeted with 
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the response: "we certainly do not mean to deny the Atomic Bomb Dome. But isn't it 
about time to pursue not only the misery but also the pleasures of peace? " (qtd. in 
Yoneyama 43). The motivation behind hibakusha testimony is treated suspiciously, 
and Yoneyama concludes that the redevelopers suspect that the survivors: 
keep on speaking about the past not so much because they genuinely 
believe that their storytellings can somehow deter the future use of 
nuclear weapons, but because they wish to further partisan political 
interests. These redevelopers believe that those who "really know the 
bomb" would not be able to talk it so openly. (89) 
Hibakusha face, then, an openly hostile reception to their memories which 
encourages them to remain silent about their experiences. Further to this, many 
hibakusha feared discrimination as a result of having lived through the bomb. 
Employers were often concerned that A-Bomb related illness might impair the ability 
of their workers; ignorance, particularly in the early years, about the nature of A- 
Bomb disease led to the rumour that it was contagious, and so many avoided contact 
with hibakusha. Fears that hibakusha were left infertile by their experiences, or that 
they may pass on genetic deformities or disorders to their children as a result of their 
exposure to radiation, meant that many survivors faced harsh social prejudice when 
seeking marriage partners. The Australian journalist Wilfred Burchett, one of the first 
Allied journalists to go to Hiroshima after the bombing, recalls the words of Ms 
Hasegawa in 197 1. Bom in the year of the atomic bombing, she spoke to him of the 
still prevailing social discrimination against hibakusha, saying "People who come 
from outside to work in Hiroshima have a slogan 'Don't marry a Hiroshima girl' 
because they fear for the after effects" (qtd. in Burchett 63). The combination of these 
attitudes led to many hibakusha concealing their experiences, even from family 
members, as in the case of Shizue Koga's sister who concealed her past from her 
children, as discussed in chapter one. 
Censorship and Expression: Ota Yoko's "City of Corpses" 
During the post-war Occupation period, the silencing of hibakusha was not 
merely encouraged, but legally enforced. On September 19 1945, the General 
Headquarters of the Allied Occupation put in place a Press Code which sought to 
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censor any material considered to be seditious, including a blanket ban on any 
unauthorised discourse on the atomic bomb. Kyo Maclear has aptly commented that 
the "post-war censorship codes operated to mute the voices of atomic victims" and it 
did this very effectively (43). Not only political writings fell under the remit of the 
Press Code, but also music, photographs, films and children's books. The Code also 
muted the suffering of the hibakusha on a much more individual level, as John W. 
Dower explains: 
It is at the local level that U. S. censorship was most inhumane. With 
but rare exceptions, survivors of the bomb could not grieve publicly, 
could not share their experiences through the written word, could not 
be offered public counsel and support. (127) 
Retribution for breaking the code was swift. Shiego Hayashi, a photographer, had all 
of his photographs of the immediate aftermath of the bombing seized by the General 
Headquarters in December 1945 (Yamane 11). He was fortunate to escape further 
punishment, for as Maclear observes, "on more than one occasion, the publication 
ban was used as a basis for harassing and threatening artists into compliance" (42). 
Sh6da Shinoe, a little known poet, responded to her experiences of the atomic 
bombing of Hiroshima with a privately published collection of one hundred waka (a 
generic term covering a variety of unrhymed poetic styles). Although published in 
October 1948, the dates on the edition were changed to read December 1948, when 
the Press Code restrictions were beginning to wind down. This modification of the 
publication date was necessary, claims Treat, because "Occupation officials [ ... ] may 
have decided to arrest Sh6da - and according to the rumours of the day, put her to 
death - for violating Press Code provisions" (Writing Ground Zero 192). The Press 
Code was widely considered to be overly harsh, leading Kurihara Sadako, a leading 
critic of Ota Y6ko's work, to caustically comment that "at that time it was forbidden 
to speak or write even of the fact that there was censorship system in existence. It 
was not permitted even to leave traces indicating that the censors had deleted 
anything" (qtd. in Treat, Writing Ground Zero 90). Setsuko, Thurlow, a feminist 
scholar, remains highly critical of the Press Code and argues that it meant that the 
hibakusha "had to suffer alone, in silence and with a sense of abandonment" (227). 
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Yet for all this the Press Code was inconsistent, particularly towards the end 
of the Occupation period in 1952. The publication of objective scientific data was 
permitted, but literary works were subjected to differing rulings. Whilst they were 
officially prohibited, some pieces evaded the attention of censors. The most 
significant of these is Tamiki's Summer Flowers,, which was published in 1947 and 
avoided censorship, it has been suggested, because it was published in a literary 
journal of such limited circulation that it simply went unnoticed by the Occupation 
authorities (Treat Writing Ground Zero 90). 
Ota Y6ko was the first professional author to publish work concerning the A- 
bomb, in a piece called "Kaitei no yd na hikari - genshi bakudan no kasha ni atte" 
CIA Light as if from the Depths - The Atomic Air Bomb Air Attack"). She later 
echoed the title of this piece in City of Corpses when she tried to describe the 
moment that the A-bomb dropped, writing: I was sound asleep inside the mosquito 
net [when the A-bomb dropped]. [ ... ]I dreamed I was enveloped by a blue flash, like 
lightening at the bottom of the sea7 (Ota 182). This brief article was published in the 
Asahi newspaper on August 30 1945, prior to the imposition of the Press Code. The 
style of this article, in its admiration for the dignity of suffering, maintains a very 
different tone to her testimony City of CoEpses,, written immediately afterwards. She 
wrote: 
The reality I saw in the riverbed in the sixth through eighth [of 
August] was hell on earth ... however, people lived in the noblest spirit for those three days. [ ... II believe that the end of the war displayed the dignified beauty of the victims (qtd. in Tachibana 30). 
Prior to the bombing Ota, like most Japanese, had maintained a pro-war stance, and 
Treat suggests that this article stands as her final avocation of this perspective. 
Certainly the sense that images of beauty could be located within the experience of 
the A-bomb is absent from any of her later writings. Treat attributes this initial 
anomalous response to the "delusion of a person still traumatised by unprecedented 
events" (Writing Ground Zero 202). These "delusions" would soon lift when she 
came to write City of Corpses. 
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The ease with which this piece was published in the pre-Press Code period 
contrasted strongly with the opposition Ota faced when she came to publish her 
testimony just a couple of months later. Her manuscript first attracted the attention of 
the censors when she sent it to her editor. She was visited by a non-Japanese speaking 
American intelligence officer who had not even read her manuscript, but nevertheless 
proceeded to question her extensively. He asked her to confirm who had read her 
manuscript, the political leanings of her editor, and to supply him with a list of her 
friends and their particular political ideologies. She was also asked whether she had 
been back to Hiroshima since the day of the attack (she had), and whether her 
manuscript exposed any atomic bomb "secrets". The official concluded his interview 
with the order, "I want you to forget your memories of the atomic bomb. America 
won't use the atomic bomb again, so I want you to forget the events in Hiroshima! ' 
(Minear 141). Unsurprisingly, Ota replied that she could not accede to this order, but 
nevertheless, the first edition of her testimony was published in November 1948, 
albeit with significant deletions. Richard H. Minear suggests that Ota's account of 
this interview may not be entirely reliable as it was written some eight years after the 
event, but even taking this into account, the censored first edition stands as testament 
to the stringent nature of the Press Code. The second chapter of her testimony, 
"Expressionless Faces"', which lists the numbers of dead and injured using statistics 
she claims to have drawn from an unnamed newspaper article, as well as the 
responses of eminent Japanese physicians, was deleted entirely from the first edition. 
City of Co1pses was not published in its entirety until May 1950. 
"Wholly caught up in the city of corpses": The Testimony of Ota Yoko 
Ota embarked on writing her testimony almost immediately on fleeing 
Hiroshima. She first moved to Hiroshima from a small village just west of the city in 
1916 when she was 13 in order to attend school. She eventually married and 
remained living in Hiroshima, working as a school teacher. However, this, her first 
marriage, was troubled, and when it ended she moved to Tokyo with her mother. By 
late 1944, the intense firebombing of the capital led Ota to send her mother to the 
comparative safety of Hiroshima, and Ota joined her there in January 1945. They 
were living there together with Ota's sister and her infant daughter on August 6 when 
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the bomb was dropped. In the aftermath, they sought refuge in Kushima, and it was 
here, whilst living above a sake shop, that Ota wrote City of ColpLes. 
In common with Wiesel, Levi and many other Holocaust survivors, Ota felt 
the need to tell the tale of the atomic bomb. Even as she was walking through the 
ruined streets of the Hakushima district of Hiroshima in the immediate aftermath, Ota 
was aware of what she perceived as her responsibility to tell the world what had 
happened. As Ota and her sister moved through the streets near the Teishin hospital, 
they found their way blocked by rubble and the corpses of victims. Her sister turned 
away from the sight, and criticised Ota for the impropriety of her gaze, who 
responded: "I'm looking with two sets of eyes - the eyes of a human being and the 
eyes of writer" (Ota 205). This reply demonstrates that Ota very rapidly became 
aware of a dualised sense of self, as discussed in chapter one, developing out of 
traumatic experience. Seemingly immediately she is able to distinguish between an 
experiential "human being" self, and an observing authorial self, and she realises the 
inextricable bond between the two. She continues, "someday I'll have to [write about 
these experiences]. That's the responsibility of a writer who's seen if' (205). Yet for 
Ota this imperative to speak takes on an added practical urgency that is absent from 
the writings of Levi and Wiesel. Indeed, Treat suggests that this "testimonial 
urgency" comes to inform her post-war fiction as well (Writing Ground Zero 200). 
Whilst the ftill implications of the after-effects of the atomic bomb were not properly 
understood for many years, the hibakusha rapidly realised that surviving the initial 
blast was not a guarantee of recovery. As time progressed more and more people, 
including those who entered the cities after the days of the bombing, began to 
succumb fatally to the after-effects of radiation, the so-called "A-bomb disease". Ota 
was particularly fearftil of falling victim to this, and her testimony is consequently 
overshadowed with an awareness of her potentially imminent death. In the preface to 
her testimony, written in 1950, she explains how these fears came to inform her 
literary style: 
Death was breathing down my neck. If I was to die, I wanted first to 
fulfil my responsibility of getting the story written down. 
Under those circumstances, I had no time to organise Cily o 
CoKpses in good literary form. [... ] I had neither the time nor the 
emotional reserves necessary to portray that reality clearly and 
skilfully in the format of superior fiction. 
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I hurried with the writing, one thought in mind: to get it 
written, using the strength I had and a form that came easily to me, 
before I died. (147) 
It is interesting that Ota considers fiction to be a superior form of representation to 
testimony. It is perhaps her status as a prominent writer before the war that gave her a 
greater appreciation of literary style, and so a greater struggle when she attempted to 
translate her experiences of the A-bomb into written narrative. Looking back over her 
career as a writer of both testimony and fiction, Ota was left frustrated, commenting 
that: 
I feel ashamed whenever I plan a work making use of traditional 
Japanese literary techniques. I feel so ashamed that I shudder. I live in 
a nation that has experienced the unprecedented. I am unable to cling 
to the ordinary sorts of literature that we had before. (qtd. in Treat, 
Writing Ground Zero 202) 
Ota's recognition of the failure of traditional Japanese literary techniques in the wake 
of the atomic bomb contests the casual assumptions of some post-war critics of 
testimonial literature. Ian Buruma, in comparing the (im)possibilities of narrating the 
trauma of the Holocaust and the atomic bomb, suggests that "the jargon of Japanese 
imperialism was racist and overblown but it did not carry the stench of the death 
camps" (50). The obvious implication made by Buruma is that the Japanese language 
did not sustain the same amount of damage that the German language did in the 
aftermath of the Holocaust. Buruma perhaps draws his conclusion from a simplistic 
understanding of the relationship between acts of barbarity and the language in which 
they were conceived as interpreted by Steiner. According to Buruma's formulation, 
as the Japanese language was not contaminated by perpetrator usage, the survivors 
can use their native language to express their experiences as victims with greater ease 
than Holocaust survivors in Europe whose language was tainted by its association 
with the perpetration of genocide. 
As discussed in chapter one, Kurihara Sadako takes an opposite perspective 
and argues that the cultural experience of resistance bom in World War 11 bequeathed 
a new literary tradition upon European writers, which Holocaust survivors were able 
to draw upon when narrating their experiences. For Kurihara, the existence in Europe 
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of a twentieth century literary tradition that attempts to deal with the complexities of 
the representation of atrocity, a tradition that goes back to the First World War, eases 
the burden of incommunicability. Certainly, Ota's comments on the failure of 
existing Japanese literary forms to confront atrocity seem to accord with Kurihara's 
opinion. Yet, this does not necessarily legitimise Kurihara's claim. Holocaust 
survivors also recognise the failure of literary traditions to equip them with the 
narrative tools with which to approach the Holocaust. Wiesel explained his 
testimonial crisis in writing that: I knew the role of the survivor was to testify. Only 
I did not know how. I lacked experience, I lacked aframework. I mistrusted the tools, 
the procedures" (qtd. in Schwarz 53). 
Ultimately, in arguing for greater narrative challenges for either hibakusha or 
Holocaust survivors, both Buruma and Kurihara are arguing for a perspective that 
overlooks individual responses to atrocity, and generalises the representational 
difficulties that beset survivors from each event who attempted to bear witness to 
their experiences. Whilst the particular problems of contaminated language and the 
absence of an adequate literary model cannot - and should not - be ignored, 
questions are inevitably raised by the ease with which Buruma and Kurihara 
generalise testimonial response. Is it really the case that hibakusha faced fewer 
problems with finding words to describe their experiences? Did a different literary 
heritage which lent itself to the representation of atrocity significantly benefit 
Holocaust survivors who sought to testify to their experiences in narrative form? The 
overwhelmingly negative response to each of these questions found in the testimonies 
of survivors warns against these generalised analyses which function to reduce the 
complexities of representation to a competitive level. 
Ota's struggle with literary form is evidenced through the fragmented 
structure of Cijy of Corpses, which incorporates her personal response, characterised 
by her anger towards both the bomb and the Japanese military authorities, whom she 
blames for the destruction, with extracts from newspaper articles and statistical data. 
The inclusion of these sources stems from her recognition of the difficulty of trying 
"to communicate in writing the indescribable fright and terror, the gruesome misery, 
the numbers of victims and dead, the horrifying conditions of atomic bomb sickness" 
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(Ota 148). Directly contradicting Buruma's contention that hibakusha did not 
confront inadequacy within existing language, Ota writes in her prologue: 
The new methods of description and expression necessary to write 
cannot be found in the repertoire of an established writer. [... ] It 
would probably have been a simple matter if one were able to express 
the bitterness of that experience in terms of that ready-made concept 
'hell, ' whose existence I do not acknowledge. I was absolutely unable 
to depict the truth without first creating a new terminology. (14 8) 
To expand on this theme, she offers examples: of a girl whose breast had been ripped 
out by the explosion she writes, "try as one might to depict that in writing, it cannot 
be done" (149). Of another young woman, horrifically injured in the explosion, Ota 
says simply: "To people who know nothing of the nature of a uranium bomb, facts 
like these must seem like lies" (149). As she finds her skills of description 
jeopardised in the face of individual instances of suffering such as these, so does she 
falter in trying to communicate the more impersonal scale of the catastrophe, and at 
this point turns to a newspaper extract. In an understated explanation for her decision 
to include j ournalistic articles, Ota writes: 
Next, from newspaper clippings in my possession, I should like to set 
down for posterity a statistical of the casualties the atomic bomb 
inflicted. I don't know why it is, but without doing so I can't get 
myself into the mood to start writing of the events of that summer 
morning in Hiroshima. (169) 
Following this newspaper clipping, she includes extracts from the scientific report of 
Professor Fujiwara, and a medical report by Dr Tsuzuki. Words seem to fail Ota, and 
rather than remain silent, she chooses to include the words of others to supplement 
her own account. This reliance on factual data and scientific data when words fail is 
actually part of a wider trend, and comes to form an identifying characteristic of 
atomic bomb testimony. 
Testimonial accounts are characterised by frequent references to the heat of 
the bomb, the size of the bomb, the survivors distance from ground zero. As the 
Holocaust narrative falls into an expressive silence at moments that defy description, 
so in the A-bomb narrative we see a dependence upon objective data as evidence of 
descriptive language failing the author. Yamaoka Michiko was aged fifteen when the 
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bomb was dropped on her home town of Hiroshima. She states early in her testimony 
that: 
My house was one point three kilometers from the hypocenter. My 
place of work was five hundred meters from the hypocenter. I walked 
toward the hypocenter in an area where all the houses and buildings 
had been deliberately demolished for firebreaks [ ... ] They say 
temperatures of seven thousand degrees centigrade hit me. (384) 
Yamaoka replaces a description of her experience with factual information about the 
temperature of the blast that hit her, information that is not her own but borrowed 
from an anonymous source. The geography of the city is retrospectively 
acknowledged; she walks towards the blast hypocentre, as the topology of Hiroshima 
prior to the bomb is made redundant in the face of the catastrophe. Descriptions of 
Hiroshima as a city made up of streets and districts are rejected in favour of 
portraying it solely in relation to the location of ground zero. The precise detail 
revealed in this description can be better recognised when compared with the halting 
ambiguity in Yamaoka's attempt to re-envision the moment the bomb fell: "There 
was no sound. I felt something strong. It was terribly intense. I felt colours" (384). 
The restraint displayed in this commentary is inextricably linked to Yarnaoka's 
geographical positioning, and as discussed in chapter one, Treat is of the opinion that 
the closer the individual was to the epicentre of the explosion, the greater the 
difficulty that survivor has in narrating their experiences, an opinion bome out by the 
evidence from The Witness of Those Two Dqys. The inclusion of factual data here 
heralds the deficiency in language to describe experience. This restriction in 
expression is further exemplified by Yarnaoka as she attempts to portray the violent 
images that she witnessed: 
There were people, barely breathing, trying to push their intestines 
back in. People with their legs wrenched off. Without heads. Or with 
faces burned and swollen out of shape. The scene I saw was a living 
hell. (385) 
The increasingly fragmented sentences she uses are eventually silenced as Yamaoka 
falls into using familiar terms - the image of hell - to portray the indescribable. On 
the other hand, Ota identifies her own inability, or refusal, to invoke the image of hell 
in her narrative as key to her struggle with language. Ota comments that: 
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I have not seen hell, nor do I acknowledge the existence of the 
Buddhist hell. Losing sight of the exaggeration involved, people often 
spoke of the experience of the atomic bomb as 'hell' or 'scenes of 
hell. ' It would probably have been a simple matter if one were able to 
express the bitterness of experience in terms of that ready made 
concept 'hell' whose existence I do not acknowledge. (14 8) 
Ota emphasises her rejection of the existence of the Buddhist hell, and her comments 
carry a tone of condemnation for those survivors who slipped into a "simple" 
comparison of the destruction to hell. This makes her inclusion of the image of hell in 
City of CorpLes all the more surprising. Writing of the chaos that reigned in the city 
of Hiroshima in the aftermath compared to the comparative tranquillity of the 
surrounding countryside to which many survivors fled, she remarks, "The living hell 
that was Hiroshima and the peaceful countryside were distinctly different worlds" 
(237). In employing the image of hell, she is betraying her method of testimonial 
practice by "exaggerating" the scene she describes. Her choice of the word 
6'exaggeratioif 'is curious at first glance. However, Ota is not trying to diminish the 
horrors of the bomb, but rather she is expressing concern that in utilising a "ready 
made concept", a concept moreover that is subject to the interpretation of each 
individual who uses or hears it, the witness is shying away from the describing the 
reality of the event. She is also wary of designating any one scene as like hell because 
such a description would conjure up images of unsurpassed horror to the reader. Yet 
for Ota, the horrors she witnessed cannot be ranked in this way, and she writes 
frustratedly "I don't like to use the word 'hell' because that would use up my 
vocabulary of horror; but there was no other way to describe this scene" (205). 
However, her rejection of the image of hell places Ota in a difficult position. She 
acknowledges that as a description it cannot do justice to the bomb, but at the same 
time she is unable to suggest an alternative. The corollary of her strident rejection of 
hell imagery is the recognition of the unrepresentability of the A-bomb. 
Hibakusha frequently open their testimonial narratives with a record of their 
distance from the bomb, and this information often stands in place of a description of 
their experience. In another account, Yoshimura Katsuyoshi begins with: 
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In August 1945 1 was in the first grade of primary school. My house 
was about 1.8kin from the hypocenter, at the approach to the Tsurami 
bridge. The bridge spans the Kyobashi River, a tributary of the Ota 
River that skirts Hijiyama Park. Along the embankment was a road 
five or six meters wide which our house faced. From the road the 
house looked as though it had only one storey, but from below it could 
be seen to have two floors. (38) 
Yoshimura continues in this descriptive vein for some time. As with Yamaoka's 
account, the extent of this description can only be acknowledged when compared to 
the brief sentences which describe the moment of the explosion itself. 
The house collapsed around us, and we were buried under the debris. 
The ceiling and the furniture from the second floor fell around us. It 
seemed like a long time, but was probably only ten or fifteen minutes 
before things stopped falling and everything grew quiet. We were 
enveloped in darkness. (39) 
The representation of the experience of the bomb itself is detached and 
emotionless, and minimal when placed in comparison with the lengthy factual 
description of Yoshimura's position at the time of the attack. The emphasis placed on 
positioning in so many hibakusha testimonies is in part due to historical context. The 
majority of early testimonies were written by survivors applying for medical 
treatment and financial assistance, and the genbaku WhO (the collective name for the 
"two atom bomb lawe'passed in 1957 and 1968 which dealt, somewhat belatedly, 
with hibakusha welfare) dictated that in order to qualify, hibakusha needed to clearly 
state their proximity to the epicentre. The effect of the atomic bomb on the individual 
had to presented as calculable in scientific measurements, and as a consequence, 
personal testimonies became littered with factual data. These early testimonies 
became the model for many later testimonies, and so the factual style of narration 
became firmly established. As Yoneyama points out, the effect of this scientific 
styling was that "survivors became alienated from their pasts, as whatever evidence 
they supplied for their own experiences was surpassed by externalised and objectified 
criteria" (94). In this lengthy description of quantifiable facts, of the describable, is 
the implicit message that the personal experience of the atomic bomb, of the 
indescribable, cannot be narrated. Personal experience becomes silenced, or at best, 
minimised in the face of factual narration. This is not to suggest that atomic bomb 
testimonies do not contain many disturbing passages of horror both witnessed and 
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experienced. However, this reliance on factual data in descriptions of moments of 
extremis indicates a sense of detachment on the part of the survivor; in replacing their 
own personal narrative with anonymous factual discourse, the survivor silences their 
own experience by distancing themselves from it. 
Treat, however, suggests that Ota's call for a new language is misplaced. "The 
old one suffices, " he argues. "The real problem, " he suggests: 
is not the relationship of the writer divorced from the means of 
delineating a new reality to that elusive means, but rather that of a 
writer fully initiated in that reality to a readership which cannot be, or, 
in consideration of the consequences which might ensue, should not 
be. (Writing Ground Zero 203) 
This more subtle appreciation of the failure of language in the face of atrocity reflects 
the concerns of Holocaust writers such as Delbo and Levi who acknowledge that 
whilst atrocity may not destroy language, it destroys the continuity of meaning in 
language. Survivors draw on a different frame of reference to non-survivors, and 
Whilst the words may exist to describe the atrocity they are rendered empty by the 
experience of extremity. For Ota, the use of language that would be understood by a 
non-survivor, that could recreate the experience of the bomb on the page, would 
herald a betrayal of the reality of the event. Lifton comments that she developed "a 
survivor's sense of 'sacred historical truth', " that dominated her attempts to write 
about the A-bomb (Death in Life 425). In an interview with him, she explained "I just 
want to write the truth - to describe it as it was without exaggeration" (qtd. in Lifton 
Death in Life 425). This desire to tell the truth as she saw it is emphasised in her 
prologue to City of Corpses. Ota writes: 
My pen did not take in the whole city. I wrote only of my very limited 
experience of the riverbed. [... ] I wrote also of the sights I saw on our 
flight to the country. The whole city was buried in a calamity more sad 
and severe than the scenes I saw on the riverbed and in the streets; that 
fact I should like my readers to be aware of. (148) 
Ota's resistance to the temptation to describe events she had not witnessed is 
testament to her desire to write only what she knew to be the truth of the bombing, 
albeit limited in scope. In order to maintain her fealty to historical truth, she dismisses 
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the possibility of drawing on infort-nal reportage to supplement her account, 
preferring instead to rely only on that which she personally witnessed, and officially 
recorded factual data. Statistical facts in City of Cornses, then, in the form of 
confirmed death tolls and scientific reports stand as a form of representation that 
cannot be jeopardised by either the taint of exaggeration or inadequacy of language. 
For Ota, they are as direct a representation of the "sacred historical truth" as is 
achievable. 
Ota has, however, been criticised for a sense of arrogance which pervades her 
writing. On meeting her, Lifton recalls that "surrounding her sense of being a leader 
hihakusha writer was a fragile aura of pride, anxiety, vanity and suspiciousness" 
(Death in Life 422). He characterises her as defensive and somewhat aggressive 
during interview, surprised that he had interviewed other A-bomb writers, remarking 
that "I am the only A-bomb writer. Who else could you find? " (qtd. in Lifton, Death 
in Life 423). Reiko Tachibana refers to her "emotional tendency to measure external 
events in terms of their effect on her personally" (59). Certainly Ota centralises her 
own suffering in her testimony, often describing the agonies of other victims in order 
to emphasise the horror of her own experiences. In her prologue to Cily of Corpses 
she writes: 
It was [ ... ] the first time that thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of 
thousands died in one instant, and I was the first to walk weeping 
among corpses lying about, so many that there was hardly a place to 
set one's feet. I was also the first to see the gruesomeness of the 
atomic bomb sickness, a vast and profound force that destroys the 
human body even while the body is alive. Under these conditions 
anything and everything I was forced to see was new under the sun; 
being forced to witness it was itself tragic. (149) 
This passage does suggest an element of self-aggrandisement, in her assertion that 
she was the first to bear witness to the destruction, and that the tragedy of her 
witnessing was comparable to the tragedy of the death of thousands. Tachibana points 
specifically to the concluding chapter of Ota's testimony, in which she states: 
All the tears, I feel, have purified my writer's soul; put water through a 
filter, and in due time only pure water will emerge. In fact, I am 
angrier at the mindlessness of Japan's imperialism, a mindlessness that 
128 
almost destroyed my life as a writer, than am at the destruction of 
Hiroshima. (Ota 270-271) 
Tachibana interprets this as Ota asserting that "her individual ability to flourish as a 
writer should be more important than all the lives lost in Hiroshima" (59). However, 
this reading fails to take into account the context of her remark. In the text, Ota 
follows this comment with an explanation: 
It is not a personal anger; it is entwined with my lament for my 
country. Seeing the mortal defeat pass into history, I grieve. Japan 
seems to be sloughing off much of its traditional character. Japan was 
crushed in the war, but that does not mean that Japan also came up 
short in all other aspects of life. The idea that Japan failed across the 
board is a psychological side effect, something that defeat brings in its 
train. (271) 
Contextualising Ota's statement demonstrates that her anger at the way in which the 
bomb almost destroyed her potential as a writer is actually part of her grieving for the 
consequences it had for Japan as a nation. She is swift to explain that "it is not a 
personal anger, " but rather part of her understanding of how Japanese culture, of 
which she considers herself a part, was impaired by the experience of the bomb. It is 
true in this statement that Ota is not focussing on the dead of Hiroshima, but neither 
is she simply reacting to the effect of the bomb on her career as Tachibana somewhat 
simplistically suggests. Rather, at the conclusion of her testimony, she is considering 
the consequences of the bomb on the future of Japan, concerned that the 
understanding of the catastrophic defeat as a result of Japanese imperialism may 
translate into a denigration of Japan's pre-war accomplishments, and a view that 
Japan as a nation, a culture and a people had utterly failed. This attempt to rescue 
Japan from the popular perception of failure is in line with her strong pre-war 
nationalism. Whilst her pre-war nationalism was characterised by militarism, she 
recanted this position in the post-bomb era and her nationalism manifested itself in a 
desire to rebuild Japan. "Japan and the Japanese belong to the Japanese, " she declares 
passionately, "they cannot belong to anyone else. Is that the reason there is room for 
both feelings, the sad and the happy? " (271). The sadness she refers to is the violence 
of the defeat; the happiness the prospect of peace and democracy in the post-war 
Japanese nation. 
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Others have contested this view of Ota as an arrogant writer. Responding to 
Lifton's generally negative characterisation of her, Richard Minear accepts that "one 
senses that Lifton the person was more sympathetic than his psychological categories 
permitted him to be" (134). Nevertheless, he still defends Ota from Lifton's 
description, citing the circumstances under which they met as hardly conducive to 
congeniality. Lifton interviewed Ota in 1962, one year before she died of heart failure 
at the age of sixty. She was still haunted by the suicide of fellow A-bomb writer Hara 
Tamiki in 195 1, connecting his death directly with his experiences of the bomb. She 
resented the isolation that she believed his death had caused her, writing in 1952: 
Had Hara Tamiki lived and written as he could [ ... ] then my soul 
would soon find rest. You don't know how hard it is, thinking that I 
must write all by myself One person can't write it all. It is a disgrace 
for Japanese writers that I am left to write it alone. (qtd. in Minear 
132) 
It seems likely that this feeling of angry isolation fuelled her hostile declaration to 
Lifton that she was "the only atomic bomb writer. - Yet by the time Lifton 
interviewed her in 1962, she had ceased to write about Hiroshima, the difficulties that 
had beset all of her attempts to write about it finally overcoming her. Minear also 
suggests that Lifton himself may have unwittingly antagonised Ota. He was a young 
man, a national of the country that dropped the bomb who appeared to her at least as 
utterly ill-equipped to interview her. He had not read any of her works, and being 
unable to speak Japanese fluently was forced to conduct his interviews through an 
interpreter. "Under these conditions, " concludes Minear, "it is hardly surprising that 
she was reluctant to see Lifton at all or that the picture Lifton painted was less than 
complimentary" (134). 
These attempts to discredit Ota as a cantankerous and arrogant individual 
should have little place in any analysis of her literary representation of the atomic 
bomb. It is, however, indicative of the low esteem in which atomic bomb writers 
were held. Indeed, Minear confirms that the very appellation "atomic bomb writer" 
was applied disparagingly, and represented the reluctance and distaste with which A- 
bomb literature was received in the immediate post-war years (123-124). Tachibana 
observes that until the 1960s, literary representations of the atomic bomb experience 
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were rejected by the bundan, the Japanese literary circles, on the grounds that such 
brutal and direct representations of atrocity contravened accepted and established 
Japanese stylistic traditions. "Hibakusha authors from Hiroshima and Nagasaki who 
wrote about the bombing, " writes Tachibana, "thus suffered from a double 
discrimination, first as hibakusha and second as practitioners of A-bomb writing" 
(33). As a result, much of the testimonial literature has emerged from those who were 
"insulated from the preferences of literary circles" (33). Many brief testimonies were 
collected for certain projects, such as those found in The Witness of Those Two Dqys 
volumes. Other wrote their accounts in order to seek compensation for their 
sufferings, and school children were often set the task of recording their experiences 
as homework projects, such as those collected in Children of Hiroshima. Others 
hibakusha kept diaries, and later published them as their testimony. Tachibana 
characterises these non-professional writings as: 
graphic and vivid pictures of the bombed cities in straightforward 
types of narration. [ ... ] these memoirs do not attempt to present detailed or elaborate descriptions, or to provide interpretations of the 
event [... ] If larger questions of society or history are evoked, it is 
because of the extreme nature of the experiences themselves, rather 
than because any conscious artistry of structure or style is apparent. 
(33-34) 
Whilst these testimonies may be considered to be amateur in style, they offer valuable 
perspectives of the bombing that are unencumbered by criticism from the literary 
establishment. One such important diary is Dr. Hachiya Michihiko's Hiroshima 
Dia , made 
famous in the West by Wemer Wells' translation. His diary offers an 
insight into day-to-day experience of survival and exposes the chaos and confusion 
that dominated the rumour ridden city of Hiroshima in the aftermath of the atomic 
bomb. 
The Diary Contract and the Illusion of Immediacy: Hachiya Michihiko's 
Hiroshima Diarv 
Dr Hachiya Michihiko was Director of the Communications Hospital in 
Hiroshima when the bomb was dropped on August 6 1945. In common with most 
citizens of Hiroshima he was at home, some 1700m. from the hypocentre, when the 
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bomb was dropped at quarter past eight in the morning. He and his wife were injured 
in the blast, and made their way to the damaged Communications Hospital 
(unwittingly moving closer to the epicentre of the explosion) seeking aid. Hachiya 
found himself in the difficult and frustrating position of being both patient and doctor 
in the days and weeks following the attack. Despite the severity of his injuries, 
Hachiya was able to record his experiences in his diary on a daily basis, from the day 
of the attack to September 9 1945. 
Reading the diary as a form of testimony introduces new challenges. The 
wartime diary of the Japanese liberal journalist Kiyosawa Kiyoshi details his personal 
and professional thoughts and activities during the war, and has been described by 
Eugene Soviak as "inadvertent autobiography" (Kiyosawa xi). This definition of 
diary subtly highlights the distinction between diary and other forms of life-writing, 
the notion of inadvertency raising issues for both writing and reading the diary as a 
form of testimony. 
Soviak's identification of the diary as a form of autobiography returns us to 
the discussion of what constitutes autobiographical writing, and whether the diary 
form fulfils the conditions of autobiography. As discussed in chapter one, Philippe 
Lejeune defines autobiography through the means of his autobiographical contract, 
the assertion of unity of identity between author, narrator and protagonist. By 
abandoning Lejeune's perception of authorial responsibility to ascertain 
autobiographical authenticity, the testimonial works of Primo Levi and Elie Wiesel 
reject this contract. The diary as a form of life writing, however, does not so much 
reject as make redundant Lejeune's contract. The diarist puts in place no guarantee of 
identity between author, narrator and protagonist, because they have no responsibility 
to a reader, no need to ascertain their authenticity. Felicity A. Nussbaum defines a 
diary as "a confession to the self with only the self as auditor and without the public 
authority"; in such circumstances, there is no need to establish the parameters of trust 
that Lejeune calls for (135). The reader of personal diaries is unanticipated, perhaps 
even intrusive, and in accordance with this "non-relationship" between author and 
reader, Rachel Cottam proposes a new contract: 
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The diary "contracf' would perhaps be one, then, that legitimises the 
illicit nature of the reader: I subscribe not to be writingfor you. The 
result is a reading that is acknowledged by writer and reader as 
implicitly furtive. (269) 
%ilst Lejeune's autobiographical contract encourages a cosy relationship between 
author and reader based on mutual trust and belief in authenticity, Cottam's diary 
contract sets up a hostility between diarist and reader. The presence of the reader is 
only reluctantly acknowledged. Donald Keene suggests that "the best diaries have an 
immediacy that may make us feel closer to the writer than any other kind of 
literature" (Modem Japanese Diaries viii). The hostility evident in Cottam's diary 
contract, however, calls into question the nature of this closeness between the diarist 
and the reader. Indeed, the flaw in Keene's understanding of diary is that this 
perceived closeness is ultimately illusory. Alexandra Zaprudrer wams against any 
close engagement with the writer, arguing that the sense of immediacy and intimacy 
offered by the text is false. She comments: 
Although many diaries can give the illusion that the reader is in the 
presence of the writer - because they are written in the first person, and 
are often intimate in tone and spontaneous in form - it is unfortunately 
not so. Whether personal or not, private or public, spontaneous or 
crafted, the content of the diary does not allow us to come to know the 
writer [ ... ]A collection of pages written over a few months or years - 
no matter how intensely personal, confidential or immediate - can be little more than a pale shadow, a wretched fragment from which to 
capture the immeasurable complexity, likes, dislikes, dreams, wishes, 
desires, contradictions, and stories that compose a whole, complete 
person. (8) 
In her condemnation of the illusion of immediacy, Zaprudrer argues that narrative 
will always fail to capture the entirety of an individual, thus rendering any sense of 
closeness between a diarist and a reader impossible. For Zaprudrer, the self cannot be 
manifested textually, the self cannot be known through narrative. The potential of a 
relationship between diarist and reader will, then, always be thwarted; to return to the 
diary contract, the diarist will never be writing for the reader. 
This perception of the immediacy offered by the diary form is not restricted to 
a perceived intimacy between diarist and reader. Whilst the immediacy between 
reader and writer may be questionable, as Zaprudrer argues, the contemporary nature 
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of diary has led many critics to suggest that diaries privilege the reader with a greater 
closeness to the history of the events within the diary. David Roskies, writing 
specifically of Holocaust accounts but making a point which can be applied more 
widely to diaries that document historical events, makes a distinction between 
66survival literature" and "real Holocaust literature". The former he categorises as eye- 
witness accounts written after the Holocaust which recollect events, the latter as 
accounts such as diaries that are actually written during the event. The "realness" of 
these texts emerges from the fact that they are linked in time and place to the event 
they describe (211). Linda Anderson concurs with the claim that a diary gives the 
reader access to an enhanced "realness" in the description of events on the grounds 
that it registers a "freshness and authenticity of impression which might be lost in 
subsequent retelling" (Autobiography 35). 
Both Roskies and Anderson recognise that the significance of the diary lies in 
the minimal time lapse between the event and its narration. Andrea Reiter, in her 
discussion of testimonies, acknowledges the problems that can be caused through an 
extended time between event and narration: 
any analysis must take account of the time that elapsed between the 
experiencing and the recording of events [ ... ] The greater the distance between the two, the more did survivors base themselves on 
explanatory models not directly connected with the experience, and 
the more they overlay their experience with models derived from 
literature or history. (Narrating the Holocaust 199-200) 
The fundamental difference between the diary and the latterly written testimony is the 
duration of time between event and narration. The longer this period, the greater the 
chance of the report being contaminated by external factors denoted by Reiter as the 
influence of literature and history. There is, then, an assumed purity inherent in diary 
which has led Berel Lang to conclude that "the diary comes as close as representation 
can to performing the events it cites rather than to describing them; it is an act in, if 
not fully of, the history it relates" (Ljolocaust Representation 22). The diary is not a 
memory of, and commentary on, history, but rather participatory in history. The diary 
comes to be viewed as part of history in itself; in the words of Lang, it is not simply 
"historical narrative", but part "of the movement of history itself' (2 1). Significantly, 
the illustration on the front cover of Hachiya's Hiroshima PLia! y pays homage to this 
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view of diary as emerging directly from history, as it displays writing emerging From 
the centre of the nuclear mushroom cloud: 
Crucially for Lang, the diary offers a "direct representation (an enactment) of 
the contingency of historical time - insofar as the diarist writes in ignorance of what 
the next moment, let alone any longer period, holds for the event he describes, or 
more pointedly, for himself'(21). Paradoxically, it is this very quality so valued by 
Lang that offers the reader such privileged access to the historical moment that has 
actually hampered the development of the academic study of diary. Donald Stauffer 
forcefully stated that "diary has scant claim to consideration, " regarding it to be "not 
the record of a life but the journal of an existence, made up of a monotonous series of 
short and similar entries [making] no pretense to artistic structure" (qtd. in Nussbaum 
128). Stauffer makes an interesting distinction between life and existence in his 
critique ol'diary. Existence is simply a series of consecutive experiences, rendered 
monotonous by the inability of the diarist to recognise certain moments that become 
significant on reflection. A life, by contrast, he considers only possible to be 
recognised from a temporal distance, when on reflection, certain moments can have 
fuller meanings attributed to them. A journal of an existence provides the building 
blocks From which the story of a life can be constructed. Adriana Cavarero identifies 
this distinction with greater clarity, arguing that: 
The meaning that saves each life from being a mere sequence of 
events does not consist in a determined figure; but rather consists 
precisely in leaving behind a figure, or something from which the 
unity ofa design can be discerned in the telling of the story. Like the 
design. the story comes after the events and actions from which it 
results. (2) 
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Cavarero introduces this thesis with an anecdote borrowed from Karen Blixen's Out 
of Africa. She tells the tale of a man who lived near a pond. Awaking one night, he 
realised that it was leaking, and ran out in the dark of the night to attempt to stop up 
the leak. He eventually succeeded and returned to bed. It was not until the morning 
when he emerged from his home the next morning that he saw the footprints he had 
made the night before had traced out the pattern of a stork in the dust. In the same 
way that the dust revealed the pattern of the stork only after the event, so the story of 
a life only gains coherence on reflection. Diary, however, represents the absence of 
the stork. It is the narration of the seemingly random patterns in the dust, simply a 
"sequence of eventsP with no "unity of design". It is this "failing" that grants the 
reader a greater proximity to the historical moment. 
It is, however, a mistake to assume that the lack of a coherent story in diary 
deprives it of meaning. As Nussbaum points out: 
Diary, simultaneously preserving and evaluating, makes meaning 
inherent in the choice of words, the sequence of phrases and the 
assignment of dialogue to self or other. [ ... ] Diary and journal are 
representations of reality rather than failed versions of something more 
coherent and unified. (136-137) 
Nussbaum recognises that despite its contemporaneity, diary narrative is still 
selective, and the diarist, perhaps unwittingly, attributes meanings to events through 
the very way in which they are represented. The lack of coherent story, she rightly 
points out, is not to be perceived as a failure of diary, but rather a triumph. It is 
through the omission of a unified design at the time of writing that diary maintains its 
position as the closest representation of reality. 
The image of the belated stork may be seen as a source for Soviak's 
description of diary as "inadvertent autobiography". The reader of a diary may detect 
a pattern or story developing as the diary progresses, a pattern that has been 
inadvertently put in place by the diarist. A diary can become the story of a life only 
when read in its entirety. Yet the term "inadvertenf' also functions to highlight the 
tension between the public and the private that is inherent in the diary format. 
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Hachiya Michihiko initially recorded his experiences of the atomic bomb in daily 
diary entries whilst he was bed-ridden in hospital. This was a personal diary, never 
intended for publication. However, his friends quickly realised the historical 
importance of his diary and encouraged him to publish it, and his diary was 
consequently serialised in a small Japanese medical i oumal entitled Teishin Igaku, 
which was circulated among the employees of the Japanese Communications 
Ministry. This serialisation had only a limited readership and was mostly restricted to 
Hachiya's professional colleagues, and those with a similar level of medical expertise 
to himself. It was not until 1951 that an American doctor, Dr Wemer Wells, learned 
of Hachiya's diary, and was determined to translate his record into English and 
publish it in its entirety. 
Wells' position as self-appointed editor of Hachiya's diary is in itself curious. 
By his own admission he can read Japanese only in a "tedious and laborious fashion, 
with complete dependence on dictionaries and grammars, " a handicap which forced 
him to employ a Japanese-American doctor, Dr. Neal Tsukifuji, actually to carry out 
the translation (Hachiya xx). Wells' role as he perceived it was to revise and edit 
Tsukiftij i's translation in order to "preserve the balance, simplicity, and quality of 
values Dr Hachiya achieved in his own tongue" (xxi). Exactly how he managed to 
revise the translation in accordance with these aims despite his scant knowledge of 
Japanese, he never explains. The extent to which Hiroshima DiM as a text has been 
subjected to revision is difficult to measure. Wells' revisions to the diary remain 
mysterious, although he does make one very clear addition to the text. He concludes 
his foreword to the diary with a catalogue of the names and roles of the most 
prominent people who figure in the diary. In its resemblance to a cast list, this seems 
to present the individuals concerned as characters in a play, thereby jeopardising their 
identities as real individuals who suffered the atomic bombing. Secondly, by 
clarifying and ordering the people in the diary in this way, rather than allowing 
Hachiya to introduce them in his own words, Wells is putting into place a false 
coherency in the text, and in doing so is denying the very quality that Nussbaum sees 
as central to the diary form. However, Wells is not alone in disturbing the potential 
immediacy of Hahiya's contemporary voice. According to Treat, Hachiya himself 
rewrote his diary for publication, although it is not known which aspects in particular 
he may have altered, or indeed what his motivation for doing so was (Writing Ground 
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Zero 52). Hachiya's diary in particular, then, challenges the notion of immediacy in 
diary. 
Wells' publication of Hiroshima Diary marked a second stage in the transition 
of Hachiya's diary from the private to the public sphere. Wells' objective was to 
introduce the English-speaking world, particularly his fellow Americans, to the 
human experience of the atomic bombings. John W. Dower, the author of the 
foreword to the 1995 edition of the diary, describes the publication of Hiroshima 
Dialy as a "salutary event". He continues, "his simple account tells us, as no one but 
the Japanese who experienced the bomb can, about the human consequences of 
nuclear weapons" (Hachiya vii). Whilst this may be a valid point, it does compromise 
the personal nature of Hachiya's diary. In this formulation, the diary becomes not a 
record of the personal experiences of one victim, but is rather expanded to become 
representative of the Japanese experience. The importance of Hiroshima DiaKy as an 
individual's experiences is subsumed in favour of presenting the account as a 
universal experience of the atomic trauma. In making the diary public, the personal is 
sacrificed. 
In taking this approach, Dower is investing in that which Leigh Gilmore terms 
"the autobiographical paradox. " This paradox dictates that "the unusual or 
unrepresentative life becom[es] representative" (Gilmore 19). Gilmore argues that the 
origin of this paradox lies in the tradition of autobiography which encourages a "close 
relation between representing yourself and participating in a representative structure 
in which one may stand for many" (19). The very act of writing the self, she suggests, 
transforms the experiences of the self from the individual to the universal. This notion 
of representativeness is rendered ftuther paradoxical when the representation of the 
self collides with the representation of trauma. "How, " asks Gilmore: 
can the exploration of trauma and the burden it imposes on memory 
be representative? How can the experience of one survivor of trauma 
stand for many? How can one tell the truth, the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth, when facts, truth and memory combine in the 
representation of trauma to undermine rather than strengthen 
representativeness? (19) 
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This sense of representativeness is imposed upon the diary by its readers. When the 
diary is a personal document the need for representativeness is absent; it is when it 
crosses over into the public sphere that the reader assumes an individual's 
experiences to be universal. 
Writing the Pika: Manifestations of Silence in Hiroshima Diary 
Hachiya situates silence at the very heart of his diary by his silencing of the 
atomic explosion. His record of the attack and his representation of his experiences is 
represented in a description that focuses on a series of visual images that demonstrate 
a shocking transition from early morning peace and tranquillity to sudden chaos. His 
diary opens with the following: 
The hour was early; the morning still, warm, and beautiful. 
Shimmering leaves, reflecting sunlight from a cloudless sky, made a 
pleasant contrast with shadows in my garden as I gazed absently 
through wide-flung doors opening to the south. [ ... ] Suddenly, a 
strong flash of light startled me - and then another. So well does one 
recall little things that I remember vividly how a stone lantern in the 
garden became brilliantly lit and I debated whether this light was 
caused by a magnesium flare or sparks from a passing trolley. 
Garden shadows disappeared. The view where a moment 
before all had been so bright and sunny was now dark and hazy. 
Tbrough swirling dust I could barely discern a wooden column that 
had supported one comer of my house. It was leaning crazily and the 
roof sagged dangerously. (1) 
The delicacy of the images, from the "shimmering leaves" to the "swirling dust", 
seems simultaneously to belie and evoke the chaos of the moment, and suggests an 
attempt by Hachiya to forge an aesthetics of chaos. Donald Keene characterises 
Japanese literature as focussing on smaller details in order to subtly reveal the larger 
picture, a style that seems very much evident in this passage, particularly in the image 
of the stone lantern illuminated by the atomic flash, orpika. Keene relates a classic 
anecdote, which serves as a model for Japanese literary style, in which a general 
wearing polished annour was awaiting an elite audience. He was informed that 
someone who was not sufficiently privileged to see him in his armour was 
approaching, and to prevent this breach in etiquette, he threw a wrap of thin silk 
around himself. Japanese writers, particularly poets, aim for the effect of the polished 
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armour shining through the thin silk (Japanese Literature 9). The subtlety of 
Hachiya's representation of the atomic flash through the image of the illuminated 
stone lantern can be best appreciated when compared to the attempts of other 
hibakusha to describe the searing reality of the pika. Yoshimura Katsuyoshi was 
seven years old at the time of the bombing, and remembers in her testimony "being 
blinded by a brilliant flash" (39). Nonaka Fumiko, a young woman living in 
Hiroshima, describes it as "a piercing flash that bit into my face. I felt my body 
shrivel with a hiss like that of a dried cuttlefish when you grill if' (89) 1. The 
experience of the pika is represented violently in the words of these two hibakusha, 
particularly in Nonaka's account. By contrast, Hachiya's image of the stone lantern 
mutes this violence, but nevertheless makes the reader aware of its presence. In 
Hachiya's aesthetic account, the illuminated stone lantern functions as the thin wrap 
of silk in Keene's anecdote. 
The vivid and evocative visuals that dominate this opening passage are 
accentuated by the silence which accompanies them. In literal terms, it is true that 
Hachiya's experience of the A-bomb was silent, as those close to the epicentre were 
unable to distinguish the two phases of the explosion - the intense flash, or pika and 
then the overwhelming boom, or don. Recollecting the moment of the explosion in 
his diary three days later, Hachiya wrote: 
Now, I could state positively that I had heard nothing like an explosion 
when we were bombed the other morning, nor did I remember any 
sound during my walk to the hospital as houses collapsed around me. 
It was as though I walked through a gloomy, silent motion picture. 
(37) 
His reference to film here heightens the visual nature of his experience, and 
compounds this visuality with a sense of unreality permeating through his memories. 
Lifion explains that those in the central city area experienced only the flash, and the 
knowledge of the boom was supplied later by those who came in from outside of the 
immediate centre (Death in Life 88). Hachiya refers to the atomic explosion as the 
pika throughout his diary, tenaciously adhering to the term that describes best his 
1 Nonaka's use of the culinary metaphor to explain her experience is significant. As will be discussed 
in chapter three, women hibakusha frequently employ metaphors directly relating to a specifically 
traditional female experience, in this case cooking, to illustrate their experiences. 
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personal experience, even when the conjoined term pikadon became ubiquitous. He 
first notes the use of the word pikadon on the 9h August, and returns to discuss this 
newly coined word on II 1h August: 
Pikadon was accepted as a new word in our vocabulary, although 
some, like old Mrs Saeki, who had been in the city at the time of the 
bombing, continued to simply say pika. Those who had been outside 
the city insisted on saying pikadon. (48) 
The emergence of this new word can be interpreted as a response to the realisation 
that existing vocabulary was inadequate to the task to describing the A-bomb, and as 
a solution to the silence that would otherwise characterise attempts to describe the 
event. Curiously, however, Hachiya does not associate himself with those who refer 
it to the explosion as the pika, even though he unfailingly continues to do so. The 
near universal replacement of Hachiya's preferred word pika with pikadon does in 
itself come to silence. Hachiya's particular experience of the A-bomb, as his 
understanding of his own experience and resultant word for the explosion are glossed 
over with a universalised term that ignores the specificities of individual experience. 
Hachiya's continuation to label the atomic explosion as a silent phenomenon acts as a 
frame to the silence that results when hibakusha attempt to describe the indescribable. 
The failure of words to describe the event is reflected in the silence of the word pika. 
Hachiya's account of the immediate aftermath of the explosion is dominated 
by a silence that he characterises as "uncanny" (5). As he struggled through the 
streets with his wife towards the hospital, he encountered "shadowy forms of people, 
some of whom looked like walking ghosts" (4). The prevailing silence contributes to 
the blurring between the living and the dead as he lists the macabre procession of 
injured that he passes on his j ourney. He writes fleetingly of seeing a naked woman 
carrying her naked baby through the streets, a naked man, and an old woman lying on 
the ground. Many of those in the immediate blast radius, including Hachiya, found 
that their clothes were ripped off by the force of the explosion. Yet whilst he tries to 
maintain the individuality of these victims in his diary, he notes that it is silence that 
unifies the experiences of them all: "indeed, one thing was common to everyone I 
saw - complete silence" (4). This uncanny silence stands as a symbol throughout his 
diary for the loss of individuality that resulted from the trauma of the bombing. Just 
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over a week after the explosion, his diary reveals that his thoughts returned to this 
silence that dominated the stricken city. He writes: 
What a weak, fragile thing man is before the forces of destruction. 
After the pika, the entire population had been reduced to a common 
level of physical and mental weakness. Those who were able walked 
silently towards the suburbs and the distant hills, their spirits broken, 
their initiative gone. When asked whence they had come, they pointed 
to the city and said, "that way"; and when asked where they were 
going, pointed away for the city and said, "this way. " They were so 
broken and confused that they moved and behaved like automatons. 
(54-55) 
The inanimate nature of these "automatons" reinforces the sense of uncanny silence 
that so disturbed Hachiya in the immediate aftermath. Continuing, he recounts the 
"amazement" of "the outsiders" when they encountered the survivors emerging fro 
the ruins of the city. "The outsiders", he affirms, "could not grasp the fact that they 
were witnessing the exodus of a people who walked in the land of dreams" (55). This 
reference to non-hibakusha as "outsiders" is an early indicator of the way in which 
victims of the atomic bomb would come to be perceived as different, and "other" 
because of their experiences. Significantly though, in this passage, by referring to the 
non-victims as "outsiders", Hachiya is inverting this relationship and representing the 
"outsiders" as the other. 
Hachiya continues his account of walking through the destroyed streets by 
describing his arrival at the Communications Hospital. As director of the hospital, 
Hachiya was privileged to receive treatment from colleagues already there 
immediately on his arrival, and he recalls his admission to the hospital: 
Miss Kado [his private nurse] set about examining my wounds without 
speaking a word. I asked for a shirt and pajamas. They got them for 
me, but still no one spoke. Why was everyone so quiet? (5) 
The question with which he ends this passage is typical of his style in this opening 
entry to his diary. Ile questions his situation repeatedly: "Where were my drawers 
and undershirt? " (1), "Where was my wife? " (2), "Could I go on? " (4), "What had 
happened? " (7). In the absence of any response, these questions serve to heighten the 
presence of silence in this immediate aftermath. 
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Whilst Hachiya writes of the actual silence that dominates his memories of the 
event, he is also forced to confront the silence that emerges from the difficulty of 
attempting to describe his experiences in his diary narrative. He rarely, however, 
refers directly to any difficulties, the most notable exception being in any entry on the 
28th August, when he recounts meeting with a close friend, Mr Yamashita. Yamashita 
was renowned before the war as possessing "well-developed literary tastes and was 
known for his artistry and skill in the writing of waka, thirty-one syllable poems" 
(13 1). Hachiya confides in his friend that he is trying to keep a diary of his 
experiences, and asks for his advice in the matter. "You know what difficulty I have 
as a writer, " he confesses, "I have the same trouble this time. Perhaps more, because I 
am out of practice and so many things distract me. Sometimes I get my notes up to 
date, but before I know it I find myself again several days behind" (132). 
Interestingly, Hachiya sees his difficulties in writing about the pika as logistical, 
rather than artistic. He finds himself distracted from his writing, rather than unable to 
write. This self-confessed attitude marks a stark contrast to Holocaust survivor- 
authors, and indeed other hibakusha-authors, who frequently return to the problem of 
trying to represent trauma. Yamashita's response accords more with the typical 
pattern of the survivor rendered inarticulate by experience. Hachiya records him as 
saying: 
I kept a diary until the day of the pika. [ ... I but since then I have done 
nothing. Yashushi, my son, was killed; my house was destroyed; so I 
endure life in despair and confusion. (132) 
In common with Hachiya, Yamashita also refers to the atomic bombing as the pika, 
representing the event as a silent phenomenon. For Yamashita, however, this silence 
extends to corrupt his eloquence in representing his life in narrative. Following the 
bombing, Yamashita finds himself unable to write anymore, a condition which leads 
to the sense of confusion which seems to dominate his post-bomb existence. To 
return to Cavarerro, it is by narrating a life that sense can be made of it; in the 
absence of narration, confusion must prevail. 
Despite rarely explicitly revealing any difficulties in translating the lived 
experience of the pika into narrative form, Hachiya's straining attempts to find a 
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comparative event, and so to find a literary model on which to base his narrative, 
suggest an underlying conflict between experience and representation. On the 8 th 
August, only two days after the bombing, he seeks a comparison in ancient history 
with which to represent his experiences: 
Those glowing ruins and the blazing pyres set me to wondering if 
Pompeii had not looked like this during its last days. But I think there 
were not so many dead in Pompeii as there were in Hiroshima. (32) 
The comparison to the cataclysmic volcanic eruption of 79AD is ultimately rejected 
however, as Hachiya finds it deficient in terms of scale. He unconsciously returns to 
this search for comparative events in his sleep, as he relates in his diary entry for 24th 
August: 
I slept poorly and had a frightfid dream. It seems I was in Tokyo after 
the great earthquake and around me were decomposing bodies heaped 
in piles, all of whom were looking right at me. (114) 
In this dream, Hachiya seems unable to assimilate the decomposing bodies that he 
saw with his own experiences, and seeks a reference point in the great Tokyo 
earthquake. The attempt to describe the atomic bombing through referencing 
catastrophic natural disasters in the diary is a common response to the scale of the 
disaster, for as Dower observes, "the destructiveness of the bomb was so awesome 
that many Japanese initially regarded theme - much like the calamitous losing war 
itself - almost as if they were a natural disaster" (119). Attempts to describe an event 
without precedent result in Hachiya's ultimately fruitless search for metaphors in his 
diary, and evidence his personal difficulties in directly representing the atomic 
bombing. The impossibility of metaphor is a problem faced by both survivors of the 
atomic bomb and the Holocaust. In his analysis of the work of Elie Wiesel, Robert 
McAfee Brown explains the difficulties in representing an event that can have no 
recourse to comparsion: 
Descriptions are made by means of comparison. Analogies are 
embedded in all attempts to communicate: this event of which we do 
not know, is like that one of which we at least know a little. But what 
if there is nothing with which to make a comparison, no analogy that 
will hold? (24) 
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McAfee Brown interprets this absence of analogies as evidence of the uniqueness of 
the Holocaust; however, as can be witnessed through the writings of Hachiya, 
hibakusha face a similar void when attempting to portray their experiences through 
the means of comparative representation. Appreciating this point of commonality in 
Holocaust and A-bomb narratives does not diminish an understanding of each as 
singular historical events, but rather produces an awareness that survivors from each 
event face similar problems in their attempt to narrate unprecedented and extreme 
moments in history. 
On the 80' August, Hachiya had his first glimpse of the ruined city since the 
day of the explosion, and lying in his hospital bed realised the inadequacy of 
language to describe what he saw: 
Devastation may be a better word, but really, I know of no word or 
words to describe the view from my twisted iron bed in the fire-gutted 
ward of the Communications Hospital. (3 1) 
His inability to describe what he could see from his window is ironically emphasised 
by the detail with which he depicts his local environment. The image of the damaged 
bed in the ravaged ward has to stand in for the greater mass devastation that Hachiya 
cannot find the words to describe. 
Particularly as he recovered and became more aware of his surroundings, 
Hachiya witnessed great suffering amongst his fellow hibakusha. Hachiya's style of 
representing the atrocity is characterised by a continual return to clinical and 
technical analysis and description. As seen in Ota's testimony, the reliance on 
impersonal, scientific data is a common feature of atomic bomb testimonies. This 
contrasts with Holocaust survivors who often display a tendency to lapse into textual 
silence when confronted with memories of inexpressible horror, demonstrated 
through a declaration of their inability to describe events, or through ellipses and 
pauses in the narrative itself. In Hiroshima Diarv, - Hachiya often confronts horror not 
with silence but with carefully written, clinical discussions of that which he 
witnessed. Ile responds to horror as a physician when, for example, an unnamed 
visitor phrases a testimony to what he has witnessed as a question: 
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Doctor, do you think a man could see with a protruded eyeball? [ ... ]I 
saw a man whose eye had been torn out by an injury, and there he 
stood with the eye resting in the palm of his hand. What made my 
blood run cold was that it looked like the eye was staring at me. 
Doctor, the pupil looked right at me. Do you think the eye could see 
me? (101) 
Hachiya is left almost speechless in the face of this tale. "Not knowing what to 
answer, " he writes, "I replied 'Could you see your face reflected from the pupil? "' 
(101). His reply suggests an attempt to conceal his horrified fascination within an 
ostensibly medical inquiry. It is all he can manage to say, but his words are 
redundant, offering no real answer to the visitor who simply says "No, I didn't 
look that close" (10 1). 
From a carefully detached perspective, Hachiya repeatedly details his medical 
findings with meticulous precision, and tries to view his fellow survivors solely as 
patients. Many diary entries contain extended clinical analysis of both himself and 
those in his care. Whilst these extracts are not as obvious a manifestation of silence 
as the textual pauses and ellipses in the Holocaust narratives of Levi and Wiesel, they 
do indicate a similar interruption in the text. Whilst Hachiya's style may be attributed 
to his professional methods of recording events as a doctor, clinical discourse 
functions in this text to displace silence, similarly to the way in which many other 
survivors lapse into an account of factual data when confronted with the 
inexpressible. 
As well as including material sourced from his clinical notebooks in his diary, 
11achiya also includes an account of his experiences that he wrote for a journalist a 
month after the atomic bomb was dropped. Contemporary accounts such as this are 
somewhat rare, as the Occupation forces put in place a censorship code on their 
arrival to prevent any unauthorised material about the atom bomb and its effects 
being published. This account is notable, as it offers a quite different record of his 
experiences to that which he narrates in his diary. In the newspaper account, he writes 
that his immediate thoughts after the explosion were "I thought that I would die, and 
decided that if I were to die, I wanted to be in my hospital" (179). His diary account 
of this time is much less stark, and represents a far more confused state of mind: 
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It finally dawned us [Hachiya and his wife] that we could not stay 
there in the street, so we turned our steps toward the hospital. Our 
home was gone; we were wounded and needed treatment; and after all 
it was my duty to be with my staff. This latter was an irrational 
thought - what good could I be to anyone, hurt as I was. (3) 
This irrationality of thought is eliminated from his newspaper account, as his fearful 
wonder at the aforementioned uncanny silence that prevailed. The feeling that he was 
about to die is also absent from his diary account; in the latter, more temporally 
immediate account as wounded only, albeit severely. According to his newspaper 
account, his first words on entering the hospital were "Anybody killed? " (171); in his 
diary it is a seemingly more mundane request for pyjamas (3). The reason for this 
discrepancy can only be speculated upon; it could be a desire to cast himself in a 
more noble light for the neNyspaper report, an omission from his diary account, or an 
error of memory as he cast his mind back to the events of a month previous. A 
significant departure from his diary account can be found later in the newspaper 
report, when he claims "from that day to the present I have been living in a well- 
ventilated hospital" (17 1). This description bears scant resemblance to the crumbling 
building that he repeatedly refers to in the first few diary entries. This revision of his 
view of his condition likely stems from his first expedition out of the hospital on the 
I Vh August. With a colleague he ventured into the city to seek emergency medical 
supplies that it was rumoured had arrived at the Sanitary Office, about a mile from 
the hospital. Whilstjoumeying there, they discovered that many injured people had 
taken refuge in the basement of Fukuya, formerly a large and prestigious department 
store. The conditions that they witnessed were horrific and Hachiya was left unable to 
describe them, writing only that "one peep into the basement was enough. it was so 
dark and forbidding [ ... ] people who had once gone there to trade were now patients 
inside. I could still hear their moans and groans" (5 1). As he was leaving the area he 
met an old friend, Mrs Yanagihara, who was staying at Fukuya. "The misery in her 
expression and the sadness of her voice, " he writes, "embarrassed me and left me 
fumbling to find a word of encouragemenf' (53). It was at this point that he came to 
the painful realisation that "our hospital was a paradise by comparison. Small? Yes, 
but there was light and good ventilation" (5 1). His newspaper account of the 
conditions at the hospital echoes directly this first understanding of his good fortune 
in staying at the hospital. 
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The discrepancies between the two accounts are reminiscent of those 
occurring between Wiesel's Holocaust testimony Night and his autobiography All 
Rivers Run to the Sea. When experience is revisited in memory, new facets are 
revealed, and certain aspects afforded greater of less significance according to the 
emphasis they receive. As Treat points outs, "in the case of testimony [ ... ] from a 
formal perspective, there are properly speaking, no facts at all, but instead only 
narrative elements that appear (or are made to appear) as such because the reader 
accepts them without the resistance of doubt" (Writing Ground Zero 52). According 
to this formulation, the "accuracy" of any one account cannot be prioritised over 
another, as the "facts" in each are only that which the author has deemed to present as 
facts. Once again, Treat's understanding of the place of factuality on testimony brings 
to the forefront questions of what constitutes verifiable authenticity in life-writing. In 
addition to the newspaper report and his original diary entry dealing with his 
experiences, Hachiya repeats his story to two concerned friends in his diary. From 
these accounts, we learn that he was awake at the time of the bombing because he had 
been on air-raid duty the night before until 4.00am, and had found himself unable to 
sleep on his return home. Notably, neither of these two repetitions of his experience 
say anything of his journey to the hospital, and his encounters with other ghost-like 
survivors. 
Combined with the narration of Hachiya's own experiences are the stories of 
many other survivors who shared their stories with him. Similarly to Levi's If This is 
a Man. Ilachiya's Ifirsohima Pýiqry can be read as a multi-authored testimony. 
Amongst others, he includes the stories of his colleagues such as Dr. Akiyama, Dr 
Ilanaoka, Dr Tabuchi, friends such as Captain Fujihara and patients such as Mrs 
Saeko. In contrast to Levi, however, Hachiya does not share the stories of the dead 
but of the living. Moreover, Hachiya does not consider his narration of these 
testimonies as part of a fulfilment of a duty to the dead, or an attempt to represent an 
absence at the heart of catastrophe. Rather, he is exhausted by an onslaught of visitors 
who feel compelled to tell him of their experiences: 
All day I listened to visitors telling me about the destruction of 
Hiroshima and the scenes of horror they had witnessed. Ihadseenmy 
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friends wounded, their families separated, their homes destroyed. [ ... ] By degrees my capacity to comprehend the magnitude of their sorrow, 
to share with them the pain, frustration, and horror became so dulled 
that I found myself accepting whatever was told with equanimity and a 
detachment I would never have believed possible. In two days I had 
become at home in this environment of chaos and despair. (24) 
For Hachiya, these repeated stories produce a dehumanising effect. He loses his 
capacity for empathy and sympathy, and becomes emotionally detached from his 
fellow sufferers. He writes, "I felt lonely, but it was an animal loneliness. I became 
part of the darkness of the nighf' (24). Whereas Levi's accounts of others represent 
an attempt to retrieve the humanity, to rescue both himself and others from silence, 
Hachiya's representation of the stories of others bear witness to a dehumanisation. He 
condemns a multitude of stories to silence, and becomes consumed by the darkness 
that Levi seeks to banish. 
By August 2 1, Hachiya confesses that the stories that had previously had the 
power to numb him with their horror now generated only feelings of tedium within 
him: 
Visitors increased daily and all had something to tell of what they had 
seen, heard or thought. By now, I was bored listening to stories they 
insisted on telling from morning until night, but my boredom did not 
worry my visitors. [ ... ] In each instance [they] tried to convince me 
that their [experience] had been unique. Some did have unusual stories 
to tell. (100) 
Ile does attempt to retell many of these unusual stories, but there is a prevailing sense 
of exhaustion in this task. Ile recounts meeting with a friend, Mr Kobata, who had 
been out in the ruined city searching for his lost brother. When they met, Mr Kobata 
immediately began to tell him of scenes he had witnessed on the streets, and Hachiya 
repeats one of these stories in his diary. However, he concludes his account of his 
meeting with Mr Kobata with a single brief sentence before going on to discuss the 
rumours that were rife in post-bomb Hiroshima. "Mr Kobata, " he writes, "had many 
such stories to tell" (69). The fact that Hachiya does not repeat them all serves as a 
reminder that words can never recount all of the innumerable sufferings caused by the 
atomic bombing. It also tacitly endorses Ota's assertion that personal testimony is 
incomplete, and cannot bear witness to the event as a whole. 
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Hachiya also addresses the motivation behind the repeated testimony. He 
recounts a visit by a friend, Mr Katsutani, who in common with all of Hachiya's other 
visitors had many tales to tell, recalling that "he repeated himself two or three times 
as if to convince himself that what he said was true and then continued" (15). Here, 
Katsutani seems to be acting out Blanchot's understanding of the relationship 
between the event and the experiencing of the event. In seeking to represent the event 
through language, Katsutani is attempting to move from living through the event to 
experiencing the event. He entrenches the truth of his experience by repeating it in 
speech, verifying it through language. He emphatically declares "I reall walked Y 
along the railroad tracks to get here" (15). In confirming his knowledge of his actions, 
he is asserting his experience of the event. 
When searching for manifestations of silence in the diary, it seems possible to 
detect messages concealed behind the given narrative. Words and feelings never 
explicitly stated appear as shadows over certain passages. In his foreword to the 
diary, Dower identifies such a passage in the entry for the 13 th September. Following 
the Japanese surrender, rumours began to spread about the barbarity of the 
imminently arriving American forces. He writes: 
Rumour reached us today that the allied forces were to land in Japan. 
As a result, many people in Hiroshima became alarmed. The same 
alarm gripped our hospital and caused some patients to flee. When I 
made rounds in the afternoon, the wards were almost deserted. [ ... ] In 
general, the women were more frightened than the men because 
someone had spread the rumour they might come to harm. (182) 
Throughout his diary, Hachiya, in common with Ota, displays little or no hostility 
towards the Allied forces, saving his bitterness and hatred for the Japanese military 
leaders. In response to the rumours about the approaching Allies, he records in his 
diary that he felt "we had nothing to worry about because westerriers were a cultured 
people, not given to pilfering and marauding" (183). Indeed, he seems to take pride in 
his refusal to believe in the more alarming rumours that circulated with great 
frequency and alacrity. On the 16th September, he writes of annoying his friend Dr 
Akiyama by sceptically raising his eyebrows as Akiyama dramatically begged him to 
join him in fleeing the city and warned him that "your wife is in danger, and if we 
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ever are to escape, now is the time! After the Allied Forces land, we'll all be lost" 
(194). However, Hachiya was unable to remain completely unaffected by the 
rumours, and in the passage identified by Dower on the 13th September he admits 
that: 
Despite my objectivity regarding the hospital and patients, I became 
an ordinary husband when I thought of my wife. My one desire was to 
get her out of Hiroshima as soon as possible, preferably to her home 
where our son was. [ ... ] But what about the 
healthy young girls in the 
hospital? Would they go unharmed? I had to confess there were doubts 
in my mind. The more I thought, the more I worried, and I ended by 
smoking a lot of cigarettes. (183) 
In this rare moment of agitation, Dower sees a tacit admission of guilt over the way 
that the Japanese treated those living in their occupied territories. The atrocities 
perpetrated by the Japanese, particularly in China, and also against Korean nationals 
are occasionally alluded to by Hachiya, and it is this that leads Dower to conclude 
that his fears are fuelled by his awareness of the behaviour of Japanese troops. 
Another passage in the text similarly encourages the reader to detect implicit 
commentary on events. On the 14'h September, Hachiya writes that he discovered a 
new term - "the mines of the towns" (188). People, he was told, were venturing out 
into the damaged city, foraging in the rubble for items of value. Disgusted at first by 
this behaviour, eventually he decided that he too should search for anything 
salvageable in the ruins of the town. Digging through the collapsed buildings, he 
came across piles of bamboo bullets and spears. "This is what happens to a nation 
that loses a war, " he writes, "substitutes for brass, wooden bullets, bamboo spears. 
Soldiers had been trained to use the bamboo spears in one heroic attempt to kill an 
enemy" (189). The image of the bamboo spears seems to rouse a sense of bitterness 
in him towards the military who sought to use such pathetic means against the 
anticipated Allied invasion of the mainland. Yet also, the image of the bamboo spears 
and the reference to the heroism of the defence soldiers implies a sense of national 
pride in the determinism of Japan to beat back the enemy in every possible way. This 
reading of the spears renders his disillusioned abandonment of his mining expedition 
even more poignant. "Suffice it to say, " he writes, I found nothing worth keeping" 
(189). 
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The attempt to rescue a sense of Japanese pride also resonates in an account 
given by Hachiya on the I Ith August. Indeed, in this entry he writes explicitly of the 
joy with which those in the hospital heard a rumour, a runiour that they were 
desperate to receive as fact, that the Japanese had dropped a similar "mysterious 
weapon" on American cities. "If San Francisco, San Diego, and Los Angeles had 
been hit like Hiroshima, " he writes, "what chaos there must be in those cities! At last 
Japan was retaliating! The whole atmosphere in the ward changed, and for the first 
time since Hiroshima was bombed, everyone became cheerful and bri ght' ' (49). This 
passage is the sole example in the diary as a whole which expressly shows a pride in 
Japanese military power. Lifton recognises in this passage a specific way of dealing 
with the bomb through "'identification with the aggressor' - that is, of dealing with 
the power one fears by becoming like it or part of if' (Death in Life 89). By 
constructing the Japanese as aggressors in this rumour, there is an attempt to rewrite 
their victim status, and recast themselves as victorious. There is a further comment in 
Havhiya's diary entry for this day behind which can be detected a similar attempt to 
rewrite Japanese honour into the atomic bomb narrative. By the 11 th August, the 
hospital building was in an advanced state of deterioration, and plaster was falling 
from the damaged ceiling on to the patients below. Jokingly, Hachiya says to his 
colleague Mr Mizoguchi that "it would be much pleasanter to suffocate under a 
shower of cherry blossoms than under plaster from this ceiling" (47). Whilst he 
maintains in his diary that this was said in jest, the historical context of the image of 
the cherry blossom adds a further dimension to his comment. The cherry blossom is a 
traditional Japanese symbol of death, and was adopted as the motif for the kamikaze 
(translated as "divine wind7) squadrons, who wreaked destruction on enemy forces 
through suicide missions. It was primarily young, unmarried men who were selected 
for these missions, and to die serving Japan as a kamikaze pilot was considered, 
particularly prior to the surrender, to be both heroic and honourable. Hachiya's 
seemingly casual employment of the image of the cherry blossom here recalls this 
sense of Japanese honour, even in the face of a catastrophic defeat. 
Silence in the atomic bomb testimony is thus a combination of presence and a 
present absence. The utilisation of factual, scientific and, in the case of Hachiya, 
clinical discourse masks the silence that emerges from the unrepresentability of the 
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atomic bombing. Silence is also manifested as a present absence in these texts, in the 
form of Ota's struggle with failed language and use of communicative silence, and 
Hachiya's description of the atmosphere of silence that prevailed in the immediate 
aftermath, his omitted retellings of the stories of others, and the hidden expression 
within his text. The historical circumstances of censorship and hostility towards the 
kataribe also contributed to the silencing of the atomic voice. When words fail, 
silence, in all its aspects, reveals itself as the only solution. 
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Chapter 3 
Women's Testimony 
3.1 Introduction: "Masculine Genealogy" and Women's Life Writing 
The place of women's writing in the tradition of autobiography has long been 
compromised by masculinist assumptions regarding the nature and purpose of 
autobiographical discourse. Indeed, Linda Anderson asserts that autobiography is the 
product of a "masculine genealogy" that denies the prospect of a female 
autobiographical voice Women and Autobiography 12). She argues that traditional 
interpretations and definitions of autobiography, such as those propounded by 
Gusdorf and Pascal, perpetuate a myth that autobiography is an exclusively male 
genre and leave little room for a consideration of women's autobiographical 
narratives. Just as the emergence of a testimonial genre challenges traditional 
interpretations of autobiography as discussed in chapter one, so too does the practice 
of women's life-writing call for a re-examination of what constitutes autobiography. 
identifying differences between men's and women's autobiographical writing 
has traditionally depended upon the assumption that there is an autobiographical 
canon which has established a set stylistic and thematic pattern that defines 
autobiography as a genre. Perceived adherence to, or deviation from, this pattern can 
then be identified in terms of gender and biological sex, creating different traditions 
of men's and women's autobiography, a process which Donna Stanton translated into 
a formulaic approach: "Male=X, ergo Female=non-X + W" (11). Yet, as Stanton 
acknowledges, this formula actually functions to obscure rather than to illuminate 
difference. Firstly, the formula rests on a false supposition that the existence of a 
large body of autobiographical works throughout history has given rise to a stable 
definition of autobiography as a genre. Without a stable 'X', the notion of a 'non-X' 
is rendered meaningless, and this approach to identifying difference between men's 
and women's autobiographical narratives is thus flawed from the outset. Secondly, 
the very attempt to define a female practice of writing in this formulaic manner 
actually contradicts the possibility of identifying a form of writing that is uniquely 
female. HdMne Cixous argues that "It is impossible to define a feminine practice of 
writing, and this is an impossibility that will remain, for this practice can never be 
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theorised, enclosed, coded" (253). The process of defining through comparison is an 
act which takes place within the boundaries of the "phallocentric system" that Cixous 
suggests dominates Western culture (253). For Cixous, this system is predicated upon 
a series of hierarchical oppositional binaries, all of which can be reduced to a 
fundamental binary relationship, that of Man/Woman. In such a discourse, argues 
Cixous, it is the male aspect of the binary that is valorised, whilst the female aspect is 
marginalised as passive and submissive. This is precisely the relationship that is at 
work in the X/non-X binary that Stanton posits as the traditional approach to 
determining sexual difference in autobiographical practice. Male autobiographical 
practice is acknowledged as the positive value in the autobiography binary, whilst 
female autobiographical practice achieves recognition solely through the fact that is 
not male - non-X. The paradox is, then, that the attempt to define a distinctive female 
autobiographical voice is orchestrated through a phallocentric system which 
privileges the male whilst marginalising the female. 
Yet, Cixous asserts that the existence of this paradox does not deny the 
possibility of writing as a woman. Indeed, she remarks that "it is through ignorance 
that most readers, critics and writers of both sexes hesitate to admit or deny outright 
the possibility or the pertinence of a distinction between feminine and masculine 
writing" (253). Where and how, then, in the case of autobiographical writing should 
the point of sexual difference be located? Stanton identifies the most popularly cited 
difference between men's and women's autobiographical writing as being primarily 
stylistic in nature, in that: "men's narratives [are] linear, chronological and coherent, 
whereas women's [are] discontinuous, digressive and fragmented" (11). Yet, as 
Stanton acknowledges, this distinction oversimplifies the nature of autobiographical 
writing. The shift in critical attention from the bios aspect of autobiography to the 
autos, as discussed in chapter one has led to the view that the self as represented in 
autobiography is not singular and coherent, but rather fragmented and split. This 
interpretation of the self as a divided subject is frequently manifested in an approach 
to autobiographical, particularly testimonial, writing which favours a fragmented 
style. "Discontinuity and fragmentation, " argues Stanton, "constitute particularly 
fitting means for inscribing the split subject, " and thus these stylistic characteristics 
should be more accurately considered to be the product of genre rather than gender 
(11). In the specific context of the testimonial trauma narratives discussed in this 
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thesis, these characteristics loosen even further from their gendered moorings. Whilst 
a basic chronological framework is employed by many survivor-authors, temporal 
digression and discontinuity frequently feature in these accounts. The representation 
of a coherent self is also often dismissed in favour of a representation which more 
accurately reflects the fracturing of an individual as a consequence of the experience 
of trauma, as discussed in chapter one. The attempt to represent trauma, the 
64unrepresentable, " is, then, arguably as influential in terms of style as theories of 
gendered writing. 
This is not to suggest that the idea that women's life-writing is a distinct subset 
of the autobiographical genre does not have currency. Indeed, Adriana Caverero 
argues that in fact autobiographical practice is an inherently feminine form of 
articulation through which women come to recognise their selves and their place in 
the world. Citing the existence of a social order which allows men to identify 
themselves as "I" in a public sphere, to recognise, and have recognised, their own 
individuality, she argues that women are consigned to a private sphere which does not 
allow for the possibility of individual self-recognition. By engaging in the "feminine 
custom of self-narration7' (59), a woman has the opportunity to recognise herself as a 
unique individual, or as Cavarero terms it, a "narratable self' (4 1). Crucially, this 
process of self-narration is a mutual process by which women come to identify both 
themselves and others in a reciprocal exchange of life-stories. For women, argues 
Cavarero, "the questions 'who are youT and 'who am IT, in the absence of a plural 
scene of interaction [i. e. the public sphere] where the who can exhibit itself in broad 
daylight, immediately find their answer in the classic rule of story telling" (58). In 
positing the theory that women are natural storytellers, Cavarero is presenting two 
aspects of difference between male and female autobiographical practice. Firstly, 
self-narration is an act which both creates and constitutes female identity, in that the 
self is only fully realised and recognised through self-narration and that this process 
of self-narration is a central component of female identity. The second aspect is the 
emphasis on the reciprocity of the process of women's self-narration. The realisation 
of the narratable self is the product of the exchange of life-stories, rather than the 
independent articulation of the personal life-story which characterises the 
autobiographical practice of men. 
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The failure of the autobiography binary to establish meaningful points of sexual 
difference between male and female authored autobiography is symptomatic of the 
flexibility of autobiography as a genre which, in the absence of a stable definition of 
'X, ' prohibits a simple classification of the 'non-X. ' Indeed, as this form of 
comparative approach is revealed to be theoretically flawed in accordance with 
Cixous" thinking, identifying aspects of autobiographical practice which are unique to 
women e-writing necessitates a reinterpretation of the meaning of autos, bios, and "s lif 
graph in the specific context of women" s writing. 
Women have long been excluded from the autobiographical canon by critics 
such as Gusdorf and Pascal primarily on the basis of bios. Indeed, Sidonie Smith 
points out that the early female admissions to the autobiographical canon were 
granted entry primarily on the basis of their 'exceptional' or unusual lives, noting that 
whilst critics "note[d] the importance of autobiography in gaining information about 
the woman's Nos" there was little interest in searching the texts for "the larger and 
more complex issues of woman's auti, woman's graphia and woman's reading" 
(Poetics 7). Critical interest lay in the experience of the author, rather than her 
gender, rendering her the object, rather than the subject of narration. Frequently, the 
everyday lives of 'ordinary' women have not been deemed worthy of narration; few 
women are considered to have reached the heights of "outstanding achievement" that 
Pascal deems to be a prerequisite of the autobiographical privilege (10). It is in this 
emphasis on the exceptional and outstanding Nos that Gilmore locates the 
"autobiographical paradox, " as considered in chapter two, whereby the extraordinary 
life comes to be representative of an entire age and its people. Gilmore argues that: 
There is a long tradition in autobiography of representing the self as 
utterly unique and, on precisely this basis, able to stand for others 
through acts of self-inspection and self-revelation. [ ... ] In fact, having 
an unusual life better suits one to stand in for others in this tradition. 
The general, the president, the philosopher, and the saint are all better 
equipped than you and I to represent a life. Read and learn about me, 
they suggest, and you will learn more about history and, perhaps, 
yourself and what you are capable oL (19) 
Gilmore describes autobiography as occupying a social, even educative, role. By 
excluding those who are not in a position to contribute to and comment on public life, 
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this tradition denies nearly all women (and indeed a large proportion of men) the 
privilege of self-representation. 
If there is a point at which a division between a male and female tradition of 
autobiography can be detected it is here at this point of emphasis on 
representativeness and the status of the autobiographer. Whilst the qualification of 
66outstanding achievement" may be central to autobiography according to its 
masculine genealogy, the importance of this precondition is apparently diminished in 
women's autobiographical text. Jacky Bratton argues that: 
The masculinist assumption is that men choose to publish their life 
stories when and because they have a unique importance to the public 
life of their day. The most pervasive characteristic offemale 
autobiography, on the other hand, is argued to be self-definition in 
relation to significant others; so that rather than a sense of individual 
autonomy, a sense of identification, interdependence and community 
is key in the development of women's identity and therefore also 
central in the stories of themselves. (10 1- 102) 
Bratton is arguing that the interpretation of women's life writing calls for a 
fundamental shift in critical perspective from the bios to the autos; the same shift that 
permits a fruitful exploration of the testimonial genre. As discussed in chapter one, 
studies of Holocaust testimonies have encouraged a relocation of critical attention 
from the story of the bios which takes place in the public sphere to the personal and 
private experiences of the autos. If it is the case that this shift is central to women's 
writing, then it could be argued that women have a privileged relationship to 
testimonial writing. This reinforces Caverero's argument that women are natural 
storytellers. As the representation of the autos is central to women's autobiographical 
practice, it is therefore necessary to examine the way in which the autos is defined 
within female authored life narratives 
Judith Kean Gardiner shares Bratton's view that, "throughout women's lives, 
the self is defined through social relationships" (182). This view, commonly held by 
early critics of female autobiography such as Estelle Jelinek, reveals that the female 
self, as represented in autobiographical texts, is recognised in terms of socially 
constructed gender roles, rather than biological sex. The female self is, then, 
constituted through an acknowledgement of her role as mother, daughter, sister and 
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wife. Yet this definition of the female autos is dependent upon the stability and 
continuity of these social relationships, and is thus compromised in testimonial 
literature which typically deals with the destruction of social and familial 
relationships. 
In her testimony, Landscapes of Memory Ruth Klilger recalls the devastating 
loss she experienced when her older half brother, Schorschi, failed to return toVienna 
after a holiday spent with his father in Prague. His father had been granted full 
custody of Schorschi, following a ruling by the Czech courts which objected to the 
upbringing of a Czech child in German-occupied Vienna. As a child, KlOger knew 
little of the judicial reasons behind the sudden absence of her brother, and understood 
only that he was lost to her. She writes that: "Schorschi was my first great loss, and 
every subsequent loss has seemed like a replay of that first. I had not only lost a 
beloved family member but also a role: little sister" (2 1). KI11ger's sense of loss was 
not only that of a sister losing a brother, but that of losing her ability to recognise 
herself. She understood her own identity in relation to those around her; with the loss 
of one of the defining components of her identity - her role as little sister - she lost a 
sense of herself as an individual. 
This experience of familial loss and the impact that KlOger reveals it to have on 
the construction of identity is central to a consideration of the way in which the 
female self is constructed in trauma narratives. It suggests, in fact, a point of potential 
differentiation between women's autobiographical narratives and women's 
testimonial narratives. In the autobiographical narrative, the female self is constructed 
through social relationships; testimonial accounts of atrocity, on the other hand, such 
as those which narrate the experience of the Holocaust and the atomic bombings, are 
conspicuous by their representation of these social relationships as having been 
violently destroyed. Charlotte Delbo poignantly bears witness to this in the 
concluding line to one of her poems in None of Us Shall Return: "Here mothers are 
no longer mothers to their childreif ' (12). In the context of the experience of atrocity 
which denies the possibility of gendered social relationships, how is the female self to 
be constructed in the absence of these social relationships? Jennifer Taylor suggests 
that the text itself becomes the point of reference for the construction of the female 
self- 
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KRIger has lost everything - family, language, status, father, mother, 
identity - and in trying to piece together a viable post-Shoah identity, 
she finds that she must; make friends' with the past [ ... ] Thus, the text becomes a mapping out of her identity as a writer, as a scholar and as a 
literary voice (84). 
KlUger's narrative allows her to realise her own identity, not only as a writer and a 
scholar, but as a woman. The female author of testimony constructs her identity 
through her relationship with the text, and by extension, her relationship with the 
reader. In a review of KlUger's Landscapes of MemoKy. Elena Lappin notes that the 
narrative "is written like an open dialogue with the reader. KlUger doesn't just write 
an account of her life, she wonders about how it may be perceived from different 
perspectives by those who didn't share her experiences, and even by those who did". 
This dialogue with the reader is, suggests Susan Rubin Suleiman, an essential 
component of autobiographical writing and reading. In reading autobiography, argues 
Suleiman, "we project ourselves into what we read, " and doing so, enter into a 
relationship with the author (48). In the absence of social and familial relationships, it 
is perhaps through these relationships with the reader and the text itself that the 
female auto is defined in testimonial literature. 
Marlene Heinemann argues that the practice of identifying the female autos 
through her relationships with others impacts significantly upon the nature of 
women's graphe. Writing specifically in the context of Holocaust narratives, 
Heinemann suggest that men's testimony is characterised by a "self-dramatising" 
style which situates the experiences of the male autos at the forefront of the narrative. 
In contrast, women's testimonies are characterised by a "self-effacing" style which 
reveals "a tendency to hide or diminish the importance of the self' (103). Whilst 
Heinemann's argument offers a somewhat generalised perspective on the difference 
between male and female authored texts, it is certainly the case that many male 
authored narratives marginalise the experiences of significant women in their lives, 
such as wives or mothers. When in Maus Art Spiegelman questions his father Vladek 
about what happened to his mother, Anja, during the Holocaust, he replies somewhat 
impatiently "I can tell you ... she went through the same what me: TERRIBLE! " 
(15 8). Whilst not disputing the fact that they both endured 'terrible' circumstances, 
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Vladek's reply does mask the specificities of Anja's experiences. However, when 
reading Holocaust testimonies, it should be taken into account that the 
marginalisation of women's experiences is not necessarily the product of a masculine 
"self-dramatising" style. The separation of women and men on arrival at the camps 
often meant that men were unaware of what happened to the women, and this 
separation also meant that women were quite simply not a part of men's Holocaust 
experiences. The narrative process of "self-dramatising" in men's Holocaust 
testimonies can, then, be more accurately located in the way in which men present 
themselves. Vladek's account of his experiences can be read as "self-drarnatising" in 
accordance with the way in which he presents his own survival as being the 
consequence of his own actions. Rightly or wrongly, Vladek believes that he had a 
degree of control over his own fate through his ability to organise food and clothing 
for himself, and learn useful trades and skills. In contrast to this form of self- 
representation, Heinemann suggests that women's narratives are 'self-effacing' in 
that they do not focus on their own actions. Instead, an emphasis is placed on 
collective experience, where the importance of the self is sublimated in favour of the 
importance of the group. Pam Morris suggests that "the most persistent, positive 
feature of women's writing is its recognition of the bonds of friendship, loyalty and 
love between women" (6 1). Certainly in women's Holocaust narratives, the 
representation of 'camp families, ' or small mutually protective groups of women, is 
common. Rachel Silberman, for example, interned with her mother and sister at 
Stutthof in 1944, recalls: 
We helped each other. I must say in the bad times, people didn't care, 
whether it was me or another girl. There was another mother and three 
daughters, and we were close together and if anything happened to 
anybody, we would all help each other. (qtd. in Gurewitsch 82) 
Whilst Heinemann reads such accounts as this as evidence of the "self-effacing" style 
of women's narratives, I would argue that in fact they demonstrate a form of self- 
dramatisation. The focus is still very much on the way in which action and behaviour 
affects chances of survival. The difference lies in the fact that women's narratives 
reveal a focus on the actions of the group rather than the individual. As opposed to 
being recognised as a distinct narrative form specific to women's writing, self- 
effacement should actually be considered as a form of self-dramatisation. 
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The gendered categorisation of "self-dramatising" and "self-effacing" narrative 
styles also fails to account for distinctions between men's and women's graphe in the 
context of A-bomb testimonies. The marginalisation. of the female experience is 
apparent in male-authored testimonies, not through the omission of women's 
experiences, but rather through their representation as archetypal symbols of 
unprecedented suffering. The image of the unknown burned mother clasping her dead 
child to her breast in the streets of a ruined city recurs frequently in men's narratives 
as a metaphor for innocent victimhood and the evil of war. This trope of maternal 
suffering obscures the specificities of women's experiences. 
Women's A-bomb narratives reveal little of the "self-effacing" style that 
Heinemann suggests characterises women's Holocaust testimonies. There is no 
comparable focus on a shared female community of suffering; indeed, the dominating 
concern is the isolation of women in aftermath of the atomic bombings. Women A- 
bomb authors often emphasise their own individual struggles in their narratives, and 
so appear to conform more to Heinemann's definition of a "self-dramatising" style. 
Evidently, this stylistic distinction between women's Holocaust testimonies and 
women's A-bomb testimonies needs to be interpreted in accordance with the 
historical circumstances unique to each event. The experience of incarceration and 
genocide is very different to that of experiencing physical, economical and 
psychological hardships in the aftermath of atrocity. The attempt to identify stylistic 
and thematic characteristics specific to women's representation of trauma must be 
situated, then, within their relevant historical contexts. 
3.2 "Different Horrors, Same Hell: " Women's Experiences in History 
(Goldenberg 150) 
An exploration of the differences between testimonial accounts by men and 
women must be rooted in an understanding of the way in the experience of trauma 
was related to biological sex and gendered roles in society. Historical and testimonial 
evidence reveals that women suffered differently to men in the cases of both the 
Holocaust and the atomic bombings. The nature of this difference, however, is 
dependent upon the historical specificities of each event. The Nazis targeted male and 
female victims differently in accordance with genocidal aims, and women suffered 
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differently to men during the event, primarily on the basis of their biological sex. In 
comparison, the immediate trauma of the atomic bombs targeted men and women 
indiscriminately. The mobilisation of civilian labour during the war meant that both 
men and women were often working side by side in factories and offices, and so the 
peacetime gendered divisions of space which commonly sited men in the workplace 
and women in the home were no longer in place. Many women who under peacetime 
conditions would have been at home in the rural villages surrounding Hiroshima had 
been drafted to work in the city to replace the men who had gone to war. In terms of 
their spatial proximity to the bomb there was little difference between men's and 
women's experiences. It is, then, primarily in the aftermath of the bomb that 
differences between men's and women's experiences emerged. 
In 1980, Joan Ringelheim, an early pioneer of women's Holocaust studies, 
received a letter from Cynthia Ozick, challenging the validity of her research into 
women9s experiences during the Holocaust. Ozick wrote: 
I think you are asking the wrong question. Not simply the wrong 
question in the sense of not having found the right one; I think you are 
asking a morally wrong question that leaves us still further down the 
road of eradicating the Jews from history. [ ... I You insist that it didn't happen to 'just Jews. ' It happened to the women, and it is only a detail 
that the women were Jewish. It is not a detail. [ ... ] The Holocaust happened to victims who were not seen as men, women, or children, 
but as Jews. (qtd. in Ringelheirn Thoughts about Women and the 
Holocaust 144) 
Ozick's concern is that by focussing on the female victims of the Holocaust as 
women rather than Jews, the true nature of the genocide will be overlooked and 
incorporated into a historical narrative belonging to women. She fears that such an 
approach will trivialise the Holocaust by reducing it to an abhorrent example of 
sexism. Ringelheim countered Ozick's challenge by arguing that identifying the 
victims solely as Jews actually gives rise to a false impression that all Jews shared the 
same experiences. As Ringelheirn points out, "if in the gas chambers [ ... ] all Jews 
seemed to be alike, the path to this end was not always the same" (Thoughts about 
Women and the Holocaust 144). Ozick is overlooking the fact that precisely because 
the motivation behind the Holocaust was genocidal in nature, women were 
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necessarily treated differently to men. In the prologue to their book Different Voices: 
Women and the Holocaust, Carol Rittner and John Roth point out that: 
Sexism, which divides roles according to biological functions, can 
exist without racism, but whenever claims are made that one race is 
superior to any or all others, discrimination directed at women is 
unlikely to be far behind. Because women are the ones who bear 
children, they are put uniquely at risk as members of a group targeted 
as racially inferior. (2) 
There is little doubt that women fared differently to men during the Holocaust, and 
that fewer women survived than men; Ringelheim confirms that only 40% of camp 
survivors in the displaced persons camps in 1946 were women (Women and the 
Holocaust 394). To make sense of statistics such as this, it is necessary to explore 
ways in which female victims were targeted both as women and as Jews. Whilst this 
approach does not, as Ozick supposes, deny the Jewish identity of the female victims, 
it does depose Jewish identity as the sole descriptive of Holocaust victims, and so 
creates a space in which the experiences of non-Jewish victims, male and female, can 
be recognised. 
The primary aim of the Holocaust, as stated by Heinrich Himmlcr, was to 
make Jews and other undesirable groups, such as Gypsies, "disappear from the face 
of the earth" (qtd. in Ringelheim, Women and the Holocaust 392). As potential 
mothers of ftiture generations, women were therefore particularly targeted by the 
Nazi regime. The act of genocide criminalised the female body, and contributed to a 
lower survival rate amongst women than amongst men. The records of the 
Einsatzgruppen killings in Eastern Europe, although incomplete, reveal that more 
women were murdered than men. Ringelheim has uncovered the fact that 72% of 
those killed by mobile killing units between September and November 1941 were 
women, a percentage that Ringelheim suggests can be considered typical across the 
entire period during which the Einsatzgruppen were active (Women and the 
Holocaust 394-395). 
The first women's internment camp, Ravensbruck, was founded in 1939. A 
smaller camp was built nearby in 1941 to house male prisoners. Notably, few of the 
106,000 women who passed through the camp were Jewish; the majority of prisoners 
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were Gypsies (particularly Austrian Gypsies), Jehovah's Witnesses and asocials or 
criminals. As the momentum of the genocidal campaign gathered force, the 
population of the camp swelled dramatically from 11,000 in 1942 to 70,000 in 1944. 
This sudden expansion of the prisoner population led to high levels of overcrowding 
and squalor, and death rates from disease and starvation rocketed. A gas chamber was 
built in Ravensbrilck in early 1945 which was in operation until shortly before the 
liberation of the camp in April of the same year. Records suggest that approximately 
2,3 00-2,400 women were murdered in the gas chamber (qtd. in Greif 23 8). 
Cynthia Haft argues that "the camp system granted complete equality between 
the sexes" (235). Her use of the word 'equality' is potentially misleading in this 
context, suggesting as it does that men and women shared the same experiences. 
Actually, women's experiences were often very different to men's, although, as 
Rittner and Roth point out, this fact should not lead to an assumption that one gender 
suffered more than the other (3). Men and women were usually separated on arrival at 
the camps, and had little contact with each other during the period of their 
imprisonment. Following this separation on the basis of gender, prisoners were 
subjected to a selection process which determined who would be murdered 
immediately and who would be sent to the barracks. Judith Tydor Baumel argues that 
women were at a greater risk during this selection process than men. Young women 
who were pregnant, or who arrived with children aged up to their early teens, were 
usually selected for immediate extermination. In contrast, young healthy men of a 
similar age group often stood the best chance of survival, as they were identified as a 
valuable labour source. The elderly of both sexes were sent directly to their deaths. 
However, Baumel suggests that middle-aged women were often at greater risk than 
men of the same age group as they were wrongly identified as older than their years, 
due to the traditional costume of long black dresses and shawls typically adopted by 
women from Orthodox communities (20). This is, though, a somewhat subjective 
view as it could be equally argued that bearded Orthodox men who wore traditional 
black garb could also be perceived as being older than their years. 
Inside the camps, women suffered horrors that were either specific to their 
sex, or at least intensified by their identity as women. For example, whilst both men 
and women had their hair shaved and were subjected to nudity in front of their fellow 
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prisoners and the SS guards during delousing treatments and selections, women's 
testimonies frequently represent these events as being far more traumatic than men's 
narratives suggest. Indeed, Baumel suggests that the experiences of enforced nudity 
and hair removal were: 
the most psychologically traumatic [events] of their entire wartime 
experiences: the first time many of then had ever stood naked before a 
member of the opposite sex; [ ... ] the degradation of having their body hair removed by a male barber; the shock of losing their hair, symbol 
of their femininity. (22) 
Both men and women were subjected to experiments into enforced sterilisation, and 
Jewish and gypsy women were targeted for experimentation of this sort at 
RavensbrOck and Auschwitz. The experiments usually proved to be fatal for the 
victims. Arguably the experience of, or fear of, sterility was again more traumatic for 
women than for men. As discussed in more detail later in this chapter, the fear that 
they would be unable to bear children in the future damaged women's hopes for 
survival, as even if they lived through the camps they would be unable to take up 
their socially defined female roles as women. 
Many women feared being subjected to sexual abuse on pain of death at the 
hands of the SS guards. Indeed, Marlene Heinemann argues that: 
the unique contribution of women's Holocaust literature is to examine 
the insidious choice between rape and death [ ... ] the choice between humiliation and death is universal in Holocaust literature by men and 
women, but the choice of sexual humiliation seems much more 
available to women. (199 1) 
Heinemann offers little justification as to why accounts of sexual abuse rather than, 
for example, amenorrhea or pregnancy should represent a uniquely female 
contribution to Holocaust literature. The fear of sexual abuse was also present for 
men, although it was much less widespread. In practice, it has been argued, sexual 
abuse was not that common an experience for Jewish female prisoners, firstly 
because the SS guards were indoctrinated into the pseudo-philosophy of racial 
hygiene, and secondly because SS men could be punished if found guilty of having 
sexual relations with Jewish female prisoners. The threat was far more real for non- 
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Jewish female prisoners, and the experiences of female prisoners who were raped in 
the camps should not be marginalised (Karay 289-291). 
Additionally, it appears that living conditions in women's camps were 
considerably more squalid than those in the men's camp. As discussed above, the 
conditions in the RavensbrUck camp were particularly poor. A further example of this 
is the women's camp in Auschwitz, which opened in 1942, and received its first 
transport consisting of 999 women from Slovakia in March. In all, 13 1,000 women 
prisoners were registered at Auschwitz, 82,000 of whom were Jewish. Camp 
Commandant Rudolf H6ss commented in his memoirs that: 
for the women everything was a thousand times harder, much more 
depressing and injurious because the living conditions in the women's 
camps were incomparably worse. The women were allocated smaller 
living space, the hygienic and sanitary conditions were greatly 
inferior ... and when women reached the 'point of no return' the end 
was not long in coming. (qtd. in Karay 307) 
Whilst gender-specific research has highlighted the danger of assuming a 
universal Holocaust experience shared by men and women, care must be taken that 
this assumption is not repeated by representing the experiences of all women to be the 
same. The experiences of each individual woman differed according to many 
variables, including her religious identity, nationality, age, class, general health, 
marital and maternal status, the place she was imprisoned, and the time at which she 
was deported or imprisoned. The study of women's narratives is, then, essential not 
only to understand the way in which women's experiences differed to those of men, 
but also to uncover the ways in which each woman's experiences differed to those of 
other women. 
The controversy that accompanied the development of women's Holocaust 
studies has not been matched in the field of atomic bomb research. This is due, quite 
simply, to the fact that little attention has been paid to the specific experiences of 
hibakusha women. The little that has been performed tends to be primarily listings of 
statistical data regarding the effect of the bomb on menstruation, pregnancy, fertility 
and the health of children born of hibakusha mothers, as presented most fully in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki: -The 
Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic 
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Bombings compiled by the Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage 
caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The lack of gender specific 
research contributes to the impression that men's and women's experiences of the 
atomic bomb were the same. However, women's testimony reveals that women 
actually suffered in ways that were specific both to their biological sex and to their 
gendered roles in society as mothers and wives. 
Conclusive statistics regarding the number of women killed outright in the 
atomic attacks are not available; indeed, the overall number of victims killed in the 
explosion has never been satisfactorily agreed. Yet even if such statistics were 
available, it would reveal little about a specifically female experience of the atomic 
bombings. The significance of sexual difference only becomes apparent in the 
aftermath of the attack. 
Regarding physical injuries resulting from the actual explosion, women 
suffered similar injuries to men in terms of wounds, and bums that left disfiguring 
scars or keloids. Yet just as Heinemann argues that enforced nudity and the shaving 
of hair exacted a greater psychological trauma on women than men during the 
Holocaust, so it could be argued that permanent scarring was more traumatic for 
women than men. Both men's and women's testimonies bear witness to an enduring 
sense of shame because of their disfigurement, and a fear that they will be forever 
stigmatised because of their visually obvious exposure to the bomb. However, for 
women these concerns are intensified as the disfigurement compromises the 
relationship between physical beauty and femininity, and so the keloids serve to 
undermine their understanding of their female identity. In his book Death in Life, 
Lifton recounts an interview with a female survivor who was left badly scarred after 
the bombing, in which she told him: 
Rather than the joy of having survived, my regret over having become 
this way was much more profound... And however much I was 
encouraged by others, I could not help believing that for a woman to 
lose her beauty is equivalent to death. All I could do was live in a 
comer [ ... ]I wanted to escape from the world... and if possible, I 
wished to die. (187) 
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For this unnamed female survivor, there is a significant difference between surviving, 
and surviving as a woman. 
As did the immediate physical injuries caused by the explosion impact 
differently on men and women, so did the longer lasting effects of the radiation 
released by the bomb. The greater the proximity of the survivor to the epicentre of the 
explosion, the more strongly these effects were manifested in the body. Women often 
found their menstrual cycles were disrupted, which led to fears that their fertility had 
been affected by their experiences. These fears were heightened by the significant 
number of miscarriages and still-births amongst pregnant women who had been 
exposed to radiation. Women feared that their fertility had been permanently affected, 
and rumours spread quickly that children bom of hibakusha mothers would be 
horribly deformed. Such rumours made it difficult for women to fulfil their gendered 
social roles in society, as many men refused to marry a woman who had been 
exposed to the bomb. It was difficult for women to survive financially outside of 
marriage, and many were reduced to long-term poverty. 
Those women left widowed with children faced particular hardship in the 
post-war years, and this is a theme that is returned to frequently in women's 
testimonies. Men who lost their wives often simply took their children back to their 
own mother's who brought them up as their own. Women, however, rarely had this 
opportunity as they left their own families when they married and became part of 
their husband's family, often living together with the husband's parents in an 
extended family group. This arrangement often created a rivalry and even hostility 
between the wife and the mother-in-law, particularly with regards to the upbringing 
of children. "In Japanese tradition, " explains Lifton, "the mother-in-law in some ways 
has greater claim upon the children than the wife since they represent the husband's 
family bloodline" (Death in Life 191-192). Widowed hibakusha women who returned 
home with their children after the bombing not infrequently found that traditional 
rivalry was intensified, and that the mother-in-law would demand a sole claim on the 
children, perceiving the hibakusha mother to be unfit to care for her children. The 
only alternative to this arrangement for many women was to attempt to set up home 
alone with their children, acting as sole breadwinner and carer, a situation which was 
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not easy in post-war Japan, particularly as hibakusha were heavily discriminated 
against by employers (Lifton, Death in Life 179-182). 
The arrival of the Allied Forces in Japan was a cause for great concern among 
the populace. Since the outbreak of war, the Japanese authorities had regularly issued 
anti-American propaganda, and during the time that had elapsed since the A-bomb 
had been dropped, rumours of the cruelty and barbarity of the American soldiers had 
proliferated. As discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, Hachiya reveals in Hiroshima 
DiM that the predominant concern was that women would be sexually abused by the 
soldiers. Hachiya is initially dismissive of these concerns, firstly because he believes 
that "westerners, were a cultured people, " and secondly because he believes that the 
female victims were so badly injured that they would be unattractive to the soldiers 
(183). Later, however, he does admit his concerns that the women who had not been 
badly injured or scarred might be at risk: "how about the healthy young girls in the 
hospital? Would they go unharmed? I had to confess there were doubts in my mind" 
(183). Hachiya's understanding of sexual abuse is revealed here to be flawed, as he 
repeats the popular misconception that rape is the product of lust, rather than a violent 
expression of dominance and power. Ultimately, these concerns about sexual abuse 
proved to be largely unfounded, and whilst the fear of sexual abuse is common in 
women's narrative, there is little testimonial evidence to suggest that any attacks of 
this nature took place. Whilst women may not have become the victims of sexual 
abuse, however, they were subjected to punishment from their fellow Japanese if they 
developed willing and consensual relations with the occupying troops. Hachiya 
recounts overhearing a young Japanese man telling a friend that he had thrown a girl 
into the sea after seeing her walking with an American soldier. Reflecting on this, 
Hachiya writes: 
The attitude this young man expressed was typical of many who had 
been taught to hate the enemy. He still had a feeling of hostility. I 
could not exactly condone his treatment of the girl, but I thought to 
myself that had I been in his position and my girl had acted as this one 
had, I might have reacted the same way. The best solution, I thought, 
was for girls to get out of the city so neither they nor the soldiers 
would be tempted. (207) 
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The fate of the young woman in the passage, and whether she survived being flung 
into the sea, is unknown, and indeed does not seem to particularly concern Hachiya. 
His tone is one of regret that this happened, but acceptance that it could not be any 
other way. Aggression towards the enemy is in this case misdirected towards the 
woman in a way which demonstrates the vulnerability of women in post-war Japan. 
Hachiya implies that the anger felt by the young man is not rooted in the sight of 
these young woman walking with an American soldier, but rather in the pain of 
defeat. In this instance, the fact that the woman is as much a victim of the war as her 
attacker is forgotten, and she is constructed as the enemy rather than the American 
soldier. Tellingly, Hachiya sees the solution to problems such as this to be not the 
ousting of the occupying forces, but rather the exiling of women from the city. 
Whilst a direct comparison of the experiences of female victims of the 
Holocaust and the atomic bombings is evidently not possible on the grounds of 
historical difference, there are nevertheless certain aspects of their narratives which 
do bear resemblance, most notably fears about the way in which female identity and 
femininity are compromised (particularly in terms of infertility and physical 
disfigurement), and the fear of sexual abuse. It is tempting to read into these points 
of similarity the suggestion that there is a specifically female form of suffering that is 
trans-historical and unites all female victims of atrocity and trauma. Whilst such a 
generalised approach to gendered experiences of trauma should be resisted, it is the 
case that women in conditions of extremity do share gender-specific points of 
vulnerability. It is only through exploring the testimonial accounts of women 
survivors that a greater understanding of the female experience of atrocity can be 
reached. 
3.3 Writing the Female Experience of the Holocaust 
"Recipes for gerilte fish are no recipe for coping with the Holocaust": Women's 
Concerns in the Testimony of Ruth Klilger (KIfiger 24) 
Every women autobiographer is a daughter who writes and establishes 
her identity through her autobiographical narrative. Many twentieth 
century autobiographical texts by women contain an intertext, an 
embedded narrative, which is a biography of the writer/daughter's 
mother. (Malin 1) 
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In keeping with Malin's perspective, KlOger's testimonial narrative 
Landscapes of Memo! y: A Holocaust Girlhood Remembered (2003) should be read 
as not only a personal account of her own experiences, but also a biography of her 
mother, Alma, and the fraught nature of their changing mother-daughter relationship. 
There are few accounts of the Holocaust that depict the mother-daughtdr relationship 
with such piercing clarity, or indeed, with such a critical eye. So unusual is K111ger's 
approach that Andrea Reiter has claimed that "the fusion of camp experience and 
criticism of the mother must be seen as the new element in KlOger's text, and 
suggests that it might indicate the advent of a new canon of Holocaust literature" (Ich 
wollte es ware ein Roman 333), Whether Landscapes of Memo[y can be heralded as 
the beginning of a new canon is debatable; although rare, the depiction of parent- 
child relationship is not exceptional (Elie Wiesel's N[ight and Livia E. Bitton 
Jackson's Elli: Cominiz of Age in the Holocaust, for example, both describe such a 
relationship, although not in the same fiercely interrogative manner that Klilger 
adopts), and in some ways KlOger's narrative can be considered to be very 
conventional in that it presents an ordered linear chronology, and offers both 
remembrance and reflection as part of the narrative. Nevertheless, Klager does offer a 
new and distinctive voice to the existing Holocaust body of Holocaust testimony, due 
in the most part to the way in which she centralises an analysis of her mother's life 
and in doing so engages with an understanding of her own identity. 
Not only does the relationship with her mother dominate the text thematically, 
it also plays a role in the genesis of the English version of her testimony. KlUger first 
recorded her Holocaust experiences in a testimony written in German, entitled weiter 
leben: Eine Juizend. Anna K Kuhn describes weiter leben as being very much "ein 
deutsches Buch, " in that "it was not only written in Germany, in German, but is also 
dedicated to Klflger's German friends [ ... I and intended for a German audience" 
(128). KlOger's decision to write initially in German is in itself a significant act. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, a survivor's choice of language in testimony can be 
interpreted as part of the act of bearing witness. Wiesel, for example, chose to write 
N jght in French as the language was relatively uncontaminated by the barbarism of 
the Holocaust. Whilst KRIger states forcefully that "German proverbs nauseate me, " 
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and considers the German language as employed in the camps to be repellent in its 
corruption of meaning, she does not reach the Steinerian conclusion that the German 
language as a whole has been damaged by the events of the Holocaust. "German, 
strange as it may sound, " Klilger argues, "is a Jewish language. Consider that until 
the Holocaust, most of the world's prominent secular Jews spoke and wrote it: Kafka, 
Freud, Einstein, Marx, Heine, Theodor HerzI (! ), and Hannah Arendt, to name the 
first that come to mind" (257-258). For KlOger, the problem of contaminated 
language is locked into time and place. The German language of the camps is 
nauseating; likewise the language of her Viennese childhood, a place where the very 
"cobblestones scream with hate, " holds the power to disturb her (25 8). '41 
understand this language, " she writes of her native tongue, "'but I don't like it. I speak 
it but I wouldn't have chosen it" (63). The German language that she draws on is, 
then, the language of Kafka, of Freud rather than the language of Himmler or 
Streicher. Indeed, her choice to write in German is an act of defiant reclamation, 
rescuing the German language of Jewish intellectualism and achievement from its 
brutal application in the death camps. 
However, KlOger's decision to write in German was primarily motivated by 
the desire to save her mother from reading her daughter's damning representation of 
their relationship. As both KlUger and her mother had built their lives in America 
after the war, Klilger explains "I thought if I wrote in German, my mother wouldn't 
see it, as she had no contact with things German, and even considered my career [she 
is a Professor of German] an embarrassment" (264). KlOger had good reason to be 
cautious; her testimony was criticised by an American book reviewer as being the 
product of a "bitter lifelong vendetta" against her mother (Dickstein 26). Yet these 
hopes were dashed when the cousin of her mother's bridge partner sent her a copy of 
weiter leben, and "even though she was an impatient and infrequent reader, my 
mother found easily all the passages that were critical of her and was badly hurt" 
(KhIger 264). Reading both resentment and bitterness towards her in her daughter's 
account of their survival, KlUger's mother was distraught about the way in which she 
was portrayed, and the opinions that her friends and neighbours would form of her as 
a consequence. "There was no point arguing that the neighbours didn't read German 
books, " writes a frustrated KlOger (264). Her deference to her mother's feelings, 
however, explains the nine year gap between the publication of weiter leben and 
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Landscapes of Memory. "I promised myself not to publish it in English until after her 
death. Let it appear in French, in Czech, even in Japanese, but not in English. I owed 
her that much, " states KlOger, suggesting a greater allegiance to her mother than her 
narrative reveals (264). Her decision to write in German is, then, a reflection of 
KlUger's testimonial duty to the living, in contrast to other survivors such as Wiesel 
and Levi who reveal in their narratives a duty towards the dead. 
KlOger describes her English account as "neither a translation, nor a new 
book: it's another version, a parallel book, if you will, for my children and my 
American students" (264). She began to write it as her mother was dying, completing 
and publishing it only after her mother's death at the age of 97 in 2000. Kuhn 
suggests that in Landscapes of Memory Klilger "mitigates and revises her criticisms" 
of her mother, and it is significant to note that she dedicates the book jo her mother 
(129). Landscapes of Memory concludes with an image of Mager's mother and her 
grandchild together, "a smile of total affinity on both their faces, " this uninterrupted 
female line offering the possibility of redemption from the sufferings of the past 
(269). 
Born in Vienna in 193 1, KlOger was deported to Theresienstadt with her 
mother and paternal grandmother in September 1942, where they remained until 1944 
when she and her mother were deported to Auschwitz. Her grandmother had already 
perished in the 'model ghetto' of Theresienstadt. They remained in Auschwitz until 
the summer of 1944, when they were deported together to Christianstadt. In February 
1945, KlOger, her mother and four other prisoners escaped together from the camp 
and travelled through rural Germany eventually finding safety with the American 
army in April 1945, a month before the end of the war in Europe. Lore Dickstein 
suggests that "it seems evident, at least to this reader, that she would not have 
survived had it not been for her mother's pluck and resourcefulness" (26). 
KlOger negotiates the representation of her mother and the nature of their 
changing relationship through the emergence of two distinct narrative personas; the 
experiential KlOger who is the child protagonist in the memories she describes, and 
the adult narratorial KlUger who reflects on her memories of her experiences during 
the war. The distinction between a potential authorial persona and the narratorial 
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persona is harder to identify in this text. Indeed, Reiter argues that Kloger explicitly 
disavows "a distance between herself the author, and the narrator in the text" (Lch 
wollte es ware ein Roman 326). Carmel Finnan suggests that K111ger's impulse to 
write her testimony was rooted in "the need to reconcile [her] present sel[fl with 
[that] of the past" (278). Whilst the relationship between the experiential past self and 
the narratorial present self does change as the narrative progresses, there is a tension 
between the two personas that is never satisfactorily resolved in the text. 
As with Elie Wiesel and Primo Levi, the use of different names is central to 
Klilger's representation of her divided self. She explains that as a child she had 
always been called by her middle name, Susi, rather than Ruth. Klilger describes her 
family as "emancipated but not assimilated, " in that whilst they did not keep a kosher 
house or practice their faith devoutly, they did acknowledge Jewish High Holy days 
with fasting and visits to the synagogue (39). However, even as a child, KIdger 
became increasingly aware of the persecution meted out to her in 1930s Vienna on 
the basis of her Jewish identity, and "became Jewish by defence" (39). Unaware of 
the biblical heritage of her middle name, Susannah, KRIger insisted that she be called 
by her first name, Ruth. She recalls, "why do I have a first name if I can't use it? I 
thought, and under the circumstances, only a Jewish name would do" (40). This 
change in name comes to represent a rupturing in KlUger's identity between her pre- 
Holocaust self (Susi) and the self that experienced the Holocaust (Ruth). The only 
member of the family to continue calling her Susi was her grandmother, who later 
died in Theresienstadt. KlOger recalls the misconception held by her family in the 
early stages of the war that "nobody would hurt an old woman. Or a child, like her 
youngest granddaughter, Susi" (40). For Kfilger then, Theresienstadt was not only the 
place her grandmother died, but also the place where Susi died. 
Nevertheless, in the frequent interjections from KRIger the narrator, KlOger 
exhibits a far closer identification with Susi than with Ruth. She recalls an incident 
where her great-aunt confiscated her collection of streetcar tickets, on the grounds 
that it was unhygienic. KlOger's narratorial voice intedects parenthetically to 
commiserate empathetically with Susi, asserting: "(But it was mine, damn it. What 
right did she have to take it? I can still feel my eight year old indignation. )" (9). 
KlOger the narrator shares with Susi an antipathy towards her mother, described as "a 
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spoiled child of wealth" (40). Indeed, most of the passages which can be considered 
to be unmitigated criticism of her mother appear early in the text where KRIger the 
narrator shares the petty grievances of Susi towards maternal authority. The 
relationship between both Susi and Klilger the narrator and her - or perhaps more 
accurately, their - mother is represented as highly competitive: "There was nothing 
that she hadn't done better than I, and my only recourse was to doubt her word" (57). 
in the early stages of the narrative, both KlOger and Susi share a mutual distrust of 
Alma, and KlUger reflects that "in our case, the symptoms of this flourishing mother- 
daughter neurosis were textbook perfect" (56). 
Yet as the narrative progresses and Ruth takes over the role of protagonist, 
KlOger the narrator gradually begins to challenge the critical attitude that Ruth adopts 
towards her mother. This is revealed most significantly in a passage in which KlOger 
recounts her mother's suggestion that they commit suicide together when they arrived 
at Birkenau. She writes: 
My mother explained to me that the electric barbed wire outside was 
lethal and proposed that she and I should get up and walk into that 
wire. I thought I hadn't heard correctly [ ... ]I was twelve years old, 
and the thought of dying, now, without delay, in contortions, by 
running into electrically charged metal on the advice of my own 
mother, whom God had created to protect me, was simply beyond my 
comprehension. The idea of it! I couldn't grasp it. I fled into the 
comfort of believing that she couldn't have meant it. Persuaded myself 
that she was only out to frighten me. Resented that she was up to bad 
tricks. Hadn't she often scared me for nothing? (I 11) 
Unable to contextualise her mother's suggestion within the desperate circumstances 
they were experiencing, Ruth is able to interpret the suicide proposal only through her 
understanding of their dysfunctional mother-daughter relationship. Finnan suggests 
that throughout the narrative, "KIdger's representations of the maternal function 
overturn the historical position of persecutor and victim [to the extent that] her 
mother assumes the role of persecutor" (28 1). The identification of her mother as the 
potential perpetrator of harm towards her offers Ruth a form of "comfort. " She is able 
to detach herself from the obvious and explicit danger around her, and focus instead 
on a perceived threat from her mother. To Ruth, the image of her mother as a 
threatening authoritative figure is familiar from their many clashes in her early 
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childhood, and thus Ruth's criticism of her mother in this instance actually represents 
an attempt to normalise the situation in which she finds herself. Her critical attitude 
towards her mother and their relationship can be interpreted as a coping strategy 
adopted to deal with the experience of trauma. 
This passage describing Ruth's interpretation of her mother's suggestion is 
followed immediately by KlOger the narrator's reflections on the incident. She writes: 
I knew my mother no better than most children know their parents, 
which isn't very well. Perhaps a certain, wild destructive pleasure was 
at the root of her proposal. But more probably she was quite serious 
and quite desperate. As I think back, I ask myself if I have ever 
forgiven her that worst evening of my life. Of course I have: but who 
can count the sparks in the ashes? [ ... ] Only when I had children of 
my own did I realise that one might well decide to kill them in 
Auschwitz rather than wait. I now believe that I would have had the 
same thought and perhaps carried it out more efficiently. (112) 
Klilger's interpretation of her mother's actions is revealed to be quite different to 
Ruth's understanding of her mother's suicide proposal. KlOger the narrator is able 
both to reflect on her mother's state of mind, and to forgive her. As a mother herself 
by this point, Klilger is able to identify with her mother's point of view in a way that 
was impossible for Ruth. Yet despite this reconciliation with her mother, Ruth's 
voice is still apparent in the final sentence of the passage, which stands in critical 
judgement not of her mother's suggestion, but of the way in which she failed to act 
upon it. 
Later in the text, KlUger tries to analyse her mother's response to the camps, 
and in particular her proposal of suicide. She asserts: 
My mother had reacted correctly to the extermination camp from out 
the outset, that is, with the sure instinct of the paranoid. Her suicide 
proposal of the first night is evidence of her understanding. [... ] Yet I 
still think that it was not her reasonableness but an old and deep seated 
sense of being persecuted which enabled her to save our lives. [ ... ]I 
think that people suffering from compulsive disorders, such as 
paranoia, had a better chance to pick their way out of mass destruction, 
because in Auschwitz they were finally in a place where the social 
order (or social chaos) had caught up with their delusions. [ ... ] But 
isn't the price she paid too high: this madness that she carried inside 
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her, like a sleeping tomcat? The cat would occasionally stretch, yawn, 
arch his back, softly case the joint, suddenly chatter with his teeth, 
reach with sharp claws for a bird, and go to sleep again - leaving the 
bloody feathers for me to clean up. I don't want to carry such a 
predator inside of me, even if he could save my life in the next 
extermination camp. (121-122) 
Interestingly, KlUger identifies the qualities within her mother that made their 
survival possible, which from Ruth's perspective identified her as a perpetrator, to be 
masculine. This is in line with her perception of the act of persecution and the 
Holocaust as being fundamentally male in nature. Yet at the same time, her mother is 
also the persecuted, and it is in recognising this duality of both persecutor and 
persecuted within her mother's nature that KlOger the narrator is able to differ to Ruth 
in her understanding of her mother. Yet whilst Klilger's voice and attitudes enter into 
the text, she does not attempt to silence Ruth, and the two personas live alongside 
each other, alternately constructing the mother as both victim of her circumstances 
and as perpetrator. 
Reiter suggests that the representation of the troubled mother-daughter 
relationship throughout the narrative should be interpreted not only as a personal 
account of KlOger's family history, but also within the wider context of her feminist 
reading of the history of the Holocaust. "Milger's criticism of her mother, " argues 
Reiter, "[ ... ] is not so much a condemnation of her but rather presents a paradigm of 
the general helplessness of the Jewish woman confronted with her family's 
deportation and extermination" (Ich wollte es ware ein Roman 334). KlUger's 
criticism of her mother is thus a screen for her feminist criticism of male oppression. 
Certainly, Landscapes of Memory stands as a text that is as much influenced 
by KlOger's post-war experiences as a feminist professor of German literature in 
America as by her childhood wartime experiences in Europe, the landscapes of the 
title seemingly echoing this geographical shift. She constructs a strongly feminist 
fashioning of history, curiously both casually dismissive of historical fact and at the 
same time insistent upon detail. For KlOger, it is essential that the name of each of the 
camps she was imprisoned in is remembered. She explains: 
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My third place of internment, whose name nobody can remember, was 
Christianstadt, which was called a work camp and was an extension, 
an Aussenlager, of another concentration camp, Gross-Rosen. There 
were many of these work camps, or Arbeitslager. Hitler's Europe was 
dotted with them, but there is a great reluctance to pay attention to 
their names [ ... ] Death camps seem easier to comprehend 
if we put 
them all into the basket of one vast generalisation, which the term 
death camps implies, but in the process we mythologise or trivialise 
them. (77) 
In this passage, KlOger argues that historical accuracy is essential in order to prevent 
the history of the Holocaust from disappearing into the realm of myth. Naming 
anchors her experiences in reality, and prevents the possibility that her specific 
experiences will be subsumed into a generalised shorthand of Holocaust history. In 
this context, the broad term 'death camps' denotes only an imaginary place; there was 
no place called 'death carnp. ' Indeed, as she points out, "the term extermination camp 
didn't exist yet" (74); the implication is that by using this non-contemporaneous 
terminology, real places are transformed into places of myth. It is perhaps this 
concern that motivates her to include the contemporaneous German terms 
A ussenlager and Arbeitslager (yet curiously not Konzentrationslager). And yet, is it 
possible for names that belong to a now lost landscape to evoke a sense of that 
landscape as real? Klilger laments the inadequacy of the term 'landscape' that she 
adopts for the title of her testimony, stating that "I want my timescapes. Evocations of 
places at a time that has passed" (74). The places that she names are places that 
belong to a separate timescape to the present, and therefore their usage does not 
necessarily resurrect them as real places. Klilger suggests that the names she records 
are like "piers of bridges that were blown up, only we can't be quite sure of what 
these bridges connected" (75). Yet to leave the places unnamed, to submit to a 
generalised discourse, is, for KlOger, to participate in the process of mythologisation 
and trivialisation. The only response, then, however unsatisfactory is to "start with 
what is left: the names of the places" (75). 
Yet this emphasis on communicating the exact historical detail of the 
Holocaust that KlOger expresses in this passage cannot be considered as a prevailing 
attitude in the text. Indeed, she exhibits a certain disregard for conventional historical 
narrative in her testimony, for example when relating the tales told to her in Birkenau 
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by an acquaintance, Liesel, whose father was a member of the Sonderkommando and 
passed on all that he witnessed to his teenage daughter: 
From her I learned that the gold fillings of Jewish teeth weren't 
permitted to stay in dead Jewish mouths, and much else that is 
common knowledge today, can be researched in many reference 
books, and need not be repeated here. (115) 
Her belief that she has no need to repeat the role of the Sonderkommando in any 
detail as it is already so well documented in history books implies that the tales that 
she does relate, mainly the stories of her own experiences and those of other women, 
are necessary as they are outside of the history books. This suggests that for Mager 
the history of the Holocaust has been told by men, is primarily about men, and that 
her role is to rectify this situation. She readily encourages the idea that her book is 
both about women and for women, writing that "most of [my readers are] likely to be 
female, since males, on the whole, tend to prefer books written by fellow males" (77). 
Not only does KlOger locate in the act of reading women's autobiography a female 
tradition of readership, but, in line with Cavarero's thinking, she also identifies 
remembrance and the autobiographical process as inherently female. 
"Remembrance, " KlUger declares, "is a branch of witchcraft" (75). Bearing in mind 
the historical marginalisation of women's autobiographical texts, it is interesting that 
she selects witchcraft, with its associations of female persecution, as a metaphor for 
her act of memory and self representation. She continues the metaphor by likening 
the process of sharing memory with that of sharing recipes in a "witches' kitchen7 
(75). She urges: 
"Use your best wooden spoons with the longest handles to whisk 
into the broth of our fathers the herbs our daughters grew in their 
gardens. If I succeed, together with my readers - and perhaps a 
few men will join us in the kitchen - we could exchange magic 
formulas like favourite recipes and season to taste the marinade 
which the stories and histories offer us. (75) 
It is tempting to interpret the image of the father's broth and the daughter's herbs as a 
symbol of the integration of male and female traditions of autobiography. The stories 
of men and the stories of women come together to form our "favourite recipes. " 
Whilst for Mager "recipes for gefilte fish are no recipe for coping with the 
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Holocaust"they may offer a way of coping with the demands of memory and 
representation (24). 
Whilst KRIger's omission of certain historical details that are already so often 
told in accounts of the Holocaust in order to allow space for the articulation of a 
specifically female experience of the Holocaust is perhaps justifiable, more 
concerning is her distortion of historical fact in accordance with her politicised views 
on gender. At one point in Landscapes of Memory, she belligerently asserts that: 
Female guards are often called 'SS women. ' It's a misnomer, since 
there were no women in the SS. The SS was strictly a men's club. 
Everybody knows this, and yet the term remains in use, as if to make 
sure that women get half the blame for an organisation that was never 
theirs. (135) 
Far from everybody knowing that there were no female SS guards, many survivors, 
including Livia E. Bitton Jackson, Charlotte Miller and Charlotte Delbo, make 
explicit reference to SS women in Auschwitz and Ravensbrack. Daniel Goldhagen 
refers specifically to 27 female SS guards who served at RavensbrUck and 
HeImbrechts (a FlossenbUrg satellite camp), although he notes that they were not 
recruited until the late stages of the war, and that "their resemblance to real SS men 
was close to nil. The head woman guard [Helga Hegel] referred to them in her 
testimony as 'S S' guards, with ironical quotation marks around S S" Q3 7-3 3 8). 
Whilst the majority of SS members were certainly men, and women primarily acted 
as auxiliaries rather leading in senior positions, to suggest that the SS was an 
exclusively male organisation is to rewrite history of the period. KlUger also states 
that "no women were charged in the great postwar trials at Nuremberg or later at the 
Auschwitz trials in Frankfurt" (13 6). This comment once again offers a misleading 
interpretation of historical fact. Luise Danz, for example, had served as a guard at a 
number of different camps, inclusing Plaszow, Majdanek and Auschwitz. She was 
placed on trial in Poland in 1946, and was given a life sentence for crimes she had 
committed during the Holocaust, although was later released in 1956. 
KlOger does, however, recall that there were female guards at Christianstadt, 
but she is reluctant to identify them as members of the SS. She argues that these 
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women were drawn "from families with little education, and were put into uniforms 
since they could hardly wear civilian clothes to work in the camps" (13 6). This 
somewhat ambiguous description suggests that officially these women were members 
of the SS, or at least wore the uniform of the SS. Yet from KlOger's perspective, these 
women should be recognised as SS in name only; they did not embrace the ethos and 
ideology of the SS organisation in any way. Instead, the women guards came from 
poor and uneducated backgrounds and were in no position to make an informed 
choice about the role they played in the perpetration of genocide. Indeed, Kfilger 
seems to be positing a radical reinterpretation of the perpetrator-victim relationship, 
whereby the female guards are constructed as victims of the male-dominated Nazi 
regime. 
Characteristic of many of the eye-witness accounts of the behaviour of female 
SS guards is an account of their unusual brutality and cruelty. Charlotte Miller recalls 
an attack by a female SS guard on her work battalion at RavensbrOck: "the SS 
Weiber could really beat a prisoner. She was beating the girls, the table knocked over, 
the chairs kaput and everything which way and didn't let anyone get out. She stood 
there in the doorway, hitting all around her with a club" (163). Yet it is precisely this 
demonisation of women that KIfiger objects to so strongly and she presents an 
impassioned defence of their actions in her narrative. She states: 
I believe on the basis of my own experience as well as from what I 
have heard and read, that in average they were less brutal than their 
male counterparts. It is hardly news that women are less violent than 
men. [ ... ] The women guards at Christianstadt were moderate in their 
authoritarianism. When they were in a bad mood they took it out on 
us. [ ... ] But they weren't egregariously cruel - not that I can 
remember. (13 7) 
Whilst her view that women were less brutal than men certainly contradicts the 
accounts of many other witnesses, it is interesting that she tempers this assertion with 
a reference to the potential fallibility of her own memory. This could be read as a 
tacit admission that her memory of her experiences has been influenced by her post- 
war political views on gender. Yet the T also reminds the reader that this is her 
personal account. Early on in Landscapes of Memory KlOger suggests that: "wars, 
and hence the memories of wars are owned by the male of the species" (7). Her 
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distinctive feminist T acts as a challenge to this male historical discourse that 
marginalises the experiences of female perpetrators and victims. For KlOger, it is 
only by rectifying this gender imbalance in the history of the Holocaust that a better 
understanding of the event can be reached. She denies that her testimony is an 
"attempt to exonerate the women who committed crimes; " rather, it is an attempt to 
situate female criminality within a more balanced historical context (13 6). From 
Mager's perspective, it is because female criminality was the exception rather than 
the rule that known female perpetrators, such as Ilse Koch, are rendered infamous 
through accounts of their perverse brutality. KlOger points out that "it seems we 
always pull the same names out of the hat when it comes to women, while the names 
of the men who committed atrocities are legion" (136). KlUger disregards as 
irrelevant the claim that the only reason women did not commit the same number of 
crimes as men was because they did not have the opportunity to do so. "We don't 
condemn people for what they might do under different circumstances, " she argues, 
"but for what they actually did" (136). Yet in light of her misleading rendering of 
historical facts, this apparently judicious comment is little short of disingenuous. 
Collectively, it may well be true that women had less opportunity to commit crimes 
than men as they were disproportionately represented amongst the perpetrators. 
However, individually, there is little to suggest that female perpetrators committed 
fewer criminal acts than their male counterparts. This approach has led to some of the 
strongest criticism of her testimony. Lore Dickstein in particular challenges this 
aspect of the Landscapes of Memory arguing that "This reflexive, outdated 
feminism, which regards anything male as suspect and all women, even Nazi women, 
as essentially powerless sisters, seriously mars the book and threatens to undermine 
its credibility" (26). 
Whilst KlOger's brand of feminism certainly draws on an essentialist rhetoric 
often associated with American first-wave feminism, it is unfair to say that this 
politicised approach undermines the credibility of her account. Firstly, Reiter 
suggests it is in fact her highly politicised stance that enables her to avoid "the 
sentimental representation of life in the camps which is so often apparent when the 
victims are children" Ich wollte es ware ein Roman 332). Secondly, Dickstein's use 
of the word "credibility" is somewhat ambiguous; historical inaccuracy is after all, 
relatively common in accounts based on memory, although admittedly, KlOger's 
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inaccuracies are rather glaring. Alternatively, Dickstein may be suggesting that her 
style undermines Klilger's position as a feminist and scholar by employing a feminist 
rhetoric which is out of keeping with early twenty-first century feminism. What 
Dickstein is overlooking in her criticism of the text is that whilst Klilger's account of 
the (non)-culpability of female perpetrators may not be in keeping with certain 
known historical facts, it is vital to her representation of the Holocaust as a part of the 
history of male oppression of women. Indeed, at one point in her narrative she 
describes witnessing her mother being punished in Birkenau by being forced to kneel 
on bricks for an extended period of time. KlOger defines this moment as her "most 
vivid and lurid memory of Birkenau" (130). Yet she is swift to argue that the 
situation of a daughter being forced to witness the abuse of her mother is not unique 
to the Holocaust, and contextualises it within a longer history of female oppression: 
"I have described something that is in many ways a common sight to the children of 
wife beaters and was common to the children of slaves in the nineteenth century" 
(130). These parallels serve to reinforce the way in which she approaches the history 
of the Holocaust. She states quite emphatically that "fascism is a decidedly male 
property, whether you were for or against if' (7), and even more bluntly that "the 
Nazi evil was male, not female" (13 6). In accordance with her politicised feminist 
view of history, she presents the Holocaust as an assault on women. Yet unlike many 
other testimonial accounts by women, KlUger chooses to focus not on physical bodily 
experiences specific to women, but rather on women's behaviour and coping 
strategies during the Holocaust. 
A distinguishing feature of women's testimonial accounts of the Holocaust is 
the effect of physical trauma and deprivation on the body. Accounts of the shaving of 
hair, menstruation and amenorrhea, pregnancy and childbirth, the fear of infertility, 
enforced sterilisation, the fear of sexual abuse and gynaecological experiments are 
routinely included in women's narratives. In comparison with other women's 
testimonies, KlUger's narrative is notable for its marginalisation of these specifically 
female experiences. 
An appropriate testimony for comparison is Livia E. Bitton Jackson's 
account, Elli: Coming of Age in the Holocaust. A similar age to Klilger during the 
Holocaust, Jackson was deported with the rest of her family to Auschwitz from the 
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Nagymagyar ghetto in 1944. Like KlOger, Jackson too remained with her mother 
throughout the war and although she often writes of her mother with great love and 
affection, the mother-daughter relationship is never foregrounded as it is Klijger's 
testimony. Jackson and her mother endured frequent transports; from Auschwitz to 
Plasz6w, back to Auschwitz, then to Augsberg in south east Germany where they 
were forced to labour in a factory. As the war drew to a close, the women of 
Augsberg and surrounding camps were forced into wagons and moved ceaselessly in 
an attempt to evade the advancing American army. As is so often the case in 
Holocaust testimony, the moment of liberation is recorded anticlimactically. The 
women in the railway wagon, including Jackson and her mother, simply awoke one 
morning in the wagon to find an American soldier staring in at them. "So it has 
come, " she recalls. "We are liberated. It is all over now" (212). 
Throughout her text, Jackson repeatedly focuses on bodily female 
experiences as compounding the misery of the camps. One particularly notable 
passage deals with her horror at witnessing a woman menstruating during a morning 
roll call. She writes: 
All at once I notice that blood is flowing on the legs of the girl before 
me. A thick red stream of blood on the inner side of each leg. Oh my 
God, she must have been shot! What should I do? Then, in a flash, I 
realise. She is menstruating. Poor girl. Of course, we have no 
underwear ... there are no pads ... the blood simply flows. Down her legs. My God, but this is horrible. Why doesn't she say something? 
Ask for a pad or something? But from whom? Whom can she say 
anything to? She might even be shot for reporting that she is bleeding. 
Does menstruating constitute sabotage? (93-94) 
The juxtaposition of the familiar - menstruation - with the unfamiliar - the camp - at 
first prevents Jackson from understanding what is going on. in the camp, she has 
come to associate blood only with violence and pain. Yet when she suddenly 
understands the situation, her horror turns to a frustrated and impotent sympathy for 
the unnamed woman. Just as quickly, however, she recognises that her first 
association between blood and violence may have been correct. She fears that her 
own body will threaten her chances of survival, that menstruation will be construed 
as a sign of rebellion, sabotage even, punishable by death. Baumel confirms that 
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Jackson's fears were indeed justified, as there was a significant threat "that any 
female inmate whose uniform would be stained with menstrual blood would be 
killed" (25). Jackson recognises that as a woman she may be endangered not only by 
her actions, but simply through being. When menstruation abruptly ceases some 
weeks later due to the effects of starvation, Jackson reveals that she is "secretly 
grateful [ ... I Avoiding the fear, pain and embarrassment of menstruation 
is worth any 
sacrifice to me at the moment" (103). Yet whilst Jackson herself is grateful, she 
relates with feeling the fears of the older women that they are being secretly sterilised 
with bromide in their food: 
Married women keep wondering about the bromide in their food again 
and again. Will they bear children again? What will their husbands 
say? Perhaps less of the food will cause less of a damage. Some try to 
eat less and the conflict is painful. Rejection of a means of survival for 
the sake of a dubious gain. (104). 
This fear of infertility appears often in women's narrative, and is intimately bound up 
with the hope of survival. Marlene Heinemann argues that amenorrhea and the 
accompanying fear of infertility constituted a form of "psychological assaulf' unique 
to women, which "threatened them with the loss of the specific biological function 
which society insists upon as the chief vocation for women. Thus the loss of fertility 
could be construed as a threat to the possibility of a worthwhile life afterwards" (67). 
The rumour of bromide in the food presented many women with an unbearable 
paradox. Abandoning the fear of sterility and eating the food was for many women to 
abandon the hope of a life after the war as a wife and mother. Yet to refuse to eat the 
food would mean a more certain and immediate death in the camp. Another survivor, 
Gerda Klein recalls "the thought of sterility did worry me. More forcefully as the 
long nights passed, the idea returned that someday I must have a baby of my own. I 
felt that I would endure anything willingly so long as that hope was not extinguished" 
(156). 
In contrast, KlOger refers to these issues of menstruation and the fear of 
infertility only briefly. Indeed, the fear of sterility she dismisses as a bourgeois 
concern expressed only by those who had never before experienced hardship and 
suffering. 
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Everyone was so undernourished that no one menstruated. But perhaps 
the cause was not only hunger, but imprisonment itself. Even well 
nourished animals seldom have a full litter in a zoo. Prison is bad for 
us living things, from the lower to the highest links on the food chain. 
Some women thought the Nazis had put something in our food to 
prevent menstruation, which only goes to show how well off they had 
been before, since they didn't know the effects of starvation. (141- 
142) 
The anguish and horror so prevalent in Jackson's account of menstruation and 
amenorrhea is utterly absent in KlOger's account. Writing in a more detached fashion, 
she is capable of reflecting on the reasons for the absence of menstruation, and wryly 
references dehumanising Nazi rhetoric in her explanation. She is scornful of "the 
presumed justification of a woman's life, having children" (252). Perhaps it is due to 
her relatively young age whilst in the camps that she does not acknowledge these 
fears fully; she claims that she could not understand the despair women experienced 
at having their hair shaved off because "she was too young to grasp the deeper and 
symbolic significance of this despoilment" (13 8). Yet for the similarly aged Jackson, 
the experience of having her hair shaved off was of great import. She reveals: 
The haircut has a startling effect on every woman's appearance. 
Individuals become a mass of bodies. [ ... I We become a monolithic 
mass. Inconsequential. [ ... ] The shaving of the hair had a curious 
effect. A burden was lifted. The burden of individuality. Of 
associations. Of identity. Of the recent past. (78-79) 
In common with KlOger, Jackson does not recognise despair in the experience of 
losing her hair. Instead, she describes the loss of individual identity positively, 
finding comfort in the 'monolithic mass. ' This echoes her previous description of her 
feelings on entering the Nagymagyar ghetto, where she explains: "I like it all. I am a 
part of every life. And every life is partly mine. I cease to be an individual. I am a 
limb of a larger body. In this I find solace" (37). This emphasis on the need for 
community is in itself a characteristic of many female authored texts. Many women 
cite in their testimonies that the reason for their survival was belonging to a mutually 
protective 'camp family', usually comprised of four or five women who were often 
unrelated. Jackson recalls forming just such a group with her mother, her aunt and 
two cousins whilst in Auschwitz: 
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We decide to form a family of five. Suri says it is much easier to 
survive in Auschwitz if you are five. [When food is distributed] every 
five get one portion of bread and a bowl of food and it is divided 
among them. If you don't know the others, you may end up without 
provisions. [ ... ] But 
if you have family and friends on the line, you 
share the food equally. (89) 
Whether these groups actually did improve chances of survival is difficult to judge; 
those who did not survive may well have also sought refuge in protective groups. 
Lawrence L. Langer suggests that despite the prevalence of accounts of camp 
families in women's narrative, "the ftill context of these narratives shows us how 
seldom such alliances made any difference in the long-range effects of the ordeal for 
those who outlived it" (Gendered Suffering 351). Ringelheim was initially an 
advocate of the theory that these 'camp families' offered women a greater chance of 
survival, but later revised her opinion, pointing out that: 
The focus on friendship, affection, and so on, distorted our 
understanding of a larger situation in which that experience may have 
played only a small role. The bonding was limited and exclusive. It 
was not a bonding against the enemy in solidarity with women. Did 
the tcrror of isolation and death not affect the women because they 
bonded? (Women and the Holocaust 388) 
Ringclhcim also questions why readers and critics are so keen to attribute such great 
importance to these groups, suggesting that it is more to do with a retrospective 
search for a positive image in the Holocaust than with historical accuracy (388). A 
further point to note is that whilst these accounts are significantly more common in 
womcnos testimonies than those authored by men, this does not necessarily mean that 
it was an exclusively female mode of behaviour; merely than it has not been 
recounted in the majority of men's narratives. The focus on camp families in 
womcnvs narratives should perhaps be more accurately recognised as style of 
narration, rather than a representation of historical reality. 
Klagcr's narrative is no exception in noting the importance of female 
relationships during the I lolocauýst. Indeed, the formation ofjust such a small group is 
also a pivotal moment in her changing relationship with her mother. Mager writes: 
"now this is the best and the most unusual thing that I can say about my mother: she 
adoptcd a child in Auschwitz. She decreed without any fuss that this girl belonged 
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with us, as if it was the most natural thing in the world" (146). The child in question 
was Susi, a teenage girl about KlOger's age, who remained with KlOger and her 
mother until their liberation in 1945. The coincidence of name between Susi the 
surrogate sister and Susi the child protagonist in the early passages of the text is 
startling, and on first reading is suggestive of a narrative device employed by Klilger 
as part of her representation of her relationship with her mother. Yet Susi the sister is 
far more sympathetic towards Alma than KRIger describes her child protagonist to 
have been. 
A key example of this emerges from an experience KlOger recalls from her 
time in Christianstadt. Beaten by an SS man after asking for food leftovers, KIDger 
returned to the barracks and told her mother about her experience. Typically, KlOger 
describes her mother's response to be unsympathetic, claiming that "if she had been 
there, she would have hit back" (IS 1). Her angry reaction to her mother's words is 
expressed in Ruth's contemporaneous voice in a particularly coruscating passage: 
My mother irritates me, because she stylises herself at my expense: 
she is the potential heroine, unlikely as it may seem, and reduces me to 
poor-little-victim status. As if the humiliation of having been hit 
wasn't enough, she has to add her superior airs and her pity. (15 1) 
Yet this rage towards her mother is immediately tempered by her inclusion of Susi's 
memories: 
And yet, reading this passage, Susi reminds me of something I had 
forgotten. My mother, oddly enough, was for a short time a kind of 
protogee, inasmuch as she got work in the laundry, which was a 
privileged job. She achieved this position in an unlikely way - she 
complained to one of the guards that her children had been treated 
unfairly. (151-152) 
These arc the memories of Susi the surrogate sister, but the coincidence of name 
makes it is tempting to read them as a figurative invocation of Susi the child 
protagonist. Could these positive memories of Alma represent a rehabilitation of the 
neurotic mothcr-daughter relationship between Susi and Alma as represented in the 
early stages of the narrative? Yet this reading runs the risk of misinterpreting 
historical actualities as literary conceits, an approach which should be resisted when 
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analysing testimonial narratives. It is preferable, then, to acknowledge the duplicated 
names as a curiosity of historical happenstance, rather than as a narrative device. 
Ruth and her mother maintained a relationship with Susi after the war when 
all three were living separately in America, although Klilger's mother would 
periodically go through stages when she would reject any contact at all with Susi. 
Mager herself describes Susi still as "my sister, for there is no other term to describe 
our relationship, which seems absolute, although we share few, if any, interests" 
(146). She cautiously accepts the idea that the relationship between the three women 
played a significant role in their survival, commenting that: "Susi always thought that 
my mother saved her life. [ ... II can't tell whether she would have remained alive 
without my mother. But I suspect that all three of us can claim a share in having 
saved each other" (146). Whilst KI ager acknowledges that in terms of emotional 
support their small group was significant, she shies away from depicting their 
relationship as harmonious and idyllic. She recalls the period when they were at 
Christianstadt and were set to labour in a nearby forest. At that time, Susi had 
contacts with the workers in the staff kitchen, and was often able to secure extra 
pieces of food for their group. Whilst these extra mtions undoubtedly contributed to 
the welfare of the group, Susi's actions also created tensions within the group as 
KIGgcr fclt compelled to compete with her for her mother's love and praise. Whilst in 
the forest, she somewhat recklessly approached a civilian foreman to ask him for 
some of his food. He refused her begging, and Mager was fortunate not to suffer any 
repercussions from her actions, but she recalls that she believed her actions were 
justified because "I wanted it notjust for myself, but to bring back to my mother and 
Susi as a token of my skill, not only because I loved them, but also because I wanted 
to say, here, look, I am good for something" (149). 
Yet whilst she describes the flow and ebb of the tensions and reconciliations 
within the group, it seems certain that their escape and consequent survival would not 
have been possible without the bravado of a group to push them. As the Russian front 
grew closer, prisoners from all the camps in the surrounding areas were forced into 
gruelling marches further and further west. During this period, K111ger, her mother 
and Susi joined together with three Czech women to plan an escape amidst the chaos 
of the mass marches. 111c decision to escape was not unanimous; whilst KlOger was 
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desperate to take the chance when it arose, her mother was reluctant to attempt such a 
dangerous venture. Their inability to reach a mutual decision could have thwarted 
their escape attempts, but KlOger was eventually able to persuade Susi to agree with 
her, and with the added impetus of the three Czech women who were keen to make 
an escape attempt, the group of six eventually fled successfully into the night. 
Whilst Mager does acknowledge the importance of the group in their 
survival, she also explores other coping mechanisms that women developed. A 
principal strategy that she explores is supportive female conversation, epitomised 
through the exchange of recipes. She recollects that whilst in Christianstadt, she 
would constantly hear women: 
cxchang[ing] recipes the same way I recited poems. At night a 
favourite game was to surpass each other with the recital of generous 
amounts of butter, eggs, and sugar in fantasy baking competitions. I 
didn't even know many of the dishes they cooked up and listened with 
a growling stomach, just as I listened with a hungry imagination to 
their tales of travel, parties, dates and university studies. (138) 
Exchanging recipes open up shared avenues of memory for the women, and provided 
a link- to the world before, as well as hope for survival, of the future meals they would 
prepare. Remembrance and hope for the future constitutes a coping mechanism, and 
is expressed in the female narrative through the recreation of the pre-war domestic 
sphere and the exchange of recipes. 
Once again in Mager's narrative, cooking serves as a metaphor for 
remembrance and continuity. Yet, whilst this shared experience of domesticity drew 
some of the womcn togcther, Mager fclt exiled from this 'witches' kitchen. ' She 
notes that she was too young to be able to share in their memories, and felt little sense 
of community with them. The recipes represented connections to a world K111ger had 
never known, a world that %%-as as alien to her as Auschwitz was to the older women. 
Ibc only life she could remember before the camps was charactcrised by the 
cxpcricncc of pcrsccution, and she explains that "in the few years that I had lived as a 
conscious person, my rights had been removed piece by piece, so that Auschwitz had 
a kind of logic to it" (109). The world of dinner parties and everyday domesticity 
jarrcd with hcr understanding of the world, and she doubted the truth of the pre- 
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Holocaust world described by her fcIlow inmatcs. "How could the past have been so 
rosy, " she questioned, "if it had led to Auschwitz and Christianstadt? What was really 
out there? " (13 8-13 9). Instead she relied upon the recitation and writing of poetry as 
her link with the world before. From an early age, Kfilger had adopted the recitation 
of poetry as a protective ritual. She recalls that as a young child: "while walking in 
the unsafe streets [of Vienna], I would mutter verses as if they were a magic spell" 
(9). Once again, Klilger is reinforcing the connection between witchcraft, 
womanhood and remembrance through her use of the magic spell simile. For KlUger, 
it is the escape into fantasy through the discourse of poetry that provides her with a 
form of coping mechanism; for the older women, it is the mutual retreat into the 
reality of the past that provides a strategy to deal with the horrors of the present. 
Ecriture Feminine? Women's Writing and the Testimony of Charlotte Delbo 
Discussing Delbo's work in the context of politicised feminist literary theory 
poses two initial problems. Firstly, Delbo, herself has challenged this approach to her 
work, stating emphatically that I must not be discussed as a woman writer. I am not 
a woman in my writing" (qtd. in Rittner and Roth 99). Nevertheless, critics of her 
work have noted "distinctly feminine qualities" to her writing (Rittner and Roth 99). 
Rose Yalow Kamel suggests that "Delbo makes use of the traditional forms often 
used by women writers to inscribe their lives as gendered beings: the diary [and] 
transcription of oral testimony" (66). Yet the vague reference to "feminine qualities" 
in Delbo's work fails to acknowledge the distinctive thematic and stylistic aspects of 
her writing. Similarly, diary and oral testimony are not exclusively "feminine" modes 
of writing, and as descriptions of the relationship between gender and writing do little 
to identify Dclbo's singular voice in the traditionally male dominated canon of 
I lolocaust literature. 
The second problem is broader in scope and questions the relevancy of this 
form of analytical approach. This is not to suggest that these texts cannot be analysed 
through an interpretative lcns of, for example, French feminist literary theory, (post)- 
structuralism, or postmodcrnism; rather it is the manner in which these analytical 
frameworks arc applied to the texts that needs to be questioned. Writing on KlOger's 
Landscgpgs of Mcmoly Rcitcr warns against describing her style as feminine: "rather 
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than labelling her narrative style and mode of reasoning as particularly feminine it 
may be more accurate to see it as the result of the conflation of a number of 
experiences and influences during her life" (Ich wollte es ware ein Roman 336). If 
testimony is to be considered as a new and distinct genre, then perhaps it is 
appropriate to call for a renewed form of critical discourse with which to analyse this 
genre. Standard literary theory, then, should be informed by an appreciation of the 
emerging critical discourse on trauma texts. 
In contrast to the other Holocaust testimonies discussed in this thesis, Delbo 
was a non-Jewish victim, arrested for her role in the French Resistance movement. 
She was touring in South America with a theatrical company when the German 
occupying forces entered France in 1940, and against the advice of her colleagues, 
she returned to Paris in 1941 after learning that a friend of hers had been executed 
following a trial of communists in occupied France. Together with her husband, 
Georges Dudach whom she had married in 1934, she worked with the Resistance, 
producing and disseminating anti-German pamphlets. They were both arrested for 
their activities in 1942 by the French police, who promptly handed them over to the 
Gestapo. Dudach was executed by the Gestapo on August 24 of that year, and Delbo 
was detained in Santd Prison for three months before being moved to Romainville. It 
was at Romainvillc that she made contact with other women who had also been 
arrested on political grounds, fostering a sense of community that would continue 
when they were deported cn masse to Auschwitz in January 1943. She was 
imprisoned in Auschwitz and a satellite camp, Raisko, until 1944 when she was 
deported to Ravcnsbrack. There were two hundred and thirty women on Delbo's 
convoy to Auschwitz in 1943; only forty-nine were left alive when the Red Cross 
finally liberated the group from Ravcnsbrilck in the final days of the war. 
In common with many other survivors, Delbo reflected on her Holocaust 
cxpcricnccs in successive publications. Her first three books, None of Us Will 
Rcturn, Uscicss Knowledgc, and The Measure of Our Days were brought together in 
hcr seminal trilogy Auschwitz and Afle (first published in English translation in 
1995). DOW wrote None of Us Will Return immediately following her liberation in 
1946, but did not have it published until 1965, later explaining to her translator 
Roscttc C. Lamont that, "I wanted to make sure it would withstand the test of time, 
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since it had to travel far into the future" (qtd. in Delbo, Days and Memoly x). 
Sections of Useless Knowledge were also written in 1946 and 1947, although she 
withheld publication of this book too, until 1970. The third book, ne Measure of 
Our Days was published soon after this. Whilst her reluctance to publish immediately 
, A2s in part due to her concerns about the potential longevity of the text, almost 
certainly a further consideration would have been the reception such an account 
would have received in the immediate post-war years. There was a certain reluctance, 
if not outright hostility, to"-ards hearing stories about the camps, and survivors often 
struggled to find a sympathetic publisher. Primo Levi, for example, wrote If This is a 
Man shortly after his return to Italy in 1947, but was unable to attract significant 
interest from a publisher until 1958. 
Dclbo's final book, Days and Memoly was published in 1985, the year of her 
death, and contains perhaps some of her most philosophical reflections on the 
I lolocaust. Towards the end of the book, Delbo interestingly begins to contextualise 
her own experiences of the Holocaust within a larger framework of twentieth century 
atrocity, expressing comradeship with those imprisoned in the Siberian gulags and 
Algerian victims of French oppression. Through her denial of the uniqueness of the 
I folocaust as a unique point of suffering in the twentieth century, Delbo situates both 
her her experiences and her writing not simply within a tradition of Holocaust 
testimony, but within a wider tradition of twentieth century trauma. Thus, in addition 
to hcr claim that hcr writing should not be considered as part of a female tradition of 
writing, Dclbo is also implicitly asserting that her writing should not be considered as 
part of a tradition of I Iolocaustwriting. Rather, her testimonial writing demands a 
placc within a broader canon - that of twentieth century trauma narratives. 
Mager also contcxtualiscs the memory of the Holocaust within a wider 
context, rcfcrring dircctly to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, an event which she 
intcrprcts as comparable to the Holocaust in terms of the struggle to represent and 
commemorate the past. "T"lic Japanese, " she writes, "are as frustrated in coping with 
past horror as we are, because they, too, can think only of the mantra 'Never again. ' 
It's casy to rccognisc the helplessness in this strange city [Hiroshima]" (69). Whilst 
she does consider the comparison with the atomic bombings apt, Kfilger objects 
strongly to arguments which attempt to draw parallels between the Holocaust and 
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other events, specifically the American genocide of the Native Americans and the 
ongoing hostilities between Israel and Palestine. Whilst KlOger rejects these 
comparisons as too simplistic, she clearly acknowledges a special relationship 
between the Holocaust and the atomic bombings, a relationship which forms the 
central premise of this thesis. Whilst she does not elaborate on her reasons for 
accepting the validity of a comparison between the Holocaust and the atomic 
bombings, it appears that she identifies similarities not necessarily between the 
historical events, but certainly between the post-event attempts of survivors to deal 
with the experience of unprecedented trauma. In this way, she locates herself within a 
community of not only Holocaust survivors, but survivors of other twentieth century 
atrocities, an approach she shares with Delbo. 
In a further overlap with Mager's work, Delbo also leans towards a distortion 
of history in order to justify her interpretation of her approach to writing. Delbo 
argues that there was no "distinctive female experience of the Holocaust" (qtd. in 
Rittncr and Roth 99). Whilst this brief yet conclusive statement does not offer such a 
prolonged and radical reinterpretation of history as Klilger does in Landscapes of 
Memory it nevertheless obscures the fact that there were substantial historical 
differences between the experiences of men and women during the Holocaust, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter. Yet in making this statement, Delbo is bolstering her 
argument that her testimony should not be interpreted as women's literature. If there 
, A-as no distinctive female experience, her argument suggests, then there cannot be - 
indeed there is no need for -a distinctive female voice to narrate those experiences. 
I lowcvcr, despite Dclbo's objections, there are thematic and stylistic elements within 
her testimonial literature which appear to bear the characteristic hallmarks of icriture 
findnine. 
Cixous's concept of Jcriturefiminine challenges traditional concepts of 
women's autobiographical writing as first proposed in the 1980s, and thus calls for a 
reinterpretation of the way in which Delbo, could be considered to be writing as a 
woman. Estelle C. Jelinck, for example, argued that: 
irrcgularity rather than orderliness inforins the self portraits of women. 
The narratives of their lives arc often not chronological and 
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progressive but disconnected, fragmentary or organised into self 
sustained units rather than connecting chapters. (17) 
Looking initially at Delbo's "None of Us Will Return, " Jelinek's defining feature of 
women's autobiographical writing certainly appears to be helpful. Delbo does adopt a 
basic chronological framework in this account, beginning with her opening chapter 
"Arrivals, Departures, " and culminating with her bleak eponymous conclusion "none 
of us will return. None of uswas meant to return" (Auschwitz and After 113-114). 
However, belying the apparent orderliness of this chronology is a series of 
disconnected camp life vignettes, constantly interrupted with post-war reflections on 
suffering. Stylistically too the text is charactcrised by discontinuity as Delbo switches 
between prose, poetry and transcripts of conversation. Yet problematically, Jelinek's 
description is rooted in the autobiography binary which defines women's writing in 
opposition to men's writing: Order/Disorder, Coherent/Fragmentary, 
Progressivc/Discontinuous. The binary permits only the possibility of observing 
difference, rather than analysing the nature of women's autobiographical writing. We 
can note gcncraliscd stylistic features such as disorderliness and discontinuity, but 
what does this tell us about the meaning of writing as a woman? Cixous's theory of 
icriturcfiminine offers the opportunity to escape from this binary formulation. 'Mere 
is then a fundamental difference between women's writing as it is conceived of by the 
critics of fcmalc autobiography writing in the 1980s and Cixous's ecriturefiminine. 
As Susan Sellers notes, for Cixous "feminine writing will challenge the present 
modcs of pcrccption and representation, and thus herald into being a new schema to 
rcplacc the cxisting hegemony" (1). 
"Woman must %kTitc hcrscir'cxhorts Cixous in The Lauph of the Medusa 
(245). She asserts a fundamental connection between female writing and the female 
body. If thcrc is truth in her maxim "censor the body and you censor breath and 
speech at the same timc, '9 (250) then lifting this censorship through the act of female 
autobiographical narration liberates the female body and allows it to take its place 
both in the world and on the page. In The Sex Which Is Not One, Luce Irigaray 
thcoriscs that woman is inscribed on the page and in speech in a manner which is 
imitativc of the female body. For Irigaray, the female body "is neither one nor two" 
(101); the plurality of the female scx organs oppose the "dominant phallic economy" 
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(100); which presupposes the authority of singularity, of the one. In contrast to this 
6one9, "a woman 'touches herself' constantly without anyone being able to forbid her 
to do so, for her sex is comprised of two lips which embrace continuously. Thus 
within herself, she is already two -but not divisible into one -who stimulate each 
other" (100). For Irigaray, thenfimininiti is identified as a plurality - for it is plural, 
not only double, as "woman has sex organs just about everywhere" - that is 
characterised not by fragmentation but by continuity between the constituent parts 
(103). Ile pluralistic nature offimininiti informs the way in which women come to 
express themselves in language. "'She' is definitely other in herself, " asserts Irigaray: 
that is undoubtedly the reason she is called temperamental, 
incomprehensible, perturbed, capricious - not to mention her language 
in which 'she' goes off in all directions and in which 'he' is unable to 
discern the coherence of any meaning. (103) 
It is, perhaps, this plurality that underlies the falsity of the autobiography binary. The 
derinition of women's writing cannot be derived from a supposition that it is a 
deviation from men's writing practices; rather it is a form of writing in which 'he' 
can find no coherence because it originates not from points of difference to men's 
writing but from a wholly unique and specifically female place. Writing as'a woman 
is constructed as a cclcbmtory activity in which female language becomes ajoyful 
manifestation of female sexuality. In The Mechanics of Fluids, Irigaray continues her 
dcrinition of women's language as "continuous, compressible, dilatable, viscous, 
conductabic, diffusible"' (I 11). In this definition, Irigaray undermines the supposition 
of the critics of female autobiography such as Jelinek who present division and 
fragmentation as synonymous with discontinuity. For Irigaray, it is the very fact that 
the female body, and soflnilniniiJ, is divided and pluralistic that permits the 
possibility of continuity. 
If it is the characteristics of continuity and fluidity that go some way to 
dcrining what it means to write as a woman, then it appears that Delbo's writing does 
cxcmplify a style which is concomitant with the theory of icriturefiminine. "Arrivals 
and Dcparturcs". the first chapter of None of Us Will Return displays precisely the 
conjunction of fragmentation and fluidity that Irigaray claims characterises women's 
writing. 11c chapter deals with the arrival of a transport at an unnamed camp, and 
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although the context suggests that it is Auschwitz, the absence of a given name 
suggests this is an 'every-camp', the single description accounting for the experiences 
of the many, rather than a specific few. The textual layout of multi-clausal sentences 
separated primarily by line breaks rather than punctuation leaves the impression of 
the words touching yet not touching, this fluidity suggesting echoes of icriture 
fiminine styling on the page: 
This is the station they reach, from wherever they came. 
They get here after days and nights 
having crossed many countries 
they reach it together with their children, even the little ones who were 
not to be part of this journey. (Auschwitz and After 3) 
Delbo's use of poetic cnJambment within a piece of prose is indicative of a style 
which is not confincd by the strictures of one genre. In this passage, the use of 
cnjambmcnt evokes a sense of relentless movement on the page, echoing the constant 
forward motion of the trainjourricys that are the subject of the passage. Delbo's style 
frequently echoes her subject in this manner; later in the chapter she lists without 
pausc the countries from which the victims were taken: 
Departure from France and Ukraine Albania Belgium Slovakia Italy 
I lungary Pcloponnesus I lolland Macedonia Austria Herzegovina from 
the shorcs of the Black Sea the shores of the Mediterranean the banks 
of the Vistula. (5) 
The omission of punctuation appears to crase the borders between the countries 
figurativcly in terms of their presentation on the page, at the same time evoking the 
scnsc of the Europc-widc gcnocidc which swept through national borders without 
pause. In her most sustained passage of cnjambment in this chapter, Delbo describes 
the victims who arrived at the station: 
Somc came from Warsaw wearing large shawls and with tied 
up bundIcs 
somc from Zagreb, the women their heads covered by scarves 
somc from the Danube wearing multicoloured woollen 
swcatcrs knitted through the long night hours 
somc from Greece, they took with them black olives and 
loukoums 
somc came from Monte Carlo 
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they were in the casino (5) 
The passage continues without pause in this fashion for some ftu-ther eleven clauses. 
The fragmentation of these clauses represents the disparate origins of the victims in 
terms of nationality, class and gender, yet through the inclusion of all the victims in 
one long continuous sentence, Delbo acknowledges that despite their diversity they 
are brought together through the experience of persecution. 
Morag Shiach suggests that the most defining feature of icriturefiminine is 
"its proximity to speech" (22), and in this context, Delbo's inclusion in her testimony 
of a transcript of a conversation between two unnamed women assumes a renewed 
signiricancc. Toril Moi declares that "femininity in writing can be discerned in the 
privileging of the voice [ ... ] woman, in other words, is wholly and physical present in 
her voice" (114). The body, the voice and writing are thus intimately connected in the 
practice of icritureflminine. Care must be taken, however, not to interpret this 
relationship between icriturefiminine and speech too literally; whilst Delbo's use of 
a speech transcript certainly cmphasises this relationship, the practice of icriture 
fiminine does not depend upon the inclusion of direct speech in writing. Rather, it 
makes possible a seamless transition from speech to writing in which writing should 
be understood as, -no more than the extension of this self-identical prolongation of 
the speech act" (Moi 114). 
Nicole Thatcher suggests that Dclbo's testimonial writing is characterised by 
a use of poetic language and form, both in her prose and, of course, most explicitly in 
the poems Delbo includes intermittently throughout the text. Thatcher suggests that 
Delbo uses this poctic language, 6'in order to touch the reader by appealing to his or 
her senses so that he or she becomes part of the vision presented, participates in it, is 
cngulfcd by it and does not remain an outsidee'(34). This close relationship between 
writer and reader is, as discussed in the introduction, symptomatic of women's 
writing. The female writcr exceeds the boundaries of the text and enters into a 
relationship with the reader, and as such feminine writing becomes characterised as a 
mutual cndeavour shared between the author and the (female) reader. 
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Yet regarding Delbo's narratives as examples of icriturefiminine potentially 
poses more problems than it solves. As a mode of discourse, icriturefiminine has 
been criticised for its essentialist nature and for elitist posturing which assumes a 
universality offimininitj which applies to all women. Ann Rosalind Jones points out 
that the definition of the relationship between female sexuality, fimininitJ and female 
literary practice is in fact restrictive rather than liberating, and fails to take into 
account the multiple interpretations of sexuality and female identity held by women 
living under different social conditions across the world. She argues: 
What is the meaning of 'two lips' to heterosexual women who want 
men to recognise their clitoral pleasure - or to African or Middle 
Eastern women who, as a result of pharaonic clitoridectornies, have 
neither lips nor clitoris through which tojouir? [ ... ] And it is hard to 
see how the situations of old women, consigned to sexual inactivity 
because of their age, or if they are widowed, to unpaid work in others' 
families or to isolated poverty can be understood or changed through a 
concept ofjouissance. (378) 
The problematic assumption that ecriturefiminine can offer a voice to all woman is 
intensified in the context of women's Holocaust narratives such as Delbo's. Ecriture 
fiminine represents a connection to and celebration of the female body. Yet does this 
maintain any currency in a representation of the female body subjected to suffering 
and deprivation: can such a body be considered as a site for textual celebration? How 
can the female sexual organs and sexuality be celebrated by women who lived in fear 
of sexual abuse and barbaric gynaecological experimentation? For Cixous the 
practice of writing as a woman is bound up with the relationship with the mother. The 
mother figure in Cixous's writing, whilst not necessarily being a representation of a 
literal biological relationship, is a symbol of nurturing and nourishment that protects 
the women writer from separation from herself. She is integral to writing as a woman: 
"There is always within her [the female writer] at least a little of that good mother's 
milk. She writes in white ink" (Cixous 25 1). Yet what does it mean to write as a 
mother's daughter when the mother has been murdered in the gas chamber? The 
glorification of motherhood is also out of place in a context where the state of 
motherhood jeopardised the possibility of survival or when the fear of infertility 
plagued the female prisoner. 
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Delbo's writing, I would then argue, emanates not from a sensibility of 
icriturefiminine, but rather from one of trauma. Her style is influenced not so much 
by her experiences as a woman as by her experiences as a victim of the Holocaust. 
The stylistic traits that could be identified as those belonging to icriturefiminine in 
fact belong to trauma narratives. It is in this reading of her work that Delbo's 
assertion that "I must not be considered as a woman in my writing" begins to make 
sense. 
The combination of stylistic fluidity and fragmentation in "Arrivals, 
Departures" is perhaps best understood not in the context of icriturefeminine but 
rather as representative of the constant tension between the urge to 'tell the tale' 
which constantly pushes the text forward, and the inability to fulfil this narrative 
impulse, as discussed in chapter two. The fragmentation of her testimonial account as 
a whole, in terms of its non-linear narrative and frequent changes in narrative form 
and style, is symptomatic once again not of icriturefiminine, but of the testimonial 
genre as described in this thesis, whereby chaotic style can function as a reflection of 
chaotic experience. 
The most significant failure of icriturefiminine as a descriptive for Delbo's 
testimony becomes apparent in a consideration of Delbo's representation of the self. 
"Woman must put herself into the text, " declares Cixous, yet for Delbo there is no 
stable sense of self that can be inscribed in the text (245). In Days and Memor 
Delbo asserts that "I feel that the one who was in the camp is not me, is not the 
person who is here, facing you today. [ ... ]I live within a twofold being" (4). She can 
locate no point of identity, no continuity between the self that experienced 
Auschwitz, and her post-Auschwitz self, and thus her body in inhabited by two 
distinct selves that live alongside each other, yet are unrecognisable to each other. As 
discussed in chapter one, this representation of the self as permanently divided as a 
consequence of experiencing trauma is a characteristic feature of testimonial 
literature. Yet in "The Measure of Our Days" written prior to Days and Mei 
Delbo goes further than representing her self as divided, and claims instead that "I'm 
not alive. I died in Auschwitz and no one knows if' (Auschwitz and After 267). 
Delbo is at once, then, both selves and no-self. In the fragmenting of the self, or 
201 
perhaps more precisely the absence of a self, that is anchored to the body, the practice 
of ecriturefiminine is an impossibility for Delbo. 
Yet making such a distinction between the sensibility of women's writing and 
the sensibility of trauma writing may in itself be a false endeavour. When reading 
Holocaust testimonies, gender should be understood as linked to the experience of 
trauma as discussed in section 3.2 of this chapter. Accordingly, Delbo is writing from 
a double perspective, as a woman and as a survivor of trauma. This suggests the 
emergence of a new form of writing, which could be appropriately termed holocauste 
flininine. The recognition of such a style would make possible the identification of 
women's Holocaust narratives as distinct from men's in terms of style and content, 
and allows an understanding of the way in which Delbo's narrative skilfully blends a 
poetics of gender with a poetics of trauma. 
Yet an initial focus through the lens of icriturefiminine can be helpful when 
approaching women's testimonies. Ann Rosalind Jones suggests that a more helpful 
way of reading Cixous' icriturefeminine is "to recognise it as a conscious response 
to socioliterary realities" (380). In this way, it becomes possible to identify a style of 
writing that is specific to women, but does not attempt to universalise a relationship 
between body and text common to all women. Understandings of the distinctive 
nature of women's writing should thus be contextualised in accordance with their 
provenance. Comparisons between testimonial literature by female Holocaust 
survivors and female hibakusha, then, should not be undertaken on the basis of a 
unified theory of women's writing. A focus on the experiences of the female body 
and the impact of trauma on femininity is shared by female writers from the 
Holocaust and Hiroshima, but any identification of common thematic concerns 
should be tempered with an acknowledgement of historical and cultural specificities 
unique to each event; unique indeed to each individual author. 
3.4 Writing the Female Experience of the A-bomb 
The tradition of women's literature has taken a very different path in Japan as 
compared to Europe. Rather than being marginalised in literary history, as the writing 
of women is often perceived to be in European history, Japanese women's writing 
developed as a different yet arguably equal tradition alongside men's writing. Joan 
202 
Ericson suggests that the emergence of a distinct form of women's writing can be 
traced back to the Heian period (8th- I Oth century), a period which witnessed a 
weakening of the prevailing Chinese cultural influences in Japan, and the emergence 
of a distinctly Japanese culture. A significant aspect of this cultural shift was the 
introduction of two Japanese syllabaries, derived from Chinese script - katakana and 
hiragana These were both used alongside the existing kanji which had been adopted 
from Chinese script. At this time, levels of literacy amongst the general population 
were very low, and the practice of writing was primarily if not fully confined to the 
Imperial court and religious authorities. Court convention dictated that men wrote 
formal, official and public documents in kanji and katakana, whereas women wrote 
more personal and impressionistic works of literature written almost exclusively in 
hiragana. Writing in hiragana required no knowledge of kanji, and as women did not 
have access to the same level of education as men they had little choice but to write 
primarily in hiragana Very rapidly then, hiragana became identified specifically as 
women's writing (onnade, literally translated as 'woman's hand') and katakana and 
kanji as men's writing (onode). Although by the tenth century, hiragana had become 
much more widely used by men as well as women, it even now retains its onnade 
sensibility. Literary culture during the Heian period was dominated by women's 
hiragana writing, and was characterised by an evocative and emotional style which 
dwelt on the details of everyday life and reflections on the nature of beauty. The 
intimate relationship between these thematic and stylistic characteristics and 
women's writing endured, and came to inform interpretations of what it means to 
"write as a woman" in Japanese culture. 
By the twentieth century the identification between women's writing and a 
sentimental lyrical style had become firmly entrenched. Ericson explains that 
"attributes presumed to be natural in a woman's voice - sentimental lyricism and 
impressionistic, non-intellectual detailed observations of daily life - were the result of 
a confluence of social and literary trends that in the 1920s crystallised the 
characteristics of a distinct 'woman's style"' (10 1). The early twentieth century 
witnessed a boom in both women's writing and readership due to the social changes 
of the period which saw increasing levels of literacy among the female population, 
and the increased mobilisation of an urban female workforce. However, the existence 
of such a strong female literary tradition did little to offer female writers the 
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opportunity to develop stylistically in a period which was focussed very much on an 
emerging style of literary realism. Whilst women did make significant inroads into 
the genre of the T-novel (autobiographical fiction), they frequently struggled against 
a tradition that dictated female writing to be lyrical and sentimental in style. 
' 
The trauma of the atomic bombings precipitated an intensification of this 
struggle. As discussed previously in this thesis, hibakusha seeking to record their 
eye-witness accounts were hampered by the lack of a native literary tradition that 
could offer a blueprint for trauma narratives. Women were arguably doubly 
challenged, on account of both genre and gender, in terms of the restrictions imposed 
upon them by the onnade tradition. Yet the traditional focus on domesticity and the 
minutiae of daily life actually offered a pathway into writing testimonial literature. 
Women's A-bomb writing is characterised by an almost exclusive emphasis on the 
domestic details of everyday life in the aftermath of the bomb. Themes of illness and 
thwarted attempts at treatment, child-care, relationships with family and friends are 
common, alongside detailed descriptions of the economic hardships of life after the 
bomb. 
John Whittier Treat argues that female hibakusha rapidly developed a 
distinctive testimonial voice, suggesting that women's A-bomb testimony is 
characterised by a "special attention [paid] to the long term disruption of biology, and 
to those cultural and social values linked to biology: fertility, marriages and child- 
bearing - in other words, to the survival of the race" (Gender of Ground Zero 279). 
Treat suggests that these characteristics are so prevailing that they actually come to 
constitute a form of A-bomb icriturefiminine, a form of testimonial literature that is 
inextricably bound up with both social constructions of gender and biological sex, 
both of which are represented in the symbol of motherhood. Yet Treat's consideration 
of women's A-bomb literature as ecriturefiminine is not unproblematic, and actually 
bears little relation to the theories proposed by Cixous and Irigaray. A fundamental 
flaw in Treat's approach is his attempt to define an A-bomb icriturefiminine through 
Whilst a full discussion of the development of women's literary culture in Japan cannot be articulated 
within the constraints of this thesis, a more detailed account can be found in The Woman's Hand: 
Gender and Theory in Japanese Women's Writing. Ed. Paul Gordon Schalow and Janet A Walker. 
Stanford: Stanford UP, 1996. 
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the identification of thematic concerns in women's narratives. This is inconsistent 
with Cixous' understanding of icriturefiminine, firstly because the very act of 
definition contradicts the concept of writing as a woman, and secondly because it 
posits content rather than an unmediated relationship between body and text as the 
dominating characteristic of ecriturefiminine. Furthermore, by suggesting that 
women's A-bomb literature can be defined as icriturefiminine on the basis that it 
recounts personal female experience, Treat makes explicit a link between the sex of 
the author and the practice of ecriturefiminine, a connection that Cixous strenuously 
objects to. 
Yet there are wider problems with attaching the appellation of ecriture 
fiminine to women's A-bomb literature, many of which echo those discussed above 
in relation to Delbo's Holocaust testimony. For example, the experience and narration 
of trauma problematises the nature of the relationship between the body and the text 
assumed by icriturefiminine; in this context, can the irradiated female body be 
considered as a site for textual celebration? A further challenge to the description of 
women's A-bomb testimony as a form of icriturefiminine is the extent to which a 
theory bom out of a philosophy of Western culture can be considered relevant to 
writings by women from the Far East. 
Preferable to Treat's attempt to define women's A-bomb literature as a form 
of dcriturefiminine is an attempt to identify shared thematic and stylistic concerns 
expressed by women through an exploration of their testimonial narratives. 
Images of Motherhood and the Rhetoric of War and Peace 
Motherhood may have been a symbol of peace in peacetime, but 
during the war it was mobilised as a symbol in the execution of war. 
(Ueno 169) 
Ueno Chizuko has written persuasively on the way in which contradictory 
images of motherhood have been mobilised for the purposes of both war and peace. 
Wartime Japan venerated the position of women as mothers, creating what Ueno 
refers to as a "strategy of segregation7 in gender politics (43). She locates within this 
strategy the beginnings of Japanese feminist discourse, in that women were granted a 
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status as equal yet different to men. The role of women in wartime Japan was defined 
in the rhetoric of war, which termed them as "reproductive warriors" and "warriors in 
the economic war" (44). According to these roles, it was expected that women would 
perform a dual role as key workers in the wartime mobilisation of labour in the 
absence of men, and more significantly as the bearers of children. The creation of the 
Ministry of Welfare in 1938 led to the passing of legislation to enshrine the position 
of women as mothers in Japanese society. Motherhood moved from the private to the 
public sphere, as population growth became a political concern. 1940 saw the 
instigation of awards for Excellent Families with Many Children, awarded to women 
who had borne ten or more children. In 1941, the Outline for the Establishment of a 
Policy on Population laid out plans stating that the population should "increase by 
approximately 27 million over the next twenty years, reaching 100 million by 1960" 
(qtd. in Ueno 44). The development of Japan became a burden placed firmly on the 
shoulders - the wombs - of Japanese women. 
Ueno draws parallels between this situation in Japan and the role of women in 
European wartime totalitarian states. She argues that the strategy of segregation and 
the focus on motherhood dominated gender politics in both fascist Italy and Nazi 
Germany, constructed as an appreciation of "manly men and womanly women"(43). 
In the context of Nazi Germany, she argues that the existence of the "death factories 
[created] to exterminate 'inferior races' [ ... I made it possible to imagine 
6reproductive factories' employing birth control" (47). Certainly, Nazi ideology 
venerated motherhood and the family in a way similar to Japan, promoting it in both 
ideology and legislation. Abortions were illegal for German women, and 
contraception was outlawed. Women with large families were awarded the Mother's 
Cross for services to the Reich at either bronze, silver or gold level. Bearing a large 
family was perceived as an act of patriotism, as Wilhelmine Haferkamp, who was 
awarded the gold Mother's Cross after the birth of her tenth child, recalls in her 
testimony of the war years: 
When one had ten children, well, not ten, but a pile of them, one 
should join the [Nazi] party; '33 it was, nicht? I already had three 
children and the fourth on the way. [ ... ] Ja, what else could my 
husband do? They joined the Party, nicht? There was nothing else we 
could do. I got thirty marks per child from the Hitler government, 
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came every month, and twenty marks from the city of Oberhausen. 
Was fifty marks per child. That was a lot of money. I sometimes got 
more (child money' [Kindergeld] than my husband earned. [ ... ] With 
a lot of children you also had a lot of ration cards, nicht? And there 
were cards for cooking, flour cards, all of that. (19) 
Here, Haferkamp makes explicit a link between political Nazism and motherhood. 
Yet her testimony also reveals a certain reluctance to join the Nazi party, and she 
represents her and her husband's decision to join more as a consequence of the 
financial rewards it brought to motherhood, rather than because of any significant 
political leanings. This reluctance to subscribe to Nazi ideology is bome out in the 
remainder of her testimony in which she describes the way in which she used her 
extra food rations to feed enemies of the state, the slave labourers working on a 
construction site near her home. Significantly, these were non-Jewish enemies; to aid 
Jews would have been a far more dangerous task. Even so, she recalls that she was 
under the threat of being denounced for her actions. %ilst Haferkamp recalls that 
she was proud to receive the Mother's Cross, she was unhappy with the burden of 
motherhood that was placed on her: 
At the time, when you were going to have a child and you didn't want 
to, the word always was, 'Better ten on the pillow than one on your 
conscience. ' ... ] When you had a child you were praised, honoured, 
esteemed. [ ... I did not want so many children [ ... 1 [11 would tremble for weeks, I hope I get my period, I hope I get my period, I said 'I was 
pregnant before I knew it. ' That is fact. I did not want so many 
children. (27-28) 
The propaganda that venerated motherhood is exposed as oppressive and 
manipulative by Haferkamp in her testimony. Her professed desire to have fewer 
children was denied by a society she understands as having valued motherhood over 
womanhood. In repeating the watchword that one child was a burden on the 
conscience of a woman, Haferkamp implicitly affirms that motherhood was a 
political act in wartime, in which the individual choice of a woman to become a 
mother or not are subsumed by a greater rhetoric of patriotism. 
An exploration of Japanese women's testimonies of the period reveals that 
similarly that whilst the condition of motherhood may have been venerated on a 
public, political level, the lot of the individual woman was very different. 
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Motherhood itself was not intrinsically valued; rather, as Ueno points out, "the family 
itself was the stronghold where the masculinity of the soldiers of the Imperial Army 
was defined" (48). According to this rhetoric of matemalism, women are taken out of 
the equation, and the emphasis is placed on the value of the male soldiers that she 
produces. Sara Ruddick develops this further and argues that "misogyny is a useful 
element in the making of a soldier, as boys are goaded into turning on and grinding 
down whatever in themselves is 'womanly"' (77). To interpret this through Cixous' 
theory of the binary, it can be seen that the role of women is that of the other, against 
which masculinity can be clearly defined. The role of femininity - symbolised by 
motherhood - is to be the foil against which masculinity can be constructed. Such an 
interpretation serves to marginalise the role of women and exposes that which Ueno 
refers to as the "dark side" of the maternal experience (48). 
Nishimoto Setsuko describes the harsh reality of bringing up eight children in 
Japan after her marriage in 1919 in her testimony "We were an odd couple, but... " 
Her testimony appears in a collection entitled Widows of Hiroshima: The Life Stories 
of Nineteen Peasant Wives. The testimonies featured are transcripts of oral interviews 
conducted by the editor, Kanda Mikio. Kanda's presence as a mediator between the 
body and the text further refutes in this instance Treat's view that women's A-bomb 
testimony constitutes a form of ecriturefiminine. 
According to tradition, her parents arranged her marriage to a man she had 
never met who was nine years her senior. As a young wife, her position in society 
was not cemented until she became a mother, and Nishimoto writes that she cannot 
remember the date of her wedding because "in those days, they didn't put you in the 
family register until you had a baby" (2). She recalls her marriage as unhappy, 
characterising her husband as a "tyrant, " describing him as: 
a heavy drinker and a very hard man to live with. Even when I was 
suckling the baby, he would hurry me up and say 'Get back to work 
quickly! ' But however much I tried to hurry, babies don't drink that 
fast. I used to really get in a sweat. (2) 
There is little evidence in Nishimoto's testimony of the honour apparently accorded 
to mothers. Whilst she never directly refers to the politically sanctioned relationship 
between motherhood and the war effort, she does bear witness to the difficulty she 
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had reconciling her duty as a "reproductive warrior" and a "warrior in the economic 
war": 
I brought up eight kids, so it was nothing but work, work, work. [ ... ] 
With so many kids I had a really hard time of it. My whole life has 
been a penance. I had one child after another, so with the baby 
strapped on my back, I'd rear any number of silkworms and do all the 
otherjobs. By day, I'd work my heart out in the fields and at night I'd 
be busy grinding grain. [ ... ] There was never a night that I went to bed 
without doing some work first. (3) 
Whilst her husband was not a soldier, he did work away from the home in a factory 
in Hiroshima, leaving Nishimoto to provide for the family alone. Her resentment of 
him is made clear in her testimony when she complains that whilst she worked so 
hard, "all he ever did was pass the time of day with the neighbours and pop in here 
and there to drink saki" (4). As she represents her life, it seems that Nishimoto 
personally had little involvement with the larger political situation that saw her 
condemned to such a harsh way of life. She recalls cutting up a kimono to make 
monpe trousers on the order of the Women's National Defence Association, "or 
whatever it was called" (4). Yet whilst she fails to acknowledge it explicitly, by 
bearing children who were all compelled to play their part in the war effort, she 
fulfilled her role as a "reproductive warrior. " Her eldest son, Shigeto was enlisted as 
a soldier, and was killed in battle in 1943. Her second son, Yoshiaki, was taken to 
work in the Clothing Depot in Kure, and her third son, Akio, worked in the 
Mitsubishi Shipyard. Her fourth son, Morito, was sent to Manchuria with the Youth 
Volunteer Corps, and her eldest daughter, Taeko, was sent to work in the Clothing 
Depot in Yoshijima when the high school pupils were mobilised. Her remaining 
three children stayed with her, too young to be of any use in the war. 
Her husband failed to return from work in Hiroshima after the A-bomb was 
dropped, and fearing the worst she and her son Akio went to the city to try and 
recover his body. Within her description of this journey, her otherwise coherent 
narration begins to falter, signalled in the text by the presence of ellipses. Of her 
close neighbour whose husband was also missing, she writes "I heard later that Mrs 
Nomura set off straightaway, but her husband was already dead... "(6). This form of 
pause in the narration, unusual in A-bomb testimonies as discussed in the previous 
chapter, suggests the presence of a commemorative silence for Mr Nomura. She 
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follows this ellipsis with another in the next paragraph at a point where language 
falls short of the possibility of description: "We peered into the air-raid shelters too. 
They were full of dead bodies piled up. They were all charred you know... " (6). 
They were unable to find his body, and as time progressed, she learned that at the 
time the bomb fell, he would have been at roll call on the Aioi Bridge. His survival 
would have been impossible. 
In common with many A-bomb testimonies, Nishimoto completes her 
account with a plea for peace. She asserts her position as a storyteller, citing her 
fears that: 
Youngsters today seem to think that if war broke out, it would be 
exciting. [ ... ] They don't know what war means. They didn't live 
through the hard times of the war, so it seems to them that war is 
exciting and something flashy. I tell my children and my 
grandchildren just what it was like during the war. War musn't happen 
again. (10) 
In stating that she speaks to her children and her grandchildren about her experiences 
of war, Nishimoto is unwittingly reclaiming motherhood and the family from their 
wartime functions, and imbuing them with the rhetoric of peace. She is utilising 
family structure to communicate a message of peace, and in doing so presents a 
reversal of the relationship between motherhood and war. 
Yoneyama argues that the trope of motherhood was reconfigured in the post- 
bomb years to become representative of peace (193). Sentimental assumptions about 
the maternal proliferated, and the condition of motherhood became synonymous 
with peace, innocence, victimhood and compassion. The bond between mother and 
child was especially venerated, as revealed in the testimony of Ogura Toyofumi. 
Entitled Letters from the End of the World, Ogura, structures his testimony as a 
series of letters written to his wife, Fumiyo, who was killed in the attack on 
Hiroshima. Published in 1948, this was the first eye-witness account to emerge from 
the atomic bombings. In letter five, Ogura recounts seeing a desperate woman 
running through the streets searching for her lost child, and reflects: 
210 
I was filled with a keen awareness of the intensity of the bond between 
a mother and her child. I began to think that rather than being purely 
spiritual in nature, such feelings seem to have physiological and 
primitive or even animalistic origins. (65) 
Ogura's identification of the matemal instinct as biological in origin captures the 
prevailing sentiments about motherhood in post-war Japan. The matemal instinct is 
understood to be natural, and as such, suggests Yoneyama, stands in direct 
opposition to "modernity, science, and technology"(1 96), which subsequently 
become identified with masculinity and maleness in an essentialist gendercd 
discourse which recalls Cixous' Culture/Nature, Male/Fcmale binary relation. At the 
heart of this matemally-oriented memorial discourse is the understanding that the 
fundamental crime of the atomic bombings was the destruction of the natural bond 
between mother and child. Recurring frequently throughout A-bomb testimony by 
both men and women is the tale of the mother who was force to abandon her child in 
order to save her own life. Ogura recounts just such a tale in letter four of his 
testimony (Letters 50-5 1), as does Hiroshima survivor Hiratsuka Shige. In 
Hiratsuka's testimony, "A Voice from the Flames, " she narrates the experience of 
having to abandon her own child. The force of the bomb blast levelled her home, and 
her six year old daughter, Kazuko, became trapped under the debris. Unable to free 
her child, Hiratsuka had little option but to flee as flames drew closer and closer to 
them, and she writes "I realised I was afraid to die. I could not let myself be burned 
alive. Tears streaming from my eyes, I placed my hands together and asked my 
daughter to forgive me" (142). It is this unbearable memory that continues to haunt 
Hiratsuka throughout the rest of her life. Towards the end of her testimony, she 
writes that despite her grief, "I want to continue living as a memorial to my dead 
[ ... ] children7' (145). This identification of the maternal body as a physical site for 
remembrance plays a key role in A-bomb memorial discourse. Hiroshima survivor 
Fujioki Michiko explains that her decision to have a baby some years after the war 
was motivated by her "duty to keep alive the horror of the atomic bomb" (189). 
The trope of motherhood potentially gave women a privileged platform from 
which to speak about the horrors of atomic warfare and campaign for peace. Indeed, 
it could be said that whereas "Holocaust memory has been shaped most decisively 
[ ... ] by men, " the memory of the atomic bombings has been influenced most 
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significantly by the voices of mothers (Rittner and Roth 38). Yet this memorial 
discourse is not unproblematic. Whilst ostensibly centralising motherhood and 
maternal sacrifice, Yoneyama suggests that it actually "erases disturbing knowledge 
about women's bodies" (197). Absent from the dominant memorial discourse, she 
argues, is the representation of "abnormalities associated with childbirth, including 
infertility, miscarriage, deformity, stillbirth, and newborns developing leukaemia 
and other health disorders" (197). Also neglected, of course, are the experiences of 
women who were not mothers. It would be more accurate to claim, then, that atomic 
bomb memory is shaped not by women's voices, but by an idcalised interpretation of 
motherhood. Whilst it is impossible to make generalisations about the role that 
women"s A-bomb narrative play in supporting or unden-nining this cclebratory 
representation of the maternal, a notable feature in many women's testimonies is the 
narrative recollection of the experience of traurnatised, rather than idealised, 
motherhood. From a testimonial perspective, from the perspective of the actual 
rather than idealised mother, the forced abandonment of a child is not a symbol of 
the conflict between feminine peace and masculine violence; it is the trauma of the 
loss of a child. 
Also excised from the dominant memorial discourse are the experiences of 
scarring and the disfigurement of the female body. Women's testimonies frequently 
bear witness to the trauma of disfigurement, and the impact it had upon their sense 
of femininity. The significant exceptions to this rule are the "Hiroshima Maidens". 
The Hiroshima Maidens were twenty-five young women, notably not mothers, who 
had been left with terrible keloids after being exposed to the Hiroshima bomb. In a 
significant departure from the ABCC's official non-treatment policy, as outlined in 
chapter one, these women were selected to be taken to America for reconstructive 
surgery. The Hiroshima Maidens enterprise was widely publicised both in Japan and 
America, yet the spotlight was arguably not on the disfigured women themselves, 
but on the symbolism of such a gesture as a sign of reconciliation between the two 
countries. The Maidens themselves interpreted their experiences somewhat 
differently. Yamaoka Michiko was one of the twenty-five, and recalls in her 
testimony: 
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When I went to America I had a deep hatred toward America. I asked 
myself why they ended the war by a means which destroyed human 
beings. When I talked about how I suffered, I was often told, 'Well, 
you attacked Pearl Harbour! ' I didn't understand much English then, 
and it's probably just as well. From the American point of view, they 
dropped that bomb in order to end the war faster, in order to create 
more damage faster. But it's inexcusable to hann human beings in this 
way. (387) 
Yamaoka's testimony reveals that she found little sympathy in America. Her 
interpretation of the American attitude suggests that just as the atomic bomb was 
recognised as an effective remedy to end the war, so the Hiroshima Maidens were 
seen as an effective remedy to heal the residual wounds of war. Yet the physical 
wounds of the individual women were largely marginalised in a celebratory rhetoric 
that focussed on healing rather than acknowledging the trauma caused by 
disfigurement. 
There is, then, a significant gap between women's experiences as represented 
in the conventions of atomic bomb memory and in their own testimonial accounts of 
their experiences. In order to identify the realities of the female experience of the 
atomic bombings, it is necessary to engage with their testimonial voices. 
"Something has to be sacrificed: 11 The Testimony of Tada Makiko 
Yoneyama suggests that women's testimonial narratives are characterised by 
a dominating motif of self-sacrifice in which women are primarily configured as 
mothers who are, "devoted, persevering women who aid in their children's recovery 
and who agonize over lost families" (196). This description suggests that women 
combine the representation of idealised and traumatised motherhood in their 
testimonial accounts. This approach is certainly apparent in the testimony of Tada 
Makiko, "My Husband Does Not Return. " The reference to her absent husband in the 
title identifies her testimony as an account of loss, not only of her husband, but of the 
consequent loss of her own self-identity as a wife. As a single mother, she 
experienced significant economic hardship and was doubly stigmatised in a culture 
that discriminated against single mothers and hibakusha. Contrary to assumptions 
that may be drawn from the title of her testimony, Tada's husband did not die in the 
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atomic attack; rather, he got ajob with a travelling circus and abandoned his family in 
195 1. Tada suffered increasingly from ill health throughout her life, and towards the 
end of her testimony she reveals that friends suggested that she should formally 
divorce her husband and give him full custody of their children, "but, " she explains, 
"I have brought them up until today because I never felt like parting with them" 
(18 0). Whilst her reluctance to part with her children is undoubtedly attributable to 
her maternal instincts, the surrendering of her children would mean a figurative 
surrendering of her identity as a mother. If, as early critics of female autobiography 
such as Jelinek and Bratton argue, women's identity is constructed through social 
relationships with others, then Tada's loss of identity as wife and mother potentially 
compromises her sense of self as a gendered individual. Her chosen title, then, 
represents not only an indication of the content of her testimony, but also bears 
witness to the way in which the experience of the atomic bomb has compromised - 
sacrificed - her sense of self The self as represented in Tada's narrative is doubled 
into a distinct gendered self and sexed selL Tada reveals each of these selves to have 
different concerns in the aftermath, and the representation of each self is 
characterised by the adoption of different narrative styles. 
Tada contributed her account of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima to a 
collected volume of testimonies, The Atomic Bomb: Voices From Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in 1989. At the time the A-bomb was dropped Tada was 39 years old, and 
living in Hiroshima with her husband and son, Mutsuzumi. Her husband, who 
remains unnamed in her narrative, worked for the Electric Railroad Company during 
the war, and their accommodation was provided by his employers. In 1945, both Tada 
and her husband began working for the Ministry of Communications, winding wire 
on drums. As a woman, Tada was paid only half of her husband's wage and received 
fifteen yen a day for her work. In addition to this, Tada also worked for the wartime 
ration distribution committee, as well as taking care of their son and the home. On the 
morning of August 6 she was walking to work at the warehouse with Mutsuzumi, and 
was outside when the bomb fell. Tada recalls, "the moment there was the flash, it felt 
as if thickly mixed paint was thrown at me, and I thought that heaven had falleW' 
(173). Although they survived, both Tada and her son were badly injured in the 
explosion, and Tada received severe bums to half of her body. Her husband was 
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already at work in the warehouse, and was protected from the force of the blast by the 
building. 
Tada's testimony is characterised by an emphasis on the effects of trauma on 
the female body. Indeed, she explicitly describes her injuries within the context of 
female bodily experiences, writing, "my chest was burning, my stomach ached like I 
was in labour" (174). Her experience of pregnancy and motherhood in the aftermath 
of the atomic bomb forms a key part of her narrative. Failing to have made a good 
recovery by February 1946, Tada visited a doctor only to be told that unbeknownst to 
her she had been pregnant and suffered a miscarriage. She became pregnant again 
shortly after receiving this news, and endured a difficult pregnancy. She gave birth to 
a healthy daughter, Masumi, in November 1946 but immediately faced further 
problems with breastfeeding. She was unable to nurse her child, and eventually was 
given an operation. "According to my doctor, " she writes, "when my chest was burnt 
by the atomic bomb, most of my mammary glands became plugged so that even 
though milk was produced when the child was born, it had no exit and that gave me a 
hard time" (177). Her simple comment that she had "a hard time" would seem to be a 
significant understatement of her experience, but is characteristic of the detached 
style Tada adopts in this section of her narrative which marginalises the 
representation of maternal trauma. Whilst she describes her medical condition in 
some detail, Tada offers no account of any personal anxieties and fears about her 
difficult pregnancy and inability to breastfeed. Indeed, the only indication that she 
suffered any concerns at all comes through her admission that, "my husband and 
midwife only scolded me, saying, 'How you fass, ' and they didn't take me seriously" 
(176). Tada's concerns are thus doubly silenced; contemporaneously by her husband 
and midwife, and later by her own narratorial persona, perhaps for fear that she once 
again would not be taken seriously. 
Tada suffered a further miscarriage after the birth of Masumi, but gave birth 
to another daughter, Kosumi, in 1949. Abandoned by her husband in 195 1, Tada was 
left alone to provide and care for her three children. She writes extensively on the 
hardships of her situation, and represents herself in accordance with Yoneyama's 
image of the 'devoted and persevering woman. ' Despite suffering from serious ill 
health as a consequence of her exposure to the bomb, manifested in the form of 
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frequent heavy bleeding and pains in her chest and back, Tada was forced to 
undertake arduous labour in order to support her family. She was fortunate to receive 
minimal welfare payments from the government, but had to supplement this income 
first by collecting rubbish and later by working at the sewerage plant under the 
auspices of the unemployment relief bureau. Tada recounts an incident that took 
place whilst she was working there, when her supervisor beat her violently for an 
imagined infraction of workplaces ethics, claiming falsely that she had submitted a 
formal letter complaining about her low wages: 
Since he was six feet tall and well built, with a judo certificate, my 
body really felt it when I was twisted down. I had bad bleeding at the 
worksite, lost consciousness when I came home, and faintly came to 
when my child fetched a doctor. Because of this, I am still unwell. 
(179). 
Whilst this is the only passage in Tada's testimony which describes such violent 
aggression towards her, her narrative is characterised by an essentialist discourse 
which presents her own maternal caring attitude in contrast to male hostility towards 
her and her children. Male figures in the text almost invariably occupy positions of 
authority over Tada and hold a set of values polarised to her own. In the moments 
immediately following the A-bomb explosion, she describes her husband rushing not 
to help her and their son, but to their home in order to try and rescue their 
possessions. She writes, "my husband said we would be in trouble if we didn't get 
our money out, even a little. I said, forget the money, let's go the doctor's, what good 
will it do if our child and I lose our lives? " (174). Following her husband's refusal to 
help her, she appealed to a soldier for assistance, but he too refused, on the grounds 
that "I wasn't the only injured person. I felt sorry for my child and put him on my 
back as I crawled on the road" (175). Her vulnerability is emphasised through her 
description of the way in which she crawled along the ground, and implicitly reflects 
the difference in social status between herself and the male soldier. On reaching the 
doctor, help is once again refused and she recalls that she: 
asked to be examined, but he flatly refused. "At least take a look at 
this child. Please put mercurochrome on him, leftovers from what 
you've used for others is fine. It'll comfort him, " I begged from the 
bottom of my heart but the doctor declined even that. (176) 
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In each instance, it seems that for Tada the most shocking aspect of the mens' 
behaviour is their refusal to help her son, so at odds is it with her own maternal 
instincts as a woman. This motif of male hostility, or at least indifference, in contrast 
to female maternal compassion ties into the wider discourse of A-bomb remembrance 
that identifies mothers with peace and men with militaristic violence. 
In Tada's narrative, however, her resentment towards the war emerges not 
from her experience as a mother, but from the trauma of disfiguration. Physical 
disfiguration represents, for Tada, a loss of her femininity which she understands to 
be intrinsically linked to her aesthetic appearance. Tada recounts that as a young 
woman she was chosen to be a finalist in a Tokyo beauty contest, for which she was 
awarded a ruby ring. Her obvious pride in her beauty, symbolic of her femininity, 
was shattered when she was left permanently scarred on her face and body following 
the bums she received during the atomic explosion. In a poignant passage, Tada 
recalls the first time she realised the extent of her disfigurement: 
On our way home [from the hospital], some children playing at the 
roadside ran home crying at the sight of me and looked at me through 
the window, terrified. I myself felt how dreadful I looked then, and I 
resented the war all the more. I thought that we should make this the 
very last war, construct a peaceful era, and save children from going 
through such sorrow. (176) 
Here, Tada is protesting the war not in terms of her identity as a reproductive woman, 
but rather in terms of her compromised femininity. Throughout her description of her 
pregnancies, miscarriages and problems with breastfeeding, at no point does Tada 
express any resentment towards the war. It is only at this point, when she fully 
appreciates the loss of her beauty and femininity for the first time, that she articulates 
her bitterness towards war. In doing so, she is reacting against the dominant 
collective discourse of A-bomb memory, as described by Yoneyama, which roots 
women's objection to war in their experience of motherhood. Tada's narrative is not 
exceptional in this approach; indeed, many women's A-bomb testimonies reveal that 
the loss of signifiers. of femininity is central to their anti-war sentiments. In her 
testimony, The Epitaph in my Heart Kubo Mitsue, a Nagasaki hibakusha, recalls 
visiting a female friend, who she names only as S-san in order to protect her identity, 
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some months after the bomb was dropped. As a result of being exposed to radiation, 
S-san had lost all of her hair. Kubo writes: 
I perceived in her moumful, stem look her grief at having been 
deprived entirely of her black hair, symbol of her female beauty. I saw 
in her eyes a cursing condemnation of the inexcusable cruelty of the 
atomic bomb. (62) 
Through centralising the trauma of lost femininity in their narratives, women's 
testimonies frequently undermine the dominating memorial discourse of the atomic 
bomb which identifies the experience of motherhood as the central feature of 
women's experiences. Yet despite her rejection of the experience of motherhood as 
the primary influence on her resentment towards the war, Tada still frames her call 
for peace within a rhetoric of motherhood and maternal compassion which calls for 
the protection of children. 
Tada believes that her disfigurement may have been the reason that she was 
abandoned by her husband, and writes: 
In those days, things were still scarce, there was no wine to drink, few 
women were beautiful and maybe because of that my husband called 
me Makiko, Makiko, and cared for me, a woman with spots in both 
eyes, worse keloid scars than others, skin stuck right on the raw flesh 
around the shoulders, and only a little bit of the original skin colour 
left on the abdomen. (177) 
Tada recalls with affection the early years after the bomb when her husband cared for 
her, calling her by a pet name, despite her terrible appearance. Yet underlying these 
memories is her surety that he remained with her not for love (for how could he love 
such a woman, she implies), but simply because there was no temptation for him to 
leave her. She suggests that his eventual abandonment of her was inevitable once the 
austerity of the post-war years eased. Lifton defines Japanese culture as placing 
"great stress upon aesthetic presentation and 'appearance' in every sense, " and it 
seems that these cultural values influenced Tada's belief that the loss of her 
femininity devalued her worth as a wife (Death in Life 185). 
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In contrast to the detached style of narration she adopts when writing 
about her experiences of pregnancy, Tada's account of her disfigurement is 
characterised by a focus on her emotional responses. Indeed, the change in style 
seems to suggest that she experiences a greater degree of trauma at the effects 
of the A-bomb on her feminine gender identity than her female sex identity. 
Tada recounts an incident when she was told not to attend her local bathhouse, 
as other customers were complaining about her presence. The owner of the 
bathhouse said to her, "if you get in the bath, even customers who are thinking 
of taking time to wash their hair [for an extra fee] quickly leave, saying it's 
unpleasant, it's ugly, so I want you to refmin from coming to our batW' (179). 
Tada's feeling of painful humiliation is evoked in the text: 
That time, if at no other, heartfelt tears really came out, and it touched 
my nerves for a while so I couldn't sleep nights. Had my body become 
that ugly? When I realised it, I never even once went back to that 
bathhouse. (179) 
The tears and anxieties that are silenced in her account of the impact of the A-bomb 
on her female reproductive body are freely expressed in this passage that focuses on 
her lost femininity. In Tada's narrative, tmumatised femininity is narrated 
sub . ectively with a full account of her emotional response to disfigurement. In 
contrast, the traumatised reproductive female body appears as the object of the 
narration. Tada represents herself as being disengaged from the experiences of her 
body; she has to be told that she has suffered a miscarriage, she has to be told that her 
inability to breastfeed is due to her exposure to the bomb. Her own voice, which 
could speak subjectively about her traumatised reproductive body, is silenced. 
Women's testimonies emergent from both the atomic bombings and the 
Holocaust reveal a common focus on experiences specific to the female body and 
representations of traumatised femininity. As such, they challenge dominant 
memorial discourses of each event that have frequently marginalised, or falsely 
idealised in the case of A-bomb memory, the experiences of women. Due to the 
differing literary traditions in each cultural context, stylistic commonalities between 
women's A-bomb and Holocaust testimonies are perhaps harder to identify. As 
discussed, theories such as Cixous' icriturefiminine and those suggested by critics 
of female autobiography, such as Jelinek, are not immediately helpful, and fail to 
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fully account for the way in which women narrate the experience of trauma. 
Nevertheless, shared narrative strategies are suggested through the way in which they 
write their testimonial accounts. The self, for example, is commonly represented in 
terms of relationships to others, be it as a mother, daughter, sister, or, specific to 
Holocaust narratives, in terms of their role in a "camp family". Rather than 
identifying women's testimonial narrative simply as "women's writing", they can be 
more appropriately recognised as a form of trauma narrative. They represent not 
ecriturefiminine, but perhaps ecriture traumatique. 
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Conclusion 
In his conclusion to 'Contrasting Two Survivial Literature: On the Jewish Holocaust 
and the Chinese Cultural Revolution, ' Sheng -Mei Ma suggests that the practice of 
comparing testimonial literatures "offers an insight into one catastrophe in light of 
another" (92). The extent to which an exploration of testimonial accounts emergent 
from different events can offer a privileged access to understanding the experience of 
trauma for the non-survivor is debatable. As Elie Wiesel often reminds us, "he or she 
who did not live through the event will never know it" (Holocaust as Literary 
Inspiratio 7). More accurately, then, it could be argued that developing a critical 
comparative approach to testimonial literature offers an insight into what it means to 
write in a testimonial form. 
Throughout the analysis of the texts discussed in this thesis, one of the most 
significant recurrent themes has been the urge to tell the tale, and a subsequent 
struggle with the demands of representing the experience of trauma. It is this 
relationship between the narrative impulse and the challenges of representation, I 
would argue, that is central to testimonial writing and gives rise to the set of narrative 
strategies and techniques that I have characterised in this thesis as distinct to the 
testimonial genre. A primary concern of chapter one was to identify these strategies 
as distinct from those employed by authors engaged in autobiographical writing 
through an exploration of the autobiographical and testimonial work of Primo Levi 
and Elie Wiesel. This chapter demonstrated that one of the key aspects of testimonial 
genre is the relationship between the narratorial self and the experiential self, and the 
usually unfulfilled struggle to reconcile these two, as evidenced in the writing of 
Levi, Wiesel and Hara Tamiki. Testimonial literature from both the Holocaust and the 
atomic bombings is characterised by a common crisis in the representation of the self. 
As shown in the discussion of the The Witness of Those Two Days project, the crisis 
of self-representation in atomic bomb testimony is also revealed through the struggle 
to represent individual experience, rather than a homogenous hibakusha experience 
common to all survivors. 
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A further key aspect of testimonial writing is the employment of a fractured 
narrative, interrupted by unexpected deviations from a linear chronological 
progression. This disrupted narrative takes a number of forms in different accounts; 
in Hara Tamiki's testimony, for example, the text opens with an account of the 
explosion and ends two days before the bomb was dropped. The testimonies of Ota 
Yoko and Hachiya Michihiko interrupt the progression of the narrative through the 
inclusion of newspaper reports or scientific information. Narratives are also often 
interrupted by switches in genre, Charlotte Delbo's Auschwitz and After-being a key 
example. A fin-ther example of disruption are pauses in the chronological narrative to 
provide narratorial/authorial reflection and comment on past events, common to both 
Holocaust and A-bomb testimonies. These disruptions can be interpreted in part as an 
attempt to miffor the chaos of the traumatic experience in a fractured narrative. They 
can also be viewed as evidence of the struggle to represent experience. 
This struggle is the primary concern of chapter two of this thesis which looks 
specifically at the use of silence as an expressive tool, a central characteristic of 
testimonial writing. Kali Tal has disputed this theory, arguing that it is "Wildly 
Orwellian7to presume that silence can be understood as a fon-n of communication. 
"if speaking is speaking, " she argues, "and silence is speaking, then what possible 
way is there not to testify? "(59). The response to Tal's somewhat simplistic assertion 
lies in acknowledging the context of silence, and the way in which it comes to 
represent an active and expressive presence in testimonial literature. Silence as it is 
configured in testimonial literature takes on a number of forms: failed language and a 
breakdown in the signifier/signified relationship, textual silence in the form of 
ellipses and white spaces on the page, silence as a thematic concern, silence as a 
space in which the dead can be acknowledged as present rather than absent, and 
silence as a form of language. The analysis of A-bomb testimonies revealed that 
silence in these texts is often manifested through the inclusion of scientific data, for 
example, distance from the epicentre, temperature of the bomb etc. These statistics 
are not part of the individual's experience. At the time, they would have had no 
awareness of their distance from the epicentre; indeed the majority had no 
understanding at all of what had befallen them. A common characteristic of A-bomb 
testimony is the falling silent of the narratorial voice, and the insertion of imported 
data to mask the silence of their response to the experience of trauma. VvUlst silence 
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takes on different forms in the narratives discussed in this thesis, I would argue that 
each form stems from a shared struggle to represent the experience of trauma. 
It is important to note that these characteristics of the testimonial genre often 
take different forms in Holocaust and A-Bomb narratives. There is not a simple 
homogeneity of generic rules which can cover all texts emergent from trauma. The 
specificity of each historical event and the differing literary cultures from which these 
accounts emerge deny this possibility. However, what should be acknowledged is that 
whilst the precise nature of these characteristics may differ, they are each evolved 
from the shared problem of bearing witness to the experience of trauma, and it is this 
that offers the strongest definition of a testimonial genre. 
However, as Robert Eaglestone has pointed out, "genre is not just a way of 
writing: it is simultaneously a way of reading. Genres for horizons of understanding, 
interpretation and reading where text, readership and knowledge come togethee, (7). 
The significance of the role of the reader, or listener, has also been acknowledged by 
Dori Laub. As discussed in chapter two of this thesis, Laub argues that the act of 
testimony can only take place in the presence of a second party, a witness to the act of 
testimony. It is through the enabling presence of this secondary witness that the eye- 
witness is able to commit to the act of witness and testimony. Testimony should, 
then, be considered as a genre which has its roots in the mutual responsiveness of 
author and reader. In this way, testimony as a genre demands the active participation 
of the reader in order to bring it into being. Kali Tal, however, has responded to this 
interpretation of testimony as dialogue rather than monologue with hostility. Tal 
argues that critics working from a postmodem perspective adopt a hubristic attitude 
in assuming significance for the reader at the expense of marginalising the voice of 
the survivor. Tal asserts that: 
The survivor herself has disappeared from the picture, reappearing only 
as a device for pushing the listener to self-examination, to allow him to 
participate in the reliving and re-experiencing of the event. (57) 
Her chosen personal pronouns in this extract anticipate the strongly feminist stance of 
her critique and she presents her argument within the confines of an essentialist and 
somewhat reactionary framework which presents women as victims/survivors and 
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men as oppressors, both in terms of the actual event and in terms of bearing witness 
to the event. In this manner, Tal's approach is similar to that expressed by Ruth 
KlOger in her testimonial narrative, as discussed in chapter 3, but like KlOger's it 
should also be treated with caution. It runs the considerable risk of marginalising 
male testimonial voices, and defining testimony and the act of bearing witness as 
feminine. Tal's criticism of the importance of the reader in the testimonial 
relationship also lacks an understanding of the balanced relationship which is 
required between author and reader. Tal presents the relationship as a simple binary - 
it is either the reader or the writer that has authority in the relationship. Eaglestone, 
however, clearly explains that such a power struggle is antithetical to the process of 
engaging with testimony as a reader. He asserts that testimony "demands a way of 
reading which does not consume [texts] through the process of reading" (72). The 
role of the reader is to provide a space for the act of bearing witness, and so make 
testimony possible. In the absence of a reader/listener a survivor cannot testify to the 
experiences - indeed, throughout his texts, Primo Levi repeatedly expresses the fear 
that his desire to bear witness will be defeated through the absence of an audience. 
Whilst Tal's theorising of the relationship between the reader and the author is 
flawed, it is central to her politicised reading of testimonial writing in which she 
seeks to restore power to the survivor. "Bearing witness, " she claims: 
is an aggressive act. It is bom out of a refusal to bow to outside pressure 
to revise or repress experience, a decision to embrace conflict rather than 
conformity, to endure a lifetime of anger and pain rather than to submit 
to the seductive pull of revision and repression. Its goal is change. (7) 
Tal interprets testimonial writing not as an individual response to trauma, but rather 
as part of a wider political act which seeks to empower those who have suffered, and 
induce change through bearing witness. This perspective is very much in line with the 
admonition of "Never Again. " Indeed, a plea for future peace and the prevention of 
such an event happening again is a common feature in many testimonial writings by 
both Holocaust and A-bomb survivors. However, in removing testimony from the 
private sphere of individual experience and situating it within a polemical context, 
Tal risks encouraging exactly that which she criticises in others - obscuring the 
identity and experience of the individual survivor. Perhaps rather than identifying 
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bearing witness as an aggressive act, it would be more appropriate to term it an act of 
resistance. Levi has explicitly described his urge to bear witness as associated with 
his will to survive and tell the tale of his suffering and that of those who did not 
survive. Rather than being understood as a willingness to "embrace conflict, " 
testimonial writing is more commonly thought of by survivors as an attempt at 
catharsis, an attempt to purge the experience of trauma. Whilst this result appears to 
be rarely achieved (as is attested to by survivor-authors) it is nevertheless a need for 
peace rather than conflict that drives the testimonial impulse. 
Having identified relevant features which together can be considered to be 
indicative of a distinct testimonial genre, it is appropriate at this point to consider the 
presence of these narrative characteristics in eye-witness narratives of traumas other 
than the Holocaust and the atomic bombings. 
Extending the Genre of Testimony 
In the context of Holocaust literature, James Young has argued that the struggle to 
represent limit events and experiences has actually had the effect of creating a 
testimonial template which has been adapted by survivors of subsequent traumatic 
events: 
It is ironic that once an event is perceived to be without precedent, 
without adequate analogy, it would in itself become a kind of 
precedent for all that follows: a new figure against which subsequent 
experiences are measured and grasped. (99) 
Whilst Young is specifically referring to Holocaust narratives, the atomic bomb can 
be regarded as equally unprecedented (as discussed in the introduction) and as such 
A-Bomb narratives contribute equally to the creation of a testimonial archetype. If, 
indeed, the idea of a testimonial archetype holds currency, then the conclusions 
drawn in this thesis regarding the narrative strategies which identify the texts 
discussed as belonging to the testimonial genre can be usefully applied to analyses of 
eye-witness accounts emergent from a broader spectrum of traumatic experiences. 
The narrative characteristics that I have identified as common to testimonial accounts 
of both the Holocaust and the atomic bombings can also be recognised in eye witness 
accounts of other tratimatic events. For example, the urgency of the narrative impulse 
and the subsequent struggle to fulfil it is identified by Subarno Chattedi as also 
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characteristic of writing by American Vietnam veterans. He comments that their 
testimonial narratives "reveal a deep, almost pathological desire to bear witness" 
(I 11), but that this desire is frequently thwarted due to the fact that language has been 
"used and abused by war" (8 1). In his account of the Rwandan genocide, We Wish 
To Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families,, Philip 
Gourevitch refers directly to both the Holocaust and the atomic bombings, using an 
existing template in order to communicate the scale of the genocide: 
The dead of Rwanda accumulated at nearly three times the rate of Jewish 
dead during the Holocaust. It was the most efficient mass killing since 
the bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. (3) 
The testimonial genre should not, however, be considered as restricted to those 
who have experienced a historical, public trauma such as war and genocide. Authors 
who seek to represent personal suffering in a private sphere have also drawn on 
narrative strategies common to testimonial writing. Rachel Falconer has identified 
testimonial characteristics in contemporary mental illness narratives, noting in 
particular the way in which personal experience is often reflected in the structure of 
the narrative. "Memoirs about depression, " she argues, "can be 'difficult, ' 
'demanding, ' 'self-involved' and 'self indulgent, ' all characteristics that are 
symptomatic of depressive illness" (118). This relationship between experience and 
narrative structure is a feature of many Holocaust and A-bomb testimonies, where 
fragmented narrative styles function to echo the chaos of the traumatic experience. 
Falconer also pays close attention to the way in which the experience of mental 
illness is represented through frequent recourse to the imagery of hell, a common 
feature of A-bomb and Holocaust testimonies. 
However, the idea that the events of World War Il acted as a trigger for the 
development of a testimonial genre is subject to challenge. Whilst Eaglestone has 
contended that "literary, historical and philosophical writing since 1945 are involved 
in a new genre, testimony, with its own form, its own generic rules, its own 
presuppositions, " literary antecedents of this genre can be located in pre- 1945 writing 
(7). Deborah Pearson, for example, has noted narrative characteristics which can 
identified as testimonial in nature in accounts of World War 1. The struggle to 
represent the experience of trauma as discussed in this thesis is also often 
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encountered in WWI narratives. Pearson refers to the common "problem of 
articulation" (177) and describes the eye-witness accounts of soldiers engaged in 
trench warfare as "shell-shocked, " the fragmented structure of the narrative reflecting 
precisely the traumatised conditions of the returning soldiers (187). A further 
comparative example can be found at the end of Erich Maria Remarque's classic 
account of World War I, All Quiet on the Western Front. In common with many 
Holocaust and A-bomb survivors, he asserts that: 
And men will not understand us-for the generation that grew up before 
us, though it has passed these years with us already had a home and a 
calling; now it will return to its old occupations and the war will be 
forgotten - and the generation that has grown up after us will be 
strange to us and push us aside. We will be superfluous even to 
ourselves, we will grow older, a few will adapt themselves, some 
others will merely submit, and most will be bewildered; - the years will 
pass by and in the end we shall fall into ruin. (190) 
This passage reveals his conviction that despite his testimony, those who were not 
there will not understand the truth of his experiences. His experience of trauma will 
continue to haunt him as a shadow following him through the rest of his life until it 
ends in ruin. This awareness of the inability to communicate his experiences 
effectively, and the sense of a doubled traurnatised self that lives alongside his post- 
war self is a common motif in the testimonial literature emergent from the Holocaust 
and the atomic bombings discussed in this thesis. 
These various points of commonality that exist between testimonial accounts 
of widely different events has led Tal to posit the existence of a community of trauma 
writers, connected not by a unity of experience but rather by a unified struggle to 
represent their experiences. Focussing her argument particularly on the issue of 
language and its failure to represent traumatic reality, she suggests that: 
The ability to 'read' words like terror may extend across traumas, so 
that the combat veteran of the Vietnam War responds viscerally to the 
transformed signs used by the survivor of the concentration camp since 
they miffor his or her own traumatic experience, while the non- 
traurnatised reader will come away with a different meaning altogether. 
(16) 
Not only do Tal's comments indicate the breadth of a potential canon of testimonial 
227 
literature, and suggest pathways for future research into comparative analysis and 
the testimonial genre, they also suggest a need to consider the place of testimonial 
writing within the wider categorisation of trauma literature. 
Testimony and Trauma Narratives 
George Yudice argues that a defining feature of testimony is that it must be 
written by a witness to the event, a view shared by Bernard-Donals and Glejzer who 
define testimony as "representations of witnessing" (52). However, both of these 
definitions fail to identify that which distinguishes testimony from other witness 
accounts of trauma, such as autobiography and diary. As such, these definitions 
threaten to obscure any distinctions between testimony and other forms of traumatic 
narrative. Even Tal, whose theories potentially lead to a consideration of the 
differences between testimony and trauma narratives, argues that "literature of trauma 
is defined by the identity of its author" (17). In making this assertion, Tal represents 
testimony and trauma narrative as being synonymous terms, thereby discouraging 
attempts to locate testimony as a specific genre within what I would argue is a 
broader canon of trauma narratives. 
Eaglestone sheds light on the specificity of testimony as distinct from other 
trauma narratives by arguing that the characteristics of testimony are not "a simple 
reflection of the psychology of trauma. " "Rather, " he suggests, "their tropes and 
strategies are empowered by their differences to other forms and genres of writing to 
offer - to be - testimony" (69). Testimony, then, is identified as a genre in its own 
right by its literary form, rather than only by its content. 
By comparison, the trauma narrative appears broader in its definition. Cathy 
Caruth has identified a trauma narrative as "the narrative of a belated experience. " It 
is through the latent acknowledgement of trauma that the traumatic event is finally 
experienced. At the heart of the story of trauma, Caruth asserts, "is the oscillation 
between a crisis ofdeath and the correlative crisis oflifie: between the story of the 
unbearable nature of an event, and the story of the unbearable nature of its survival" 
(Unclaimed Experience 7). The trauma narrative is then, perhaps, more accurately a 
literature of crisis, identified by the fact that it deals with the irreconcilable nature of 
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experiencing and witnessing. Trauma narrative is then, to borrow Eaglstone's 
terminology, the "reflection of the experience of trauma. " The different literary forms 
that this reflection adopts then determine whether a text is most appropriately 
identified as, for example, a testimonial trauma narrative, or an autobiographical 
trauma narrative. 
Concluding Comments 
The intention of this thesis has been to perform a comparative analysis of the 
testimonial literature emergent from the Holocaust and atomic bombings. Through 
the identification of commonalities and differences between the two literatures, I have 
sought to move closer towards a definition of testimony as a distinct literary genre. 
Certainly, it has been possible to establish certain shared features, such as the urge to 
tell the tale juxtaposed with the inability to communicate the experience of trauma, 
the fragmentation of the experiential and narratorial selves, and the thematic and 
stylistic concerns dealt with in narratives written by both men and women. By 
drawing together these features, it has been possible to develop an understanding not 
only of what constitutes testimony, but crucially also how it differs from other forms 
of life writing and trauma narratives. 
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